Q&A: Jewish Law and Rationale
Jewish Law and Rationale
Question
*Question:*
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Shalom Dr. Michael Abraham,
I looked into your remarks regarding the authority of Jewish law and morality, especially your claim (for example in your book *God Plays Dice*, p. 273ff.) that autonomous moral judgment can at times stand above a halakhic obligation, or at least undermine it—and that a clear moral obligation overrides an incomprehensible halakhic commandment, in the name of rationality and conscience.
Your words seem difficult, at first glance, to reconcile with substantial sources (and sufficiently authoritative ones..) in the tradition:
A. Maimonides, at the end of the laws of Me’ilah (8:8), writes that one should not speculate about the reasons for the commandments, and that even those which appear to lack reason are a “decree of the King,” which one may not nullify or be lenient with. It would seem from his words that even if they appear immoral—that is not a reason to reject them.
B. Nachmanides (Leviticus 19:2) writes that “You shall be holy” means going beyond what reason requires, and submitting to the spirit of the Torah, even in matters that are not understood.
C. In the well-known Talmudic passage (Kiddushin 31a), it is told of Dama ben Netina that he did not violate the commandment of honoring his father—even when it seemed to conflict with a consideration of great profit.
D. Rashi (Numbers 19:2): “This is the statute of the Torah”—because Satan and the nations of the world taunt Israel, saying: “What is this commandment, and what reason is there for it?” therefore it is written of it as a statute: it is a decree from before Me; you have no permission to question it. Solomon too said about this section, “I said: I will become wise, but it was far from me” (Ecclesiastes 7:23).
Does your approach not carry the danger of subjective motivation leading to the rejection of every halakhic law in the name of “private conscience”? And is there not in this—even if unintentionally—a complete mixing of partial and relative human judgment with the word of God?
How do you reconcile the contradiction between your approach and the idea that the Torah is absolute truth even when it transcends our understanding?
Does your argument imply that you are not subject at all to anyone’s words (and that is the paradox in showing sources—as I am doing—when part of the claim is that you are not subject to them..)
With respect and appreciation,
Moshe Jami
Answer
What you quote from my remarks is not familiar to me. I do not think that a moral obligation necessarily overrides a halakhic obligation (I did not understand why it matters whether it is understood or not. I am not sure there are any halakhic obligations that are really understood at all). What I argue is that in sufficiently extreme cases, it may be that a halakhic obligation is overridden. And I further argue that the decision about what overrides what is not handed over to Jewish law, but to the person himself, since this is an extra-moral dilemma.
A. These words of Maimonides do not touch on my claims in any way. Also because he himself explicitly writes in many places that all the commandments have reasons, and in his view they can generally also be understood. But even without that, the fact that they have no reason does not mean they cannot be overridden.
B. What does that have to do with it? Following the “spirit of the Torah” is an expectation of the Torah, just like explicit commandments. And like them, it too can be overridden in the face of a moral principle.
C. Does one example prove anything? Especially since this is about a commandment versus profit. What does that have to do with a commandment versus morality?
D. Again, you brought one example of a commandment that is a statute. From that itself you should infer that for most commandments the situation is different.
In short, none of these sources has anything to do with what I am saying. If you want to learn more about my approach to the relationship between Jewish law and morality, you can search here on the site and in the lecture series I gave. I dealt with all this in much greater detail in many places.
Even if there is a danger, that is the truth. Dangers do not determine what the truth is. After understanding what the truth is, one can think about how to deal with dangers. I also do not see a danger here, because anyone can also simply not observe Jewish law at all if he wants. Someone who wants to observe Jewish law and is not looking for excuses will override Jewish law only in extreme cases, and that is indeed what should be done. So what danger do you see here? On the contrary, in the prevailing approach the danger is that people will not fulfill the command of morality because in their view Jewish law always takes precedence. I do not understand why people always see the danger on the side I am talking about and not on the opposite side. Why is a halakhic danger more important than a moral danger?
I do not know what the idea means that the Torah is absolute truth whether it transcends our understanding or not (what does one have to do with the other). The Torah is absolute truth and morality is also absolute truth. The question is what one does when there are clashes between them. When saving a life overrides the Sabbath, does that mean one of them is not absolute truth? What does that have to do with anything?
In short, this question is full of conceptual confusions, and because of them all the sources that were brought are also irrelevant to the discussion.