I’ve now also seen this here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%90-%D7%AA%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A8

“In my opinion, the rabbinic interpretation according to which these are examples of a general authority is certainly reasonable”

So they just happened, by pure chance, to give as examples only matters between one person and another?

“Between lesion and lesion” in its plain sense means injuries and bodily harm, as the plain-meaning commentators say.
It’s like in the verse —

“And the Lord said to Moses, Yet one plague more will I bring upon Pharaoh and upon Egypt; afterward he will send you away from here. When he lets you go, he will surely drive you out from here altogether.”

But let’s say, as you say, that it refers to a leprous lesion, impure or pure… that still strengthens my argument. Because a leprous lesion is exceptional among the commandments between man and God, since the priest already received special authority on this subject:
“And the priest shall look at the lesion in the skin of the flesh, and if the hair in the lesion has turned white and the appearance of the lesion is deeper than the skin of his flesh, it is a leprous lesion; and the priest shall look at him and pronounce him impure.”

“When a person has on the skin of his flesh a swelling, or a scab, or a bright spot, and it becomes on the skin of his flesh a leprous lesion, then he shall be brought to Aaron the priest, or to one of his sons the priests.”

And since when do we derive the rule from an exceptional detail? The very fact that they brought lesion as an example and not any other commandment is a migo argument. After all, if they had brought a commandment like fringes, then we could have made an a fortiori argument to lesions (about which explicit authority had already been given to the priest earlier).

You wrote there:
“It seems to me that such an interpretation of the verses is not far-fetched, since it says there ‘according to all that they instruct you,’ and perhaps ‘all’ comes to include all their instructions.”

It says “according to all,” not “from all.” And there is a difference, because “according to all” speaks about specific things, while “from all” speaks about everything. In other words, the simple meaning of the verses is: do as they told you regarding what you asked about.
Because the verses say —
“And you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the matter of judgment.”
And then —
“And you shall do according to the word that they tell you.”

That means that what they say is the matter of judgment. So the verses are not discussing at all what happens if they say something unrelated to judgment. And again, you can try to make overly subtle textual inferences, but there’s a strong migo claim here, because the Torah could have written briefly and much more clearly that this refers to the whole Torah (+ decrees that violate “do not add”).

I answered everything. You are making derashot and raising difficulties. We have a tradition that one resolves with difficulty, but does not raise objections with difficulty.
Your interpretation of the verses is strained, and I do not understand how you can raise objections on its basis. “Between blood and blood and between law and law and between lesion and lesion” means everything. “Between blood and blood” is prohibition and permission, “between lesion and lesion” is impurity, and only at the end: “matters of dispute in your gates,” meaning quarrels between one person and another. According to this, “between blood” and “between law” are not necessarily matters between one person and another, since that is stated in “matters of dispute.” Rather, they can also be different kinds of laws.
In short, I don’t see any problem.

A strained interpretation?? Pot, meet kettle…

Here are Nachmanides’ words:
“‘Matters of dispute’ — that the sages of the city disagree about the matter, one declaring impure and the other pure, one obligating and the other acquitting; this is Rashi’s language, and it is the view of Onkelos. But this is not correct. Rather, according to the midrashic interpretation (Sifrei Shoftim 152): ‘between blood and blood’ — between the blood of menstruation, the blood of childbirth, and the blood of discharge; ‘between law and law’ — between monetary law, capital law, and the law of lashes; ‘between lesion and lesion’ — between lesions of people, houses, and garments; ‘matters of dispute’ — the ordeal of the suspected adulteress, the breaking of the heifer’s neck, and the purification of the leper… But according to its plain meaning, ‘between blood and blood,’ etc., means between cases of homicide, or monetary law, or wound and injury — all matters of dispute that may arise in your gates…"

“Matters of dispute” is the general rule, and before it came examples. This is a familiar structure in the Torah, for example:

“Fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he has inflicted a blemish upon a person, so shall it be inflicted upon him.”

What does the last line add if the Torah already spelled out the examples? One can understand that it is the general rule, and what came before were only examples to explain and simplify. Same here. How is the interpretation that Nachmanides says is the plain meaning somehow “strained”??

The word “law” in the Bible does not describe the laws of commandments; it describes the judgment of one person against another (or its final result, meaning the verdict).

And I also brought this verse as evidence —
“And the Levitical priests shall approach, for the Lord your God has chosen them to serve Him and to bless in the name of the Lord, and by their word shall every dispute and every lesion be decided.”

And I’ll bring further support from the adjacent passage about the king:

“Now when he sits on the throne of his kingdom, he shall write for himself in a book a copy of this Torah from before the Levitical priests.
And it shall be with him, and he shall read in it all the days of his life, so that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Torah and these statutes, to do them,
so that his heart not be lifted up above his brothers, and so that he not deviate from the commandment to the right or to the left; in order that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his sons, in the midst of Israel…”

Interesting to see that the king needs nothing more than reading the book of the Torah in order to learn the commandment without deviating from it right or left… If that is true for him, why shouldn’t it be true for everyone else?
You can say he is an exception that does not testify to the rule, but then you need to accept what I said earlier about bringing proof from the case of leprous lesions. And you’ll also have to prove that he really is an exception that doesn’t testify to the rule, because I can say there’s an a fortiori argument, since he is under much greater pressure not to do the will of God (“lest his heart turn aside…”)

You don’t raise objections from “one can understand.”
We’ve exhausted this.

“One can understand” is how Nachmanides understood it and said that this is the meaning according to the plain sense.

I brought several sources that prove that the meaning of the verses and the words in the verse is as I and Nachmanides say. But you only raise possibilities and bring no proof at all for your interpretation.

Does the Rabbi dispute that the meaning of the verses —
“Fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he has inflicted a blemish upon a person, so shall it be inflicted upon him”
—is examples followed by the general rule?
Because really it’s not just “one can understand,” but “one must understand” (sorry for the understatement).

If from “one must understand” we don’t raise objections, then certainly from “one can understand” we don’t make claims. Such as the claim that certain human beings have authority to rule over God’s Torah, including killing anyone who does not obey them.

I also add to the list of proofs the verse “Do not follow the majority for evil.” Certainly acting against the will of God is evil; if that’s not evil, then I don’t know what is. Therefore even if 99% of the rabbis think the will of God is x, and I think it is y (for rational reasons, of course), then by force of that verse I am obligated to act according to my own view.

And likewise the standard proof, I guess —
“For this commandment which I command you today is not too wondrous for you, nor is it far off. It is not in heaven, that you should say, ‘Who will go up to heaven for us and bring it to us and make us hear it, that we may do it?’ Nor is it beyond the sea, that you should say, ‘Who will cross the sea for us and bring it to us and make us hear it, that we may do it?’ But the matter is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to do it.”

I have to say that A.B. proved his point. I didn’t expect such contempt and lack of clear answers from the Rabbi. Indeed, you are right, A.B. The verse simply gives no one any authority over God’s Torah. It’s so simple and true, and whoever doesn’t see it is deceiving himself, so good luck to him.

Sorry for raising this exchange from the dead. I just wanted to see what A.B.’s answer would be.
First of all, to claim that “lesion” means injuries and bodily harm on the basis of one verse, when there are so many verses whose meaning is that lesion means leprosy, is not the plain sense.
Second, maybe there is a difficulty with Nachmanides, but who says we have to accept Nachmanides’ plain sense? “Between blood and blood” sounds much more reasonable as talking about impure and pure blood, not murder (what is there to distinguish between blood and blood? If someone was murdered, between which bloods am I supposed to distinguish? There’s only the victim’s blood).
Third, just because there is another case in which there are examples followed by rules does not mean it is always like that.
Fourth, afterward the Torah writes another verse: “According to the Torah that they instruct you and according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do; you shall not deviate from the word that they tell you, right or left.” Here there is certainly a general commandment (to listen to them in the whole Torah), otherwise this is excessive redundancy.
Fifth, your argument is even stranger. If the Torah commanded the killing of someone, then obviously there will be a religious court that carries it out and decides when one really kills and when, according to the Torah, one does not kill. According to your view, would everyone just murder however he sees fit, and every Sabbath desecrator or homosexual should be killed even without a religious court? Obviously there has to be authority.
Sixth, if you think God’s will is to keep the Torah, then He commanded listening to the Sanhedrin, so your argument doesn’t really get off the ground. (If you don’t think God’s will is to keep the Torah, then you don’t need the verse at all.)
Seventh, obviously everyone has to learn and keep the Torah. The question is who instructs the Jewish law of what to do in practice so there won’t be anarchy. But certainly everyone has to learn and keep the Torah. Have you seen any society that studies Torah more than religious people do?
As for the king, what does that have to do with it? In addition to what everyone needs, the king also has to carry a Torah scroll with him constantly so that his heart will not turn aside because he is king.

1. “Lesion” in plain language just means a wound/injury. And when they talk about leprosy they explicitly say “a leprous lesion” (a lesion of the leprosy type). But it really doesn’t matter if you want to say it means only leprosy, because I already addressed that: that would be an exception that proves the rule and would only strengthen my claim.
“And the Levitical priests shall approach, for the Lord your God has chosen them to serve Him and to bless in the name of the Lord, and by their word shall every dispute and every lesion be decided.” Again: dispute and lesion. Only those things. Why not the whole Torah? According to your view it should have said “and by their word shall every matter of commandment and Torah be decided,” or something like that.

