Q&A: Jewish Law and Morality: Are There Moral Commandments in the Torah?
Jewish Law and Morality: Are There Moral Commandments in the Torah?
Question
Good morning,
A post was published on the blog "Young Rabbi" about whether there are moral commandments in the Torah, and this is what it says:
The second part of Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham’s third book in his trilogy, "Walking Among the Standing," deals with "Jewish Law and Morality: A Dual Commitment." In the fifth chapter, "Jewish Law and Morality," he discusses cases in which there is a contradiction between Jewish law and morality. For example: not saving a non-Jew on the Sabbath. The questions he asks are (p. 79): "Is it possible that the Torah is not moral? What should someone do in such cases if he is committed both to Jewish law and to morality? Is it even possible to be seriously committed to both of these systems?"
A believing Jew may relate to morality in one of three ways:
1. To see Jewish law as the true representative of morality.
2. There really is no such thing as morality to which we are obligated; we are obligated only to Jewish law.
3. "Normative duality." That is, we are obligated both to morality and to Jewish law, and both are the will of God.
According to the first approach, we would need to find explanations for how it is nevertheless moral not to save a non-Jew on the Sabbath, or to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and the like.
But beyond that, it is not clear how the Torah can command, "And you shall do what is good and right." According to this approach, is there a "good and right" that is not part of Jewish law and the Torah itself? Commandments of this kind teach us that there is a "good and right" that is universal, and the religious command only comes to add to it.
This question is also difficult for those who advocate the second approach. Beyond that, how can the Holy One, blessed be He, come with complaints against Cain for murdering Abel, or how can one be a scoundrel within the permission of the Torah?
According to the third approach, there are moral principles that all human beings are commanded in, and beyond them there are religious commandments whose observance serves additional purposes.
According to this approach, when there is a commandment that is not moral there is no difficulty here, but rather a religious principle that determines that sometimes the moral principle must be set aside in favor of another principle.
But according to this approach, one must ask what sense there is in the Torah commanding commandments that are moral commandments. For example, the prohibition of murder is a moral obligation. If the commandments of the Torah are a legal system parallel to the moral principles that all human beings are obligated in, why is there also a need for the Torah to command moral principles?
You can read Rabbi Michael Abraham’s answer in the attached image.
According to him, Jewish law does not deal with the moral aspect of the commandment/prohibition, but with the halakhic aspect, which is added to the moral aspect.
In the summary of the chapter, the author writes as follows (p. 100):
"We have seen that the correct model for the relationship between Jewish law and morality is a picture of normative duality. In this picture, laws of type A are also categorically distinct from the parallel moral commandments. I explained that the commandment 'You shall not murder' adds a religious dimension to the moral prohibition. One could argue that this is a commandment with other purposes beyond the moral one. The moral prohibition of murder has a moral purpose, whereas the halakhic prohibition has some religious purposes. But it is very reasonable to say that the reason for the religious prohibition is also moral, except that the halakhic command comes to add a religious dimension to the moral prohibition itself. The religious dimension added by the command is the command itself and the demand for obedience. The Torah seeks to add a religious command to the moral prohibition against murder."
That is the end of the summary of Rabbi Michael Abraham’s words.
These things did not sit well with me.
First, why not simply say that the Torah indeed commands moral commandments as well (not that it determines what is moral, but that it also commands moral commandments, such as "You shall not murder" and "You shall not steal," and also religious commandments, such as the Sabbath, kashrut, and niddah)? This would be similar to a law code that also defines immoral prohibitions as illegal, but does not determine what is moral and what is not. On the other hand, a law code also does not define every immoral thing as legally forbidden.
In a law code too there is a difference between what is moral and the boundary that can be enforced legally. Again, I do not see any difference here between the discussion of Jewish law and the same discussion that could be had about secular law.
Beyond that, the answer Rabbi Michael Abraham gives is not at all clear. According to him, morality is the will of God, and the commandment is the command of God. But what is the practical meaning of the fact that I transgressed both the will of God and the command of God? What is the meaning of that religious aspect that joins the universal human moral aspect? Does it have any meaning at all?
Source: http://ravtzair.blogspot.com/2021/01/blog-post.html?m=1
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=3712785235411486&id=237561492933895
Answer
Hello,
I divided Jewish law into three categories: "moral" laws, "anti-moral" laws, and "a-moral" laws. I argued that all three categories are unrelated to morality and come to achieve religious goals. As far as I understand, he disagrees only with my determination regarding the first category. In my view, that is the smaller novelty in what I wrote, and I’m glad the rest is agreed upon. But even on this point, in my opinion the writer is mistaken, as I will explain.
In my book, regarding this category I brought two kinds of arguments: 1. There is no need to command moral laws if we know them even without the command, especially if the Holy One, blessed be He, expects this of us even without a command (see Cain and Abel). It is no coincidence that "And you shall do what is right and good"—the expectation that we behave morally—is not counted among the commandments by any of those who enumerate the commandments. 2. The parameters of the "moral" commandments do not match morality. For example, in discussions regarding murder, there are cases like one who restricts and brings the matter near to fire, and where the sun will eventually come, and so on. And regarding one who causes damage, there is an exemption for indirect causation, etc. None of these are relevant on the moral plane. Is someone who murdered with his left hand or indirectly less of a criminal than someone who murdered directly with his own hands? There is no difference at all. In both cases he intended to murder and performed an action that took a life. The difference is only formal. My argument is that indirect causation is only a halakhic exemption, but the moral wickedness remains exactly as it is (that is, there is no religious transgression here, only a moral one). It is true that one who causes damage indirectly is exempt under human law but liable under the law of Heaven, but that itself is a distinction within the halakhic category. One who causes damage indirectly is morally wicked exactly like one who causes damage directly. And it is no coincidence that Meiri wrote in the name of Ba'al HaHashlama that the liability by the hand of Heaven in the topic of indirect causation does not come to say that there is a prohibition, but that there is an obligation to pay—except that it is by the hand of Heaven and not by a religious court. According to my approach, this is interpreted very well: it is a moral obligation, and therefore it is not collected in a religious court.
And two comments on what the critic himself wrote:
- He argues that in a law code too there is a difference between the boundary for which one can impose liability and the boundary where something is merely undesirable. But the distinctions in Jewish law do not overlap with that boundary. After all, no law code exempts in cases of indirect causation, does it? It is no less problematic than one who causes damage directly, so I do not see why one should not impose liability. What boundary was not crossed here? Not to mention one who kills indirectly, or by preventing someone from getting out of water or fire, etc.
- The writer argues that the Torah itself has moral purposes. But that is no different from what I wrote. Let me translate: in immoral acts there is also a problem in the religious aspect. What is the difference between these statements? At the end of the day, you violated God’s command beyond the moral problem involved. The writer himself says that the Torah added a command, meaning that a moral principle without a command would not have been a commandment, and the command turned it into a commandment (a positive commandment or a prohibition). That is exactly what I am saying.
As for the question at the end—what practical difference is there between the two kinds of problems? I answered that too: in those situations where there is only a moral problem and not a religious one (robbing a non-Jew, murder or damage by indirect causation), there is still a prohibition. As Rabbi Shimon Shkop wrote, robbing a non-Jew is completely forbidden according to all opinions on the moral plane. To violate a written oath (which did not have formal verbal declaration) is a full prohibition even without there being a command. And of course there is a practical difference regarding punishment (punishment is given only for the religious transgression, and the proof is that one is not punished for situations where there is only a moral problem, as I demonstrated above here). But beyond that, why does there have to be a practical difference? The Torah tells us that this is the truth: that these acts involve both a moral problem and a religious one.