Q&A: Jewish Law and Morality – A Double Obligation
Jewish Law and Morality – A Double Obligation
Question
Rabbi Michi, hello,
I would like to ask about the analysis in the third book of the trilogy, part two, chapter 5, regarding contradictions between Jewish law and morality.
If I understood your approach correctly, morality is a universal normative category that obligates every person simply by virtue of being human. Beyond that, since the obligation of the moral imperative can be explained only on the basis of a divine command, it can in practice be regarded as part of the revelation of God's will. Jewish law is the particular normative demand made of Jews, built as a second story above the universal obligation.
In your analysis in that chapter, you reject approaches that identify morality with Jewish law, and you advocate a normative duality in which a Jew who is obligated by Jewish law is at the same time also obligated by universal morality. According to your analysis, when a substantive contradiction occurs (and not a circumstantial one) between the systems, Jewish law prevails, because it is clear that the Holy One, blessed be He, who is the source of both systems, intended to instruct us that the religious value overrides the moral one (in this context you mention the mechanism of “a transgression for its own sake” as an exceptional possibility of acting in accordance with morality against Jewish law).
I would like to challenge the conclusion that in a substantive conflict between Jewish law and morality, Jewish law prevails, and to suggest an alternative approach. I would be glad for your response.
- If Jewish law is a system of particular norms situated above a universal system, it is not clear how it can exempt us from the universal obligation (in earlier chapters you gave examples of parallel legal systems that obligate us simultaneously. In all those examples, the particular systems cannot release us from obligation to a broader system, and in a case of conflict they are set aside)?
- As I understand it from the way the arguments were conceptualized, one cannot find within the halakhic system itself a binding source for dealing with a conflict with an outside system that is also absolutely binding and also of divine origin. If this is a matter of reasoning, why not adopt the opposite reasoning, namely that a person's moral condition after the giving of the Torah cannot be lower than it was before it.
- Perhaps one could propose a model according to which morality, as an expression of God's will, is absolutely binding, and a contradiction between it and other expressions of God's will cannot exist. When we identify a substantive contradiction, an interpretive move is required—a change in the circumstances of the halakhic situation or in the moral judgment—that turns the substantive contradiction into a circumstantial one. Similar to what was done in Meiri's approach regarding the status of the non-Jew (and perhaps even by the Sages regarding the stubborn and rebellious son?), one could also argue this regarding the status of women, LGBT people, mamzerim, etc. (women are not the same women, and moral norms too have changed since the giving of the Torah). In this way, when the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded, for example, a priest to divorce his wife who had been raped, the religious value was a-moral. With the change in attitude toward the rape of women, toward the status of women in general, toward the institution of marriage, toward conceptions of couplehood, and so on, the realization of that religious value became immoral. Adopting such a model would require significant halakhic changes, but it seems to me that throughout the book you demonstrated that suitable tools exist for this.
- In the above proposal I am not sliding into a position that identifies Jewish law with morality; these are still two different categories, and religious values are still different from moral values. But we are not obligated to realize religious values that are immoral.
- It is possible, admittedly, to propose the explanation that in a case of conflict, serving God means suspending moral judgment—the binding of Isaac model. I did not see in the book that you tend toward an explanation of that kind.
Thank you
Answer
I did not understand the whole concept. It is entirely built on the claim that it is unclear how Jewish law overrides the moral obligation. But the question has no basis to begin with. You yourself noted that I explained this by saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, who is the source of both systems, expressed His will by commanding the relevant law in the Torah.
Discussion on Answer
That was already clear to me before. But I do not understand why not assume that if something is written in the Torah, then the Holy One, blessed be He, intends that we do it, even if there is a moral price. He also knows that, and nevertheless He commanded it. Moreover, you assume that it is always possible to work things out through interpretation. But if that were possible, I would do that according to my view as well. The question is what to do when it is not possible.
I do not assume the priority of God's word in the Torah over God's word in morality because:
A. There is greater uncertainty in halakhic interpretation than in the moral command (of course, when we are speaking about cases in which the moral judgment is clear, and most of the examples you bring are of that kind)
B. The theological and emotional price of doing an immoral act in order to realize a religious value is, in my eyes, higher than the price of not realizing the religious value
C. I have no logical way to decide how the Holy One, blessed be He, truly wants us to act, since He seemingly gave contradictory commands, and so I turn to intuition, and that usually guides me to prefer morality
D. After the giving of the Torah, were things made more lenient rather than more stringent?
E. It is not clear to me why not assume that if the Holy One, blessed be He, gave a moral command, He intends that we fulfill it even if He knows that this contradicts the halakhic command (in a certain interpretation of it, and not always a necessary one).
You are right that I do indeed assume that it is always possible to work things out with interpretation and with the many tools you detailed in the book. The literature is full of examples of radical changes from the Torah's plain rulings. When there is a will there is a way. The question is one of religious agenda and of choosing which system, among those that express God's will, is given priority.
Fine, I can only repeat what I wrote. Apparently we do not agree.
Indeed, we do not agree. But the purpose of writing to you was not to test agreement, but to understand whether there are additional reasons beyond the above for your choice to prefer Jewish law in situations of substantive conflict with morality, and whether my arguments for the opposite position hold water. In any case, thank you—the dialogue helped me define my position.
He did indeed command that particular law, on condition that it not contradict what He commanded in universal morality—that is the concept.
And to clarify the question again: why do you choose to prefer God's word in the Torah over God's word in morality? On its face, I would have thought the opposite, because according to your view it comes out in practice that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us in certain circumstances to be immoral.
The alternative proposal for resolving the contradiction is this: the content of the moral obligation changes over the generations; what may have been a categorical command in the past cannot be so today, and the interpretation of the Torah's words also undergoes changes (the issue of non-Jews, for example). Therefore, at the time it was commanded there was no substantive contradiction. The contradiction arose as a result of changed circumstances, the moral command was updated, and halakhic interpretation less so. Jewish law does not have to express moral values, but responding to God's word in morality obligates us to adapt Jewish law so that it does not contradict it.
I hope I made myself clear.