2. Impure and pure blood? Why would you even want to know whether the blood is impure or pure? When are we ever interested in knowing whether blood is pure? You’re really straining hard to create a difficulty against Maimonides.
Listen, it takes a lot of nerve in an argument about the authority of the sages to casually brush aside, with weak claims like these, the interpretation that Nachmanides insisted was the plain sense.
But if that’s your opinion, then please… you won’t listen to Nachmanides, and I won’t listen to any rabbi. Deal?
In Deuteronomy, blood always talks about murders.
Besides, the opening line is: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you.” Judgment… what does impure and pure blood have to do with a court?
“Blood” can be a synonym for murder. Then the meaning is simply to distinguish between types of killings.
Or it really means blood, and then the meaning is simply to distinguish whether it is blood spilled accidentally/by damage, justified bloodshed or not.

If the Torah wanted to say what you are trying to force into its mouth, it could have done so much more simply. Like “between the impure and the pure”…
Many times in the Torah it speaks about all the laws of Jewish law as such. Never in this way.
For some reason specifically here, where it matters most, it was precise in my direction. And it used expressions that fit matters between one person and another, instead of the much more standard and general expressions it could have used, which don’t sound like harming others (teachings, commandments, statutes, instead of blood, law, lesions, and disputes). Nachmanides understood that too. Anyone with minimal intellectual honesty will admit it.

3. Here it is like that. It is exactly the same structure. You are trying hard to ignore the significance of that structure.

4. You forgot the context.
Before that: “And you shall come to the Levitical priests and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the matter of judgment.”
They tell you the matter of judgment that you had a difficulty about. That is what they tell you. And that is what you need to do. It is not speaking at all about a case where they say something unrelated to judgment.

And notice:
“According to the Torah that they instruct you and according to the judgment that they tell you…”
And according to the judgment.
That means they gave you Torah about a specific judgment.
And that is what you need to do. The Torah is deliberately precise that it is not talking about other things, but about that same judgment at the beginning, which falls under the matters mentioned above. So that their authority should not exceed its domain and become a dictatorship over all areas of life and Jewish law.

5. There is no human authority in matters between man and God. That’s what I’m claiming. What does that mean regarding Sabbath desecrators? Apparently it means they cannot be killed where there is a dispute. A conclusion that doesn’t seem terrible to me at all.

6. But in my opinion He did not command listening to them in matters between man and God. And here we have a dispute on the plain meaning at the very point of this authority: I and Nachmanides think this way, and you think otherwise. So what do we do? Do you want me to give up my opinion just because maybe you are the majority? (Depends who you count.)

7. There is anarchy anyway… Rabbi Michi also ultimately supports autonomy in Jewish law. And today we are in halakhic anarchy. For example, Haredi rabbis say that one may not listen at all to Peninei Halakha. So what is an Orthodox person supposed to do? The responsibility is on him, whether he likes it or not, to choose whom to listen to. Luckily there is no Sanhedrin. This anarchy seems wonderful to me. Otherwise Judaism would be even more ossified than it is today. And religious people would have even less capacity for critical thinking, because they’d simply be told what to think and how and what to do. And whoever dared to do what really seems to him to be the will of God would get hit for it… deeply dystopian, and a severe blow to human free choice.

Nice. I didn’t expect I’d actually get an answer.
1. “Lesion” may be a wound; maybe that’s a more precise definition than bodily harm (because then it indeed includes the leprous lesion too).
Honestly, what you’re saying is relatively convincing.
2. I didn’t understand what the problem is. In order to decide whether people are impure or pure. And what kind of impurity they have, whether discharge or menstruation, etc.
What is written in Deuteronomy is not proof. Blood is mentioned many times in the Torah, so focusing only on specific places where blood is mentioned is not serious.
Okay, that’s a somewhat more serious difficulty, though even here I’m not sure it’s right. After all, you immediately take “judgment” into the context of matters between people. “Judgment” is also brought many times in the context of doing something in the proper way; maybe that is the plain sense here: if you forgot how to do something correctly in the listed cases, then go up to the Sanhedrin.
I thought about this explanation regarding homicide laws, and maybe it is indeed correct.
It said it in its own words.
What are the other cases where the Torah speaks about all of Jewish law?
3. You’re taking advantage of my lack of Torah knowledge, but I assume one can compare this to other things.
4. Until now I felt I was a bit occupied with apologetics; now I really feel I have the upper hand. According to your view, the Torah is basically confusing us with all kinds of unnecessary verses.
Let’s look at the whole passage:
“If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you, between blood and blood, between law and law, and between lesion and lesion, matters of disputes in your gates, then you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose. And you shall come to the Levitical priests and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the matter of judgment. And you shall do according to the word that they tell you from that place which the Lord shall choose; and you shall be careful to do according to all that they instruct you. According to the Torah that they instruct you and according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do; you shall not deviate from the word that they tell you, right or left.”
According to what you write, verses 10 and 11 say the same thing. But if we go even with your explanation of verse 8, that it really refers to matters between one person and another, then that continues until verse 10. Then in verse 11 there is a turn: “according to the Torah and according to the judgment” — implying that these are two different things, and in addition to judgment one must also listen to the Torah they say. Which, even by your view, would mean matters between man and God. And everything falls neatly into place.
5. What difference does it make whether it seems terrible to you or not? The Torah wrote, “those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death,” and one who commits sexual immorality or idolatry should die. If there is no court meant to deal with this and decide when they die, what exactly is the Torah commanding? That its own commandment not actually be fulfilled? (Apparently that’s the case nowadays, but only because there is no Sanhedrin; once there is a Sanhedrin, in extreme cases the commandment will indeed be fulfilled.) That everyone should murder his fellow because he suspects him of desecrating the Sabbath?
6. No. Because you need to persuade that this is the meaning of the verses.
7. Indeed, unfortunately despite the writing down of the Talmud (which seemingly was supposed to prevent anarchy), nowadays anarchy has arisen, and in the language of the sages, “the Torah has become two Torahs.” In my humble opinion this is something shocking, which de facto divides the Jewish people into several parts.

2. Do you go to court to determine whether this blood is menstrual blood or discharge blood? Why is specifically that mentioned, that specific example and not some other law in the Torah that doesn’t sound like harming another person?
Meaning, even if we grant that one can interpret “between blood and blood” as about menstrual/discharge blood, although that is extremely strained (what does going to the Sanhedrin for menstrual/discharge blood have to do with anything? It’s way too random a law to be what is meant here), or as about homicide laws as I say, the very fact that the Torah chose to describe it this way and not in a much simpler and more general way according to your claim, like “between the impure and the pure,” means you are in serious trouble.

The other times “blood” is mentioned are mostly sacrifices. Plain “blood,” outside the context of sacrifices, always or almost always speaks about murders, so that is the default in our case. Certainly when you look at the context, which is the book of Deuteronomy generally, but even just in general.

For example, it could have said (as it already says elsewhere):
“To distinguish between the impure and the pure, and between the animal that may be eaten and the animal that may not be eaten.”
That is already ten times more general than distinguishing between menstrual blood and discharge blood.
Or: “And to distinguish between the holy and the common, and between the impure and the pure. And to instruct the children of Israel in all the statutes that the Lord spoke to them by Moses.”
Or “between the forbidden and the permitted.” And the ending too should have been different, not “matters of dispute,” but “in all the matters that the Lord commanded Israel,” or something similar.

By the way, a verse from Ezekiel supports me:
“Make the chain, for the land is full of bloody judgment and the city is full of violence.”
From here we see that “judgment of bloods” comes together with violence, meaning these are offenses between one person and another. “Judgment of bloods” is simply judgment concerning murders, as Nachmanides said. Unless here too you want to interpret it as judgment about menstrual/discharge blood?..

And you are ignoring the additional proof I brought —
“And the Levitical priests shall approach, for the Lord your God has chosen them to serve Him and to bless in the name of the Lord, and by their word shall every dispute and every lesion be decided.”
Why only dispute and lesion?

I don’t know if I mentioned this verse already —
“You shall not follow the majority to do evil, nor shall you testify in a dispute to incline after the majority to pervert.”
It is forbidden to incline after the majority toward evil, and forbidden to incline after the majority in court (in a dispute).
It’s just interesting that one second the Torah is individualistic and demands that you not listen to the majority opinion, and then the next second says that if you don’t listen to the elite regarding your personal matter opposite God they can kill you — and even if in your view they are wrong and what they demand from you is evil, you still have to do it.

4. That “and” is an added condition. Meaning, it is Torah regarding a specific judgment. And proof of this is that everything here is written in the singular: “Torah” and “word,” not “Torahs” and “words.”
The whole introduction comes to cancel your understanding: “and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the matter of judgment… you shall not deviate from the word that they tell you, right or left.”
What they told you is the specific matter of judgment. It does not say here that they told you something on another topic and that to that too you must listen. They gave you a specific Torah regarding the judgment under discussion, and that is what you need to do.

And otherwise there is also a linguistic difficulty here.
“According to the Torah that they instruct you and according to the judgment that they tell you…”
That is really difficult in your interpretation. What does “and according to the judgment” mean? If it had said “and the matter of judgment that they tell you,” or “and according to the judgment that they tell you,” then fine. But it doesn’t say that. If you say that here it refers to two different things and not a condition, then it sounds like a completely broken sentence. They tell you Torah, and it is about the specific judgment we have been talking about from the beginning and emphasizing. “About the judgment,” not “according to the judgment.”

Even if we interpret it like you that these are two things, repetition for emphasis exists all over the Torah. So you can’t infer anything from here. Especially when we have a very distinctive opening that one has to forcefully try to convince oneself is not speaking only about a specific matter between one person and another that is why you went to them and then need to do what they said.
And according to your suggestion, it is completely unnecessary and strange that they had to emphasize at the beginning that it is about judgment between one person and another (so again, why the emphasis?) and then in half a verse write that it is actually about anything they say all the time.

5. They should, but the question is: if they do not want to, can one force them? And what if in their view they did not commit a sin? That’s the question. In my view, no. By the way, even according to your view, no… that follows from the rabbinic laws, which said that you need to hear the offender say that he knows there is a death penalty for the transgression he is committing and that he is doing it anyway.
Basically they completely uprooted the ability to punish a person on this matter.

7. And if there were a Sanhedrin, would it change anything? No. The Reform, the Haredim, the Karaites, and all the other groups that don’t belong to the Religious Zionists would simply say they don’t need to listen to a word those Sanhedrin people say because they understand nothing, and they’d cast doubt on the way they were selected.

2. If I have doubt about the law of the blood, what am I supposed to do besides go to Torah scholars? I don’t know why the Torah chose to say specifically that. Your difficulties about why the Torah chose specifically this formulation are not the kind of difficulty that one dies from; maybe it wanted to stress that even on things like these one needs to go to a religious court. Maybe because this is something where doubt is more common.
Blood is mentioned in many contexts, including menstruation and discharge. So deciding that it specifically means murder (more accurately, that blood means a person’s life in the cases you’re talking about) is not necessary.
What kind of proof is it that “judgment” is mentioned elsewhere in the context of murder law? I can bring a contrary example —
“And this shall be the due of the priests from the people, from those who offer a sacrifice, whether ox or sheep: they shall give the priest the shoulder, the two cheeks, and the stomach.”
Meaning, what one needs to do for the priests.
Indeed, you brought another proof that the priests judge only dispute and lesion; it’s just amazing to me that you forgot another verse you quoted two paragraphs above:
“And to instruct the children of Israel in all the statutes that the Lord spoke to them by Moses.”
Now say that this too refers only to disputes and lesions. As far as I know, “statutes” we would all agree means the whole Torah, and the priests were commanded to instruct the people. If that isn’t authority, I don’t know what is.
According to your interpretation of the verse “You shall not follow the majority to do evil, nor shall you testify in a dispute to incline after the majority to pervert,” it is written in a very strange way. First it says not to be after the majority for evil; then it says not to incline after the majority in court (“nor shall you testify in a dispute to incline”); so then what is the meaning of the words “after the majority to pervert”?
4. First of all, the fact that it says “Torah” and not “Torahs” proves nothing. All of Scripture is called Torah, and that includes all the commandment and all instruction, so it doesn’t need to say “Torahs.”
Actually you taught me a new plain meaning, and for that you deserve a yasher koach. Now I understand the passage better. At first the Torah really talks about matters between one person and another and common matters (lesions), and it says to listen to the priests, and then it includes everything in a more general sentence in the next verse. As you yourself said — they start with examples and move to rules.
I didn’t understand what is broken in the sentence: “according to the Torah that they instruct you and (= in addition, also) according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do.” Please explain where the sentence is broken. I specifically see here a wonderful explanation that presents exactly what I said.
5. I didn’t understand the beginning of the paragraph. In any case, according to your view I can kill a Sabbath desecrator or idol worshiper according to my own understanding, because I accept neither your authority nor that of the rabbis. Does that seem logical to you? Even if the sages made capital punishment something very hard actually to reach, they can do that if they have authority. You claim they have no authority, and basically everyone will do what is right in his own eyes (even in matters between man and God).
7. The Sanhedrin has to be accepted by all Israel; otherwise it indeed will not function as a Sanhedrin.
In any case, if you accept Chronicles as a prophetic source, then there is there a conclusive proof of authority also in matters between man and God.
“And in Jerusalem also Jehoshaphat appointed some of the Levites and priests and heads of the fathers’ houses of Israel for the judgment of the Lord and for disputes, and they returned to Jerusalem. And he commanded them, saying: Thus shall you do in the fear of the Lord, in faithfulness and with a whole heart. And every dispute that comes before you from your brothers who dwell in their cities, between blood and blood, between Torah and commandment, statutes and judgments — you shall warn them, that they not incur guilt before the Lord, and wrath come upon you and upon your brothers; thus shall you do, and you will not incur guilt.”
If that is not general language for all the commandments (including between man and God), then I don’t know what is. By the way, here it would seem that “dispute” means an argument and not necessarily a clash between one person and another.

2. If blood by default means murder in the Hebrew Bible, then here too that is the default that should be accepted. Simple interpretive logic.

“What kind of proof is it that judgment is mentioned elsewhere in the context of murder law?”
What? You mean the verse from Ezekiel? The one that explicitly says “judgment of bloods”?
Bloods.
It doesn’t just say judgment. It says judgment of b-l-o-o-d-s!!! “Between blood and blood.”
What are those bloods?
Menstrual blood?? This source is excellent proof that here too, where blood is said in the context of judgment, we are dealing with murder law. Exactly as in Ezekiel, and exactly as Nachmanides and others said.

“And to instruct the children of Israel in all the statutes that the Lord spoke to them by Moses.”
No one disputes that they have to teach these things. That is exactly their job: to teach. But not to determine them monopolistically and enforce their opinion violently. From here to authority to enforce by force of arm, up to the death penalty for their opinion in Jewish law, there is still a huge distance.
What they do have authority in is what it says about them: “And by their word shall every dispute and every lesion be decided.” By their word it shall be, because they can impose that on reality by force. But only in dispute and lesion. In all the rest of the Torah they may teach, but it will not necessarily be according to their opinion.

“And then what is the meaning of the words ‘after the majority to pervert’?”
My friend, you are falling into the trap of taking a rabbinic derash and thinking it is the plain meaning.
You divided the verse incorrectly.
There is no comma before “after the majority to pervert”; rather it is one sentence: “nor shall you testify in a dispute to incline after the majority to pervert.”

“According to your interpretation of the verse”
That is definitely not my interpretation; it is the accepted interpretation even among rabbis.
From Rashbam (a clear plain-sense commentator): “And do not answer concerning a dispute to incline after the majority to pervert (the judgment).”
And even Rashi (the most derash-oriented commentator there is): “And I say, to settle it according to its proper plain meaning, its explanation is this: … ‘nor shall you answer concerning a dispute to incline after them etc.’ — if the litigant asks you regarding that judgment, you should not answer him concerning the dispute with a word that inclines after that majority to pervert the judgment from its truth, but state the judgment as it is, and let the responsibility hang on the neck of the majority.”

My difficulty is very serious for you. You are missing the big picture and are willing to sacrifice rationality on the altar of the childish religious faith they fed you.
The fact that the Torah wrote this way and not otherwise is an argument you cannot wave away. Everything in the opening verse — from its structure to the examples chosen and the closing rule — indicates that the Torah wanted to be precise that this is about judgment between one person and another. If it could have been interpreted otherwise, Nachmanides would have done so.
By the way, Rashbam also interprets exactly as I said: “Between blood and blood — according to its plain sense: between one killing and another, between accidental and intentional.”
And Ibn Ezra:
“‘If a matter is too difficult for you’ — it speaks with the judge, regarding the testimony of two to put the condemned man to death.
And this is the meaning of ‘between blood and blood’ — between innocent blood and liable blood.
‘Between law and law’ — in monetary matters.
‘And between lesion and lesion’ — like wound and bruise. And the general rule is ‘matters of disputes.’”

And the fact that the plain meaning is hidden from you in the most essential matters of Pharisaic religion, and that the foundation of “the authority of the sages” rests on rotten chicken legs, is strong proof of how weak the rabbinic claim is, and how much concealment and midrashim are required to try to keep the seat. Even though of course these verses give no legitimacy at all to the authority of sages in our times. And “incline after the majority” too — the circular argument based on the rabbis’ famous taking it out of context — says nothing (who counts as part of the majority? Christians? Reform? And how do we determine that?).

4. The problem is that “and according to the judgment” is not something that stands on its own. If it were, then one could say the sentence without the first part and it should still be fine. But “and according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do” is a broken sentence. “According to the judgment” would have been fine, but that is not what is written…
“And according to the judgment” means that the Torah mentioned previously was stated regarding this specific judgment. Your interpretation simple doesn’t work technically.

And your interpretation effectively eliminates the need for the opening that describes exactly what kind of judgment is involved, namely matters between one person and another. Because if one has to listen to them anyway on every subject, it is very silly to add such a detailed introduction.
And again, why is the opening only about matters between one person and another?? There is no logic in that unless the Torah wants to place limits on their authority.
You haven’t gotten rid of the problems in your interpretation; you only added questions.
This interpretation is highly implausible. The Torah could and should say explicitly, and not in the broken and incidental way you suggest, that one must listen to them in everything or die.

It also doesn’t fit with what I said before about “dispute and lesion.”

5. You cannot kill according to your own judgment, because a person is not killed without trial and witnesses. According to my claim, one cannot put him on trial for that, because the court has no authority in matters between man and God, and therefore one cannot kill him. The only way it would be possible is if sins between man and God are also sins between one person and another. Meaning that the moment he commits the sin, it harms you.
But that can only be in a situation of mutual responsibility within the nation rooted in divine intervention. A plain Sabbath desecrator does not harm you in any way. But if because of him you will be expelled from the land, for example, or there will be drought (as the curses in the Torah promise), then there is justification for legal intervention.
But even that can only be in a situation where it is proven that he is harming another, and you could only do that if you had prophecy. Otherwise there is no way to prove that the guy who worked on the Sabbath harmed the nation in a way that would be legally admissible. Therefore today, when there is no prophecy, there is not even a theoretical possibility of stoning Sabbath desecrators, because how will you prove that there is still mutual responsibility today and that they are really mistaken in their interpretation of the Torah? This is also a claim that fits very well with the moral intuition of most people (probably of the sages too), that it is absurd to harm a person who did not harm another person, but only for religious reasons.
I didn’t want to get into this because it’s complicated and feels like a digression from the topic, but oh well.

7. Look, this source really does nicely show how it should have been written in the Torah if it wanted to grant general authority.

“Here it would seem that dispute means argument and not necessarily a clash between one person and another.”
I actually see the opposite: “for the judgment of the Lord and for disputes” — two different things. One is between man and God, one between one person and another.

In any case, if you understood what I said in 5, then this is actually no difficulty for me, because I can claim that “lest they incur guilt before the Lord, and wrath come upon you and upon your brothers; thus shall you do, and you will not incur guilt” proves that we are speaking of a historical period in which there was mutual responsibility in the nation. In that period God’s wrath against specific sinners harmed the entire people and even the innocent. So commandments between man and God become matters between one person and another, and a halakhic dispute becomes a dispute between people, and thus there is justification for general authority in all matters of Torah, even according to my interpretation.

I really do not accept Chronicles as an authoritative source, because who knows who inserted it into the biblical canon and why and when. And in fact, from the differences among the texts, the problems are evident. But that is just an aside.

I feel a bit that no matter how many proofs I give, you will remain blind by choice.
Even if you changed your mind regarding the opening verses, you still won’t conclude from it that they’ve been lying to you all this time and hiding information from you; instead you try hard to stay with your old beliefs.
No matter how much apologetic athletics you use, and how many of my claims and sources you choose to dismiss out of hand, at the end of the day you will have to live with your choice, and I wish you luck with that.

2. You called it the default. I’m not sure about that. In any case, let’s leave the blood issue aside; it’s not that important. Let’s assume you are right.
As for the priests’ instruction — I don’t understand your claim. If the Torah gave them permission to instruct, then obviously there is an obligation to listen to them. Otherwise what is their role? Everyone can learn; what need is there for an authority that teaches? And if they were told to instruct, then obviously it will indeed be according to them; otherwise they would not have received a command to instruct.
Fine, I accept that (though it seems the command is addressed to a court, where things must be decided by the majority).
Unfortunately you’ve reached bizarre territory, as if someone is hiding something from me. Whereas the rabbinic commentators themselves said what you said, so apparently they are not trying to hide anything.
4. You are twisting the meaning so it fits your claim. Obviously the words “and according to the judgment” do not stand alone because they come to add something. “According to the Torah that they instruct you and additionally also according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do.” It is not supposed to begin with the words “and according to the judgment.” How can one say that “according to the Torah that they instruct you” means the judgment? If it had said only Torah I would understand your argument (that it really refers to what was discussed before); if it had said only judgment I would also understand your argument (because it explicitly says judgment). Now that it says according to the Torah and — that implies an addition, meaning these are two different things. And indeed “Torah” is a general description for all the commandments. (You are ignoring the “and” that begins an additional command.)
The reason they started with matters between one person and another is very logical. Because that is the issue where there is usually dispute (as you yourself rightly raised the question: why would I go up to a court to distinguish between types of blood?), so they started there. First the Torah starts with authority in the context of dispute; after that it says there is authority in everything. It goes from the common case to the comprehensive ruling — that is actually very logical.
What difference does it make if it doesn’t fit with what you said?
5. Why did you decide that sometimes desecrating the Sabbath harms the majority and sometimes it doesn’t? Impressive apologetic backflip, but it has no source. In any case, according to your claim, because there is no authority, I can reject your claim and understand the Torah however I want and go kill people in the name of the Torah. And that would be permitted and fine! Because no one has authority over Torah and Jewish law (not even you), so if I understand that one should kill a Sabbath desecrator nowadays, I can do that.
7. According to the made-up distinction of yours that only at certain times what the Torah says is applicable (without a source from the Torah for saying this), it works out that suddenly there is judging in matters between man and God.
I knew you wouldn’t accept Chronicles, though it seems that in addition to the fact that Chronicles shows there is authority for a court to do this, it is also their interpretation of the passage we were discussing (and this is a description of events from the time of Jehu).
As for intellectual honesty — I feel the same way about you. So all that remains is to argue with arguments.

2. “If the Torah gave them permission to instruct, then obviously there is an obligation to listen to them.”
Everyone has a commandment to teach. With them it is one of their main purposes. There will also be disputes among themselves, so the idea that this is some monolithic group saying one single thing that one must listen to is absurd in itself.
And no, teaching and coercing are two completely different things. If you disagree with him, you are not obligated to do what he says. The teacher is not always right. Especially if one teacher says A and another says B — you can choose for yourself whom to listen to.
Everyone can also serve in the Temple, but it is more efficient that there be a tribe designated for that in advance and trained for it from birth. It is not a monopoly; everyone can teach, but with them it is a more essential calling than for the rest.

What one is obligated to obey is what is said of it: “by their word it shall be.”
Otherwise you need to explain what the difference is between “to instruct” and “by their word it shall be,” and why it is written that way, and what should be inferred from that division, and from the fact that by some miracle this division fits exactly my claim that only in matters of dispute and lesion do they have authority to coerce. Or is that division just by chance, and words in the Torah have no significance?

Right, the commentators say it — some of the plain-sense ones even admit that the plain meaning here is as I say. But your teachers did not teach you that. Everyone has heard of the midrashic interpretations that you can recite so nicely, but they won’t teach you what I had to teach you, namely that some commentators say this, to the point that many religious people think these midrashim are actually the plain meaning. If that isn’t concealment, I don’t know what is.

4. “That implies an addition” — yes… it adds a condition. Like “come to the store, and on Friday (…come to the store).” An added condition.
Likewise: “Act according to this Torah they told you, and regarding this judgment they told you (…this Torah).” The Torah is about the judgment. I’m struggling to understand what’s hard to understand here…
“Because that is the issue where there is usually dispute”
You didn’t understand the severity of the problem you are in… They emphasized, at length, that this is about matters between one person and another. Even though they could have made it general. You are not managing to explain why they didn’t make it general. To say that this is the issue where there is usually dispute is also factually untrue. People in the study hall argue day and night about matters between man and God. And you and I right now are arguing theologically, but probably will never argue about matters between one person and another. There is no basis for the assumption that most disputes are between people. And even if by chance that were true, there is no justification for being precise in the opening that it is specifically about matters between one person and another just because they are the majority, when it could have been made general and that would have been more accurate according to your view and also included everything else without any problems.

And it cannot be two different things, because syntactically it doesn’t work. What is “and according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do” without context? What is that?! It’s murdering the Hebrew language, that’s what it is…

“And additionally also according to the judgment that they tell you, you shall do”
I don’t understand… what according to the judgment?? What is said about the judgment?.. The Torah was said about the judgment! If you admit that the second phrase does not stand without the first phrase, then you admit they are connected and that this is Torah said regarding a specific judgment.

This, in addition to the fact that you didn’t really answer the problem of “dispute and lesion,” tells me that you’re clinging to very shaky reeds to justify your belief.

“Torah” is definitely not a description of all the commandments. Not in biblical language.
“Torah” in the Bible is a certain collection of laws. For example:
“This is the law of the sin offering,” “this is the law of the burnt offering,” “of the beast,” “of the leper.”
So you actually opened my eyes that even if these are two different things (which technically doesn’t work), it still does not mean that the Torah they say can be about anything whatsoever, and it is still subject to the condition emphasized at the start of the passage, that this concerns matters between people.
Can they tell you whom to marry? Which car to buy? Do they have authority over every matter whatever it may be? Obviously not — there is a limit. The Torah they give cannot be on every subject. So if you want to say that one has to obey every Torah teaching that comes from them, fine — but it is clear from the structure of the passage and other sources that this Torah is restricted to matters between one person and another.

5. How does a Sabbath desecrator harm you if there is no mutual responsibility from God? I didn’t decide that — it’s common sense.
If you prove that he harms you without miraculous intervention the moment he commits a certain transgression, then no problem — it will simply be a matter between one person and another in the natural way. But if you cannot prove harm and only say that it is a sin as justification for harming him, that does not justify it, because it is not a matter between people, so the court has no authority to coerce him.
The only way someone’s sin could harm you despite it not being by the natural order is if there is divine intervention causing that.
Who said there is still mutual responsibility today? A lot has changed in our nation; we were already punished by exile from the land, and we have no Temple and no prophecy. From what I see around me, I conclude there is no connection between some sin someone commits and the amount of rain that falls. If you claim there is, the burden of proof is on you, because you are the one who wants to punish him, and for that you need admissible proof in court.

In any case, you too can interpret the Torah however you want and murder people. After all, in the end your belief too is based on people accepting your/ the rabbis’ interpretation of these verses. If they don’t accept it (like the Sadducees, Karaites, Beta Israel, Reform, Messianics, etc.), then there may indeed be a problem that people will do what they want. But that is simply a fact of reality. It is not connected to my claim at all. In the end people need to be persuaded by the interpretation both in your system and in mine.
According to my interpretation, you cannot just go kill people, because according to the Torah one needs a court and testimony in order to kill someone. And since the court has no authority, you simply cannot do it without violating “Do not murder.”
According to my view, a person who murdered and deserves the death penalty, the court can punish him with that because it is between one person and another. But that does not mean that you, as a private person, can take the law into your own hands and kill people without trial. And if you do that, you’ll also get in trouble with the real Sanhedrin, because you turned it into a matter between people.

I think there are sources for my claim. For example, look at places where there is execution of someone who violated a matter between man and God in the Torah, and you will discover that they needed God’s approval many times if not all of them, and prophecy was required.

7. Chronicles, in any case, gives us nothing for the discussion because I already explained it according to my interpretation. That is why I said I do not accept it as a source, only as an aside, because it truly does not matter to me even if it were authoritative. It only gives us a historical anecdote about an implementation of this passage under the conditions that existed then.

First of all, the reason it took me so long to answer is because I realized I would probably have to work harder than I planned in this discussion with you in order to answer. Honestly, when I first read what you wrote, I really was shaken. We’ll see who turns out to be right in the end, and truth is dearer than anything. Since I’m trying to make this a somewhat principled clarification, this will probably be longer than a regular comment.
At first I thought we needed to clarify the meaning of the word “dispute” in the Torah. Our initial understanding is according to its meaning in modern Hebrew, in the sense of a quarrel. But in one of the comments above I suggested that maybe it actually means a disagreement, in which case a disagreement could also be about matters between man and God, and the judges would need to decide every disagreement. What occurred to me is that the Torah has another word to describe a quarrel — “they strive” (I’m not sure of the root, maybe n-tz-h). See Exodus 21:22, I Samuel 25:11 (though maybe proofs from the Prophets are questionable, because Hebrew in the Prophets may not be identical to Hebrew in the Torah), Exodus 2:13, and I believe there are many more examples. But still, the fact that there is another word for quarrel does not mean that the meaning of “dispute” is indeed different from quarrel.
So I’ll try to examine the meaning of the word “dispute.” The source that seems to me most central for understanding the meaning of “dispute” is the verse in Exodus 17:2: “And the people quarreled with Moses and said, ‘Give us water that we may drink.’” This verse can be understood in two ways. A. “And the people quarreled with Moses” is a heading, and then what they actually did (that is, what it means to quarrel with Moses) was say to Moses, “Give us water that we may drink.” B. There are two actions here: one is quarreling with Moses, and the second is saying, “Give us water that we may drink.” Seemingly the first option is more reasonable (if you disagree, say so). Therefore the meaning of “they quarreled” (that is, of “dispute”) is argument/contention. Not necessarily a brawl, simply because I don’t think there is a brawl here between people. In other words, it is not some situation that creates a legal ruling between one person and another. (Afterward it says there was a dispute with God; it is hard to define that here as a brawl.)
After this analysis, let us approach understanding the first verse (after that we’ll continue). First of all, let us examine the heading of the passage: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you” — meaning, the next verse speaks about what one does in a case of doubt about how to act in practice. Seemingly the simple meaning of “judgment” is as you said, matters between one person and another. But as I already wrote above, from several places it seems that “judgment” means doing something as it should be done (doing something according to its proper procedure). I’ll explain why that is also the meaning here. Even you agreed that “between lesion and lesion” refers to the laws of a leprous lesion (for that is the prominent and only meaning we know in the entire Torah for distinguishing between lesion and lesion, and we also know of the authority of the priests in matters of leprosy, so it makes sense that this is what the verse is talking about). And the language of the verse implies that “between lesion and lesion” is part of what is too difficult for judgment. So if “judgment” means only matters between one person and another, it is not logical that it would also include leprosy law. The same goes for “matters of disputes” (according to the way you explained the structure of the verse). So the explanation of the verse is: if you have a doubt in a certain law about how to carry it out, whether between different killings — whom to blame (I went with your interpretation, because throughout the Bible it indeed seems that “blood” means what you said), between different monetary laws — whom to obligate, between different lesions — what to declare impure and what pure, any matter over which there is argument/contention (perhaps doubt?) — then go up to the Temple. And the next verse describes what one should do in the Temple: ask the priests, the Levites, or the judge, and they will tell you the correct thing / what should be done. The next verse says that you must listen to everything they say. The verse after that is already general and comes to add also a negative commandment. We’ll return later to explaining the last verse. Now to the substance of your points.

2. On second thought, indeed there is no obligation to listen to all priests and Levites in the world. They do not have the authority of the Sanhedrin; that belongs only to the Sanhedrin (the place is what creates it). Meaning, they do not have authority to enact decrees, etc. So perhaps indeed the verse that they must instruct in the whole Torah is not proof. (Nor is it a contradiction, simply because, as I said above, the place is what creates it.) And specifically in dispute and lesion, even lesser priests and Levites have responsibility (presumably judges too, as in the Great Court, except in lesions), and you are obligated by their rulings and enactments (they can enforce despite their lesser status in those cases). The comparison to the Temple does not help the discussion, so there is no point discussing it.

4. At least this time you explained how you understand it. (The three words in parentheses made me understand; before that it really wasn’t clear.) True, the letter “and” can add a linking condition. But I don’t think that is the explanation here. Just as there can be a sentence like “I love bell peppers and cucumber,” or in a sentence more relevant to our issue: “Act according to what I tell you and also according to what I write to you,” so too here: “according to the Torah that they instruct you,” meaning according to what they teach him (“Torah” and “instruct” from the language of instruction), “and according to the judgment that they tell you,” meaning according to the ruling they tell you to do in practice, you shall do. Nothing is said about the judgment; they will say something about it in the future. I even have proof (not the strongest) for my point: two different expressions are used here, implying two different actions. In Torah they instruct, and in judgment they say what to do. I didn’t understand your alarm; I feel we are speaking Chinese and Japanese a bit in analyzing this sentence. They will tell you whatever they want about the judgment — why did you decide that this is the Torah? I’d be glad if you explain the linguistic problem. What you write is: “what about the judgment?? What is said about the judgment?” Nothing is said about it. What does the question “what about the judgment” have to do with anything? “About/according to” here means “according to,” that is, also according to the judgment that they tell you.
Now I have also answered why the examples are matters between one person and another (two of them): because the subject of the passage is not, as you describe it, the authority of the sages — that is only a byproduct. The subject of the passage is what happens when we have a doubt about how to rule in a certain case. Therefore common examples were brought, and debates in the study hall are really not relevant. The passage was not said to a society of learners, but to practical ruling.
“Torah” is indeed a collection of instructions. But in the plain case of “the Torah,” it means everything that is taught. To turn it into specific laws, one has to specify — which did not happen here. (And there are plenty of examples where “Torah” means the whole Torah.)
Indeed they have authority to instruct on everything. (By the way, as Rabbi Michi says, it is clear from here that they do not have authority in determining facts about reality; they only have authority to instruct. Actually, on second thought, that is so simple.)
5. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.
7. You invented an okimta that only at certain times can one judge matters between man and God. But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know? And if so, why isn’t there now? The problem is that I don’t know all the places in the Bible where there was capital punishment; maybe I’ll merit to clarify that later (right now Sabbath is almost here so I can’t check more). Besides, if at a certain time criteria were set for matters between man and God by a court because it harmed mutual responsibility, then presumably that would also remain true after that court — because what changed is the mutual responsibility, but in truth it is still a problem; otherwise it would not have been harmful even when there was mutual responsibility.
In short, I don’t think you are right. I truly think I explained everything rationally, without evasion and without apologetics.
Finally, two questions.
1. Do you observe matters between man and God only with the Written Torah? (That seems very challenging without the Oral Torah.)
2. Do you accept the Order of Damages? Seemingly, if sages have authority in matters between one person and another, then you should accept the Order of Damages, which deals entirely with matters between people.
If you got this far, thank you very much for challenging me and teaching me new things. I hope you continue the discussion, which I personally find enriching. And there is no joy like the resolution of doubts.

First of all, the reason it took me so long to answer is because I realized I would probably have to work harder than I planned in this discussion with you in order to answer. Honestly, when I first read what you wrote, I really was shaken. We’ll see who turns out to be right in the end, and truth is dearer than anything. Since I’m trying to make this a somewhat principled clarification, this will probably be longer than a regular comment.
At first I thought we needed to clarify the meaning of the word “dispute” in the Torah. Our initial understanding is according to its meaning in modern Hebrew, in the sense of a quarrel. But in one of the comments above I suggested that maybe it actually means a disagreement, in which case a disagreement could also be about matters between man and God, and the judges would need to decide every disagreement. What occurred to me is that the Torah has another word to describe a quarrel — “they strive” (I’m not sure of the root, maybe n-tz-h). See Exodus 21:22, I Samuel 25:11 (though maybe proofs from the Prophets are questionable, because Hebrew in the Prophets may not be identical to Hebrew in the Torah), Exodus 2:13, and I believe there are many more examples. But still, the fact that there is another word for quarrel does not mean that the meaning of “dispute” is indeed different from quarrel.
So I’ll try to examine the meaning of the word “dispute.” The source that seems to me most central for understanding the meaning of “dispute” is the verse in Exodus 17:2: “And the people quarreled with Moses and said, ‘Give us water that we may drink.’” This verse can be understood in two ways. A. “And the people quarreled with Moses” is a heading, and then what they actually did (that is, what it means to quarrel with Moses) was say to Moses, “Give us water that we may drink.” B. There are two actions here: one is quarreling with Moses, and the second is saying, “Give us water that we may drink.” Seemingly the first option is more reasonable (if you disagree, say so). Therefore the meaning of “they quarreled” (that is, of “dispute”) is argument/contention. Not necessarily a brawl, simply because I don’t think there is a brawl here between people. In other words, it is not some situation that creates a legal ruling between one person and another. (Afterward it says there was a dispute with God; it is hard to define that here as a brawl.)
After this analysis, let us approach understanding the first verse (after that we’ll continue). First of all, let us examine the heading of the passage: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you” — meaning, the next verse speaks about what one does in a case of doubt about how to act in practice. Seemingly the simple meaning of “judgment” is as you said, matters between one person and another. But as I already wrote above, from several places it seems that “judgment” means doing something as it should be done (doing something according to its proper procedure). I’ll explain why that is also the meaning here. Even you agreed that “between lesion and lesion” refers to the laws of a leprous lesion (for that is the prominent and only meaning we know in the entire Torah for distinguishing between lesion and lesion, and we also know of the authority of the priests in matters of leprosy, so it makes sense that this is what the verse is talking about). And the language of the verse implies that “between lesion and lesion” is part of what is too difficult for judgment. So if “judgment” means only matters between one person and another, it is not logical that it would also include leprosy law. The same goes for “matters of disputes” (according to the way you explained the structure of the verse). So the explanation of the verse is: if you have a doubt in a certain law about how to carry it out, whether between different killings — whom to blame (I went with your interpretation, because throughout the Bible it indeed seems that “blood” means what you said), between different monetary laws — whom to obligate, between different lesions — what to declare impure and what pure, any matter over which there is argument/contention (perhaps doubt?) — then go up to the Temple. And the next verse describes what one should do in the Temple: ask the priests, the Levites, or the judge, and they will tell you the correct thing / what should be done. The next verse says that you must listen to everything they say. The verse after that is already general and comes to add also a negative commandment. We’ll return later to explaining the last verse. Now to the substance of your points.

2. On second thought, indeed there is no obligation to listen to all priests and Levites in the world. They do not have the authority of the Sanhedrin; that belongs only to the Sanhedrin (the place is what creates it). Meaning, they do not have authority to enact decrees, etc. So perhaps indeed the verse that they must instruct in the whole Torah is not proof. (Nor is it a contradiction, simply because, as I said above, the place is what creates it.) And specifically in dispute and lesion, even lesser priests and Levites have responsibility (presumably judges too, as in the Great Court, except in lesions), and you are obligated by their rulings and enactments (they can enforce despite their lesser status in those cases). The comparison to the Temple does not help the discussion, so there is no point discussing it.

4. At least this time you explained how you understand it. (The three words in parentheses made me understand; before that it really wasn’t clear.) True, the letter “and” can add a linking condition. But I don’t think that is the explanation here. Just as there can be a sentence like “I love bell peppers and cucumber,” or in a sentence more relevant to our issue: “Act according to what I tell you and also according to what I write to you,” so too here: “according to the Torah that they instruct you,” meaning according to what they teach him (“Torah” and “instruct” from the language of instruction), “and according to the judgment that they tell you,” meaning according to the ruling they tell you to do in practice, you shall do. Nothing is said about the judgment; they will say something about it in the future. I even have proof (not the strongest) for my point: two different expressions are used here, implying two different actions. In Torah they instruct, and in judgment they say what to do. I didn’t understand your alarm; I feel we are speaking Chinese and Japanese a bit in analyzing this sentence. They will tell you whatever they want about the judgment — why did you decide that this is the Torah? I’d be glad if you explain the linguistic problem. What you write is: “what about the judgment?? What is said about the judgment?” Nothing is said about it. What does the question “what about the judgment” have to do with anything? “About/according to” here means “according to,” that is, also according to the judgment that they tell you.
Now I have also answered why the examples are matters between one person and another (two of them): because the subject of the passage is not, as you describe it, the authority of the sages — that is only a byproduct. The subject of the passage is what happens when we have a doubt about how to rule in a certain case. Therefore common examples were brought, and debates in the study hall are really not relevant. The passage was not said to a society of learners, but to practical ruling.
“Torah” is indeed a collection of instructions. But in the plain case of “the Torah,” it means everything that is taught. To turn it into specific laws, one has to specify — which did not happen here. (And there are plenty of examples where “Torah” means the whole Torah.)
Indeed they have authority to instruct on everything. I hope they have common sense. (By the way, as Rabbi Michi says, it is clear from here that they do not have authority in determining facts about reality; they only have authority to instruct. Actually, on second thought, that is so simple.)
5. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.
7. You invented an okimta that only at certain times can one judge matters between man and God. But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know? And if so, why isn’t there now? The problem is that I don’t know all the places in the Bible where there was capital punishment; maybe I’ll merit to clarify that later (right now Sabbath is almost here so I can’t check more). Besides, if at a certain time criteria were set for matters between man and God by a court because it harmed mutual responsibility, then presumably that would also remain true after that court — because what changed is the mutual responsibility, but in truth it is still a problem; otherwise it would not have been harmful even when there was mutual responsibility.
In short, I don’t think you are right. I truly think I explained everything rationally, without evasion and without apologetics.
Finally, two questions.
1. Do you observe matters between man and God only with the Written Torah? (That seems very challenging without the Oral Torah.)
2. Do you accept the Order of Damages? Seemingly, if sages have authority in matters between one person and another, then you should accept the Order of Damages, which deals entirely with matters between people.
If you got this far, thank you very much for challenging me and teaching me new things. I hope you continue the discussion, which I personally find enriching. And there is no joy like the resolution of doubts.

First of all, the reason it took me so long to answer is because I realized I would probably have to work harder than I planned in this discussion with you in order to answer. Honestly, when I first read what you wrote, I really was shaken. We’ll see who turns out to be right in the end, and truth is dearer than anything. Since I’m trying to make this a somewhat principled clarification, this will probably be longer than a regular comment.
At first I thought we needed to clarify the meaning of the word “dispute” in the Torah. Our initial understanding is according to its meaning in modern Hebrew, in the sense of a quarrel. But in one of the comments above I suggested that maybe it actually means a disagreement, in which case a disagreement could also be about matters between man and God, and the judges would need to decide every disagreement. What occurred to me is that the Torah has another word to describe a quarrel — “they strive” (I’m not sure of the root, maybe n-tz-h). See Exodus 21:22, I Samuel 25:11 (though maybe proofs from the Prophets are questionable, because Hebrew in the Prophets may not be identical to Hebrew in the Torah), Exodus 2:13, and I believe there are many more examples. But still, the fact that there is another word for quarrel does not mean that the meaning of “dispute” is indeed different from quarrel.
So I’ll try to examine the meaning of the word “dispute.” The source that seems to me most central for understanding the meaning of “dispute” is the verse in Exodus 17:2: “And the people quarreled with Moses and said, ‘Give us water that we may drink.’” This verse can be understood in two ways. A. “And the people quarreled with Moses” is a heading, and then what they actually did (that is, what it means to quarrel with Moses) was say to Moses, “Give us water that we may drink.” B. There are two actions here: one is quarreling with Moses, and the second is saying, “Give us water that we may drink.” Seemingly the first option is more reasonable (if you disagree, say so). Therefore the meaning of “they quarreled” (that is, of “dispute”) is argument/contention. Not necessarily a brawl, simply because I don’t think there is a brawl here between people. In other words, it is not some situation that creates a legal ruling between one person and another. (Afterward it says there was a dispute with God; it is hard to define that here as a brawl.)
After this analysis, let us approach understanding the first verse (after that we’ll continue). First of all, let us examine the heading of the passage: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you” — meaning, the next verse speaks about what one does in a case of doubt about how to act in practice. Seemingly the simple meaning of “judgment” is as you said, matters between one person and another. But as I already wrote above, from several places it seems that “judgment” means doing something as it should be done (doing something according to its proper procedure). I’ll explain why that is also the meaning here. Even you agreed that “between lesion and lesion” refers to the laws of a leprous lesion (for that is the prominent and only meaning we know in the entire Torah for distinguishing between lesion and lesion, and we also know of the authority of the priests in matters of leprosy, so it makes sense that this is what the verse is talking about). And the language of the verse implies that “between lesion and lesion” is part of what is too difficult for judgment. So if “judgment” means only matters between one person and another, it is not logical that it would also include leprosy law. The same goes for “matters of disputes” (according to the way you explained the structure of the verse). So the explanation of the verse is: if you have a doubt in a certain law about how to carry it out, whether between different killings — whom to blame (I went with your interpretation, because throughout the Bible it indeed seems that “blood” means what you said), between different monetary laws — whom to obligate, between different lesions — what to declare impure and what pure, any matter over which there is argument/contention (perhaps doubt?) — then go up to the Temple. And the next verse describes what one should do in the Temple: ask the priests, the Levites, or the judge, and they will tell you the correct thing / what should be done. The next verse says that you must listen to everything they say. The verse after that is already general and comes to add also a negative commandment. We’ll return later to explaining the last verse. Now to the substance of your points.

2. On second thought, indeed there is no obligation to listen to all priests and Levites in the world. They do not have the authority of the Sanhedrin; that belongs only to the Sanhedrin (the place is what creates it). Meaning, they do not have authority to enact decrees, etc. So perhaps indeed the verse that they must instruct in the whole Torah is not proof. (Nor is it a contradiction, simply because, as I said above, the place is what creates it.) And specifically in dispute and lesion, even lesser priests and Levites have responsibility (presumably judges too, as in the Great Court, except in lesions), and you are obligated by their rulings and enactments (they can enforce despite their lesser status in those cases). The comparison to the Temple does not help the discussion, so there is no point discussing it.

4. At least this time you explained how you understand it. (The three words in parentheses made me understand; before that it really wasn’t clear.) True, the letter “and” can add a linking condition. But I don’t think that is the explanation here. Just as there can be a sentence like “I love bell peppers and cucumber,” or in a sentence more relevant to our issue: “Act according to what I tell you and also according to what I write to you,” so too here: “according to the Torah that they instruct you,” meaning according to what they teach him (“Torah” and “instruct” from the language of instruction), “and according to the judgment that they tell you,” meaning according to the ruling they tell you to do in practice, you shall do. Nothing is said about the judgment; they will say something about it in the future. I even have proof (not the strongest) for my point: two different expressions are used here, implying two different actions. In Torah they instruct, and in judgment they say what to do. I didn’t understand your alarm; I feel we are speaking Chinese and Japanese a bit in analyzing this sentence. They will tell you whatever they want about the judgment — why did you decide that this is the Torah? I’d be glad if you explain the linguistic problem. What you write is: “what about the judgment?? What is said about the judgment?” Nothing is said about it. What does the question “what about the judgment” have to do with anything? “About/according to” here means “according to,” that is, also according to the judgment that they tell you.
Now I have also answered why the examples are matters between one person and another (two of them): because the subject of the passage is not, as you describe it, the authority of the sages — that is only a byproduct. The subject of the passage is what happens when we have a doubt about how to rule in a certain case. Therefore common examples were brought, and debates in the study hall are really not relevant. The passage was not said to a society of learners, but to practical ruling.
“Torah” is indeed a collection of instructions. But in the plain case of “the Torah,” it means everything that is taught. To turn it into specific laws, one has to specify — which did not happen here. (And there are plenty of examples where “Torah” means the whole Torah.)
Indeed they have authority to instruct on everything. (By the way, as Rabbi Michi says, it is clear from here that they do not have authority in determining facts about reality; they only have authority to instruct. Actually, on second thought, that is so simple.)
5. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.
7. You invented an okimta that only at certain times can one judge matters between man and God. But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know? And if so, why isn’t there now? The problem is that I don’t know all the places in the Bible where there was capital punishment; maybe I’ll merit to clarify that later (right now Sabbath is almost here so I can’t check more). Besides, if at a certain time criteria were set for matters between man and God by a court because it harmed mutual responsibility, then presumably that would also remain true after that court — because what changed is the mutual responsibility, but in truth it is still a problem; otherwise it would not have been harmful even when there was mutual responsibility.
In short, I don’t think you are right. I truly think I explained everything rationally, without evasion and without apologetics.
Finally, two questions.
1. Do you observe matters between man and God only with the Written Torah? (That seems very challenging without the Oral Torah.)
2. Do you accept the Order of Damages? Seemingly, if sages have authority in matters between one person and another, then you should accept the Order of Damages, which deals entirely with matters between people.
If you got this far, thank you very much for challenging me and teaching me new things. I hope you continue the discussion, which I personally find enriching. And there is no joy like the resolution of doubts.
The site is giving me trouble with the comment.

First of all, the reason it took me so long to answer is because I realized I would probably have to work harder than I planned in this discussion with you in order to answer. Honestly, when I first read what you wrote, I really was shaken. We’ll see who turns out to be right in the end, and truth is dearer than anything. Since I’m trying to make this a somewhat principled clarification, this will probably be longer than a regular comment.
At first I thought we needed to clarify the meaning of the word “dispute” in the Torah. Our initial understanding is according to its meaning in modern Hebrew, in the sense of a quarrel. But in one of the comments above I suggested that maybe it actually means a disagreement, in which case a disagreement could also be about matters between man and God, and the judges would need to decide every disagreement. What occurred to me is that the Torah has another word to describe a quarrel — “they strive” (I’m not sure of the root, maybe n-tz-h). See Exodus 21:22, I Samuel 25:11 (though maybe proofs from the Prophets are questionable, because Hebrew in the Prophets may not be identical to Hebrew in the Torah), Exodus 2:13, and I believe there are many more examples. But still, the fact that there is another word for quarrel does not mean that the meaning of “dispute” is indeed different from quarrel.
So I’ll try to examine the meaning of the word “dispute.” The source that seems to me most central for understanding the meaning of “dispute” is the verse in Exodus 17:2: “And the people quarreled with Moses and said, ‘Give us water that we may drink.’” This verse can be understood in two ways. A. “And the people quarreled with Moses” is a heading, and then what they actually did (that is, what it means to quarrel with Moses) was say to Moses, “Give us water that we may drink.” B. There are two actions here: one is quarreling with Moses, and the second is saying, “Give us water that we may drink.” Seemingly the first option is more reasonable (if you disagree, say so). Therefore the meaning of “they quarreled” (that is, of “dispute”) is argument/contention. Not necessarily a brawl, simply because I don’t think there is a brawl here between people. In other words, it is not some situation that creates a legal ruling between one person and another. (Afterward it says there was a dispute with God; it is hard to define that here as a brawl.)
After this analysis, let us approach understanding the first verse (after that we’ll continue). First of all, let us examine the heading of the passage: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you” — meaning, the next verse speaks about what one does in a case of doubt about how to act in practice. Seemingly the simple meaning of “judgment” is as you said, matters between one person and another. But as I already wrote above, from several places it seems that “judgment” means doing something as it should be done (doing something according to its proper procedure). I’ll explain why that is also the meaning here. Even you agreed that “between lesion and lesion” refers to the laws of a leprous lesion (for that is the prominent and only meaning we know in the entire Torah for distinguishing between lesion and lesion, and we also know of the authority of the priests in matters of leprosy, so it makes sense that this is what the verse is talking about). And the language of the verse implies that “between lesion and lesion” is part of what is too difficult for judgment. So if “judgment” means only matters between one person and another, it is not logical that it would also include leprosy law. The same goes for “matters of disputes” (according to the way you explained the structure of the verse). So the explanation of the verse is: if you have a doubt in a certain law about how to carry it out, whether between different killings — whom to blame (I went with your interpretation, because throughout the Bible it indeed seems that “blood” means what you said), between different monetary laws — whom to obligate, between different lesions — what to declare impure and what pure, any matter over which there is argument/contention (perhaps doubt?) — then go up to the Temple. And the next verse describes what one should do in the Temple: ask the priests, the Levites, or the judge, and they will tell you the correct thing / what should be done. The next verse says that you must listen to everything they say. The verse after that is already general and comes to add also a negative commandment. We’ll return later to explaining the last verse. Now to the substance of your points.

2. On second thought, indeed there is no obligation to listen to all priests and Levites in the world. They do not have the authority of the Sanhedrin; that belongs only to the Sanhedrin (the place is what creates it). Meaning, they do not have authority to enact decrees, etc. So perhaps indeed the verse that they must instruct in the whole Torah is not proof. (Nor is it a contradiction, simply because, as I said above, the place is what creates it.) And specifically in dispute and lesion, even lesser priests and Levites have responsibility (presumably judges too, as in the Great Court, except in lesions), and you are obligated by their rulings and enactments (they can enforce despite their lesser status in those cases). The comparison to the Temple does not help the discussion, so there is no point discussing it.

4. At least this time you explained how you understand it. (The three words in parentheses made me understand; before that it really wasn’t clear.) True, the letter “and” can add a linking condition. But I don’t think that is the explanation here. Just as there can be a sentence like “I love bell peppers and cucumber,” or in a sentence more relevant to our issue: “Act according to what I tell you and also according to what I write to you,” so too here: “according to the Torah that they instruct you,” meaning according to what they teach him (“Torah” and “instruct” from the language of instruction), “and according to the judgment that they tell you,” meaning according to the ruling they tell you to do in practice, you shall do. Nothing is said about the judgment; they will say something about it in the future. I even have proof (not the strongest) for my point: two different expressions are used here, implying two different actions. In Torah they instruct, and in judgment they say what to do. I didn’t understand your alarm; I feel we are speaking Chinese and Japanese a bit in analyzing this sentence. They will tell you whatever they want about the judgment — why did you decide that this is the Torah? I’d be glad if you explain the linguistic problem. What you write is: “what about the judgment?? What is said about the judgment?” Nothing is said about it. What does the question “what about the judgment” have to do with anything? “About/according to” here means “according to,” that is, also according to the judgment that they tell you.
Now I have also answered why the examples are matters between one person and another (two of them): because the subject of the passage is not, as you describe it, the authority of the sages — that is only a byproduct. The subject of the passage is what happens when we have a doubt about how to rule in a certain case. Therefore common examples were brought, and debates in the study hall are really not relevant. The passage was not said to a society of learners, but to practical ruling.
“Torah” is indeed a collection of instructions. But in the plain case of “the Torah,” it means everything that is taught. To turn it into specific laws, one has to specify — which did not happen here. (And there are plenty of examples where “Torah” means the whole Torah.)
Indeed they have authority to instruct on everything. (By the way, as Rabbi Michi says, it is clear from here that they do not have authority in determining facts about reality; they only have authority to instruct. Actually, on second thought, that is so simple.)

5. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.
7. You invented an okimta that only at certain times can one judge matters between man and God. But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know? And if so, why isn’t there now? The problem is that I don’t know all the places in the Bible where there was capital punishment; maybe I’ll merit to clarify that later (right now Sabbath is almost here so I can’t check more). Besides, if at a certain time criteria were set for matters between man and God by a court because it harmed mutual responsibility, then presumably that would also remain true after that court — because what changed is the mutual responsibility, but in truth it is still a problem; otherwise it would not have been harmful even when there was mutual responsibility.
In short, I don’t think you are right. I truly think I explained everything rationally, without evasion and without apologetics.
Finally, two questions.
1. Do you observe matters between man and God only with the Written Torah? (That seems very challenging without the Oral Torah.)
2. Do you accept the Order of Damages? Seemingly, if sages have authority in matters between one person and another, then you should accept the Order of Damages, which deals entirely with matters between people.
If you got this far, thank you very much for challenging me and teaching me new things. I hope you continue the discussion, which I personally find enriching. And there is no joy like the resolution of doubts.
I split the comment because at first the site wouldn’t let me send such a long one.

. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.
7. You invented an okimta that only at certain times can one judge matters between man and God. But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know? And if so, why isn’t there now? The problem is that I don’t know all the places in the Bible where there was capital punishment; maybe I’ll merit to clarify that later (right now Sabbath is almost here so I can’t check more). Besides, if at a certain time criteria were set for matters between man and God by a court because it harmed mutual responsibility, then presumably that would also remain true after that court — because what changed is the mutual responsibility, but in truth it is still a problem; otherwise it would not have been harmful even when there was mutual responsibility.
In short, I don’t think you are right. I truly think I explained everything rationally, without evasion and without apologetics.
Finally, two questions.
1. Do you observe matters between man and God only with the Written Torah? (That seems very challenging without the Oral Torah.)
2. Do you accept the Order of Damages? Seemingly, if sages have authority in matters between one person and another, then you should accept the Order of Damages, which deals entirely with matters between people.

5. You explained nicely and sensibly why someone who violates a matter between man and God thereby harms his environment and so it really becomes a matter between one person and another. But your main problem lies in two places. First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature? Do you know heavenly calculations so well that you can say what affects what and what doesn’t? The basic assumption should be that if a sin had an effect once, then it still has an effect now. In addition, why was there mutual responsibility once and now there isn’t? These are your own inventions.
The difference between my interpretation and yours is that in my case I argue that one should conduct oneself in Jewish law according to the Sanhedrin, and anyone who does not act according to the Sanhedrin is a criminal (also in matters between man and God), so not everyone does what is right in his own eyes. Whereas you say one should act according to how one understands the Torah (in matters between man and God), so if someone acts differently from you, according to your view he is not a criminal (he is not obligated to accept your interpretation). In other words, happy is your lot, Shlissel (though perhaps according to your view lesbianism isn’t really forbidden). Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people, so either way the Sanhedrin has responsibility also over matters between man and God and one is obligated to listen to them there too.

Did the rest of the comment go up? I simple can’t see it on my computer…
Sorry if I posted too many times.

See Rabbi David Zvi Hoffmann on the chapter, and II Chronicles 19, if I remember correctly.

“Dispute” in the Torah means a legal dispute between people. Everyone admits this, because that is what follows from all the places where the word appears in Scripture.
“And the two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord, before the priests and the judges who will be in those days.”
“And you shall not favor a poor man in his dispute.” (Poor relative to whom? To the other person in this legal case between people.)
“If there is a dispute between men, and they come to judgment, and they judge them and justify the righteous and condemn the wicked.”
“And let the Lord be judge and judge between me and you, and see and plead my cause and judge me out of your hand.”
“And Absalom said, Oh that I were made judge in the land, and every man who has a dispute and judgment would come to me, and I would justify him.” (What is there to justify here if this is a halakhic question?)
This is the accepted interpretation everywhere I have seen.
You are welcome to try to find where in the Hebrew Bible “dispute” can mean a halakhic disagreement. You won’t find it, because there is no such case. It always comes in the context of matters between one person and another, because “dispute” is always claims concerning a wrong done to someone.
Specifically, “a person’s dispute” means a legal grievance, a complaint about a wrong done to him. His legal claims.
“You shall not pervert the justice due to your poor man in his dispute.”
“They do not judge the orphan, and the widow’s dispute does not come before them.”
“And he called the name of the place Massah and Meribah because of the dispute of the children of Israel” = their claims (in a legal style), that they had been brought out to die in the wilderness, etc.
(So “to justify a dispute” is also a sensible expression, meaning to vindicate the person’s legal claims.)

“Judgment” can be interpreted as you said, meaning simply what should be done, and that would fit a description of all the commandments. It’s just that if the Torah wanted to speak about “judgment” in the sense of all matters of Torah, there are more suitable words for that that are used that way elsewhere, and not just “judgment” by itself. Usually it would be “statutes and judgments,” for example, if the Torah wants to speak about everything. And when “judgment” appears by itself it usually means matters between one person and another (like the portion of Mishpatim), though there are also places where “judgment” is the law of commandments between man and God, so it is certainly possible to interpret it as you do — but it fits less well because there are more conventional ways to say that.
Therefore the word “judgment” alone really doesn’t tell us much, although initially it fits my point better.

“Even you agreed that ‘between lesion and lesion’ refers to the laws of a leprous lesion”
No. I agreed with Nachmanides and the other commentators that it refers to injuries and bodily harm. A leprous lesion may be included among lesions (though I don’t think that is needed at all, because authority was already given elsewhere, so there is no real reason to mention it here), but plain “between lesion and lesion” means judgment in matters of injuries and bodily harm.
But in any case, even if we go with you, your conclusion from that is very weak.
A. Leprosy can certainly become a matter between people and come to court. It is easy to imagine a case where a person complains about the priest and claims that he was targeted in identifying the lesion, so it will very quickly become a dispute. And practically, leprosy is a kind of disease; it is easy to imagine a case where a person, for example, refuses to undergo inspection and his neighbors sue him over it.
B. A leprous lesion is exceptional in that authority was already given regarding it. So you want to tell me that, as an example of commandments between man and God, the Torah just happened to bring only that commandment for which authority had already been given??!! And from that exception you want to infer the rule?..
That is completely implausible, sorry.
In my opinion it is not talking about leprous lesions; and if it is, then you have a serious problem of inferring the rule from an exception. And if not, then only matters between one person and another are brought here as examples, together with “matters of disputes” as the general rule, and it is clear what this is trying to tell us.

Notice what you are asking me to accept here.
You want me to accept that “dispute” means just any disagreement, even in a person’s private matters between man and God, and not a legal grievance, a matter between one person and another, as it means everywhere else and as everyone admits. And likewise “judgment,” that I should accept that it means a general commandment and not the more likely sense (even if not necessary) of judgment between people.
And you want me to accept that the examples that, in your view, were given just happen to be only matters between one person and another + a leprous lesion, which is also an exceptional commandment regarding authority among matters between man and God. But we are supposed to infer from here that it refers to all commandments… So it just happens that two examples of matters between people were given + a commandment between man and God that is an exception within matters between man and God (in my view, following Nachmanides, there are three examples of matters between people and not leprous lesion).
And all this despite the fact that what you are trying to say the Torah means could easily have been described in a much simpler way, with words that fit better, and in a way that would fit better with the various places in the Torah where all the commandments are described.
You still have not given a satisfactory answer as to why the Torah did not describe in a much simpler way what you are trying to say it says.
I don’t think I can accept this in any way.

2. Wait, wait… so you accept that “dispute and lesion” talks about matters between one person and another + leprous lesion?… I thought you just tried to explain that “dispute” means everything in the Torah..? If “dispute and lesion,” according to what you said a moment ago, means all things in the Torah, then A. why is it written this way? after all “lesion,” according to you, is already included in “dispute,” like all the other commandments?
B. So do they have authority over everything? Or not? What is the meaning of this sentence then? I don’t understand…
Maybe I missed something or didn’t understand correctly, because the contradiction in what you’re saying seems too big to me.

4. Your interpretation still sounds broken to me because it sounds like modern Hebrew slang.
“And regarding the judgment (…) that they tell you, you shall do”
It sounds to me like: “Hey bro, right, about that matter from before? About the judgment…? So whatever they tell you — do it. All right, bye.” Especially when I try to say it out loud, it sounds problematic to me.
I don’t think that works in biblical Hebrew, but maybe I’m wrong.
In any case, let’s go with you.
As I said before, I cannot accept the claim that it is just “by chance” that these are the examples given, while the heading actually speaks about all the commandments.
I’m willing to accept that there is a distinction here between “Torah” and “regarding the judgment,” because it doesn’t really matter that much. I’ll just infer from it that they do not need to wait for a trial in order to publish instructions, but can issue Torah bulletins to everyone whenever they want.
But it is still in matters between one person and another, otherwise the heading that is precise about matters between people is mistaken and misleading.
And why shouldn’t we say it applies to anything they feel like, including deciding whom you marry and to whom you sell your house, etc.? And even on your interpretation, the verse regarding “dispute and lesion” is still unclear as to why it was written this way and what the meaning of that distinction is from the matters before it.

5. “First, why did you assume there is no effect by way of nature?”
I’m not assuming; it follows from my life experience. As Rabbi Michi says, I do not see any indication in reality of providence. Technically, it could also be that every time you type a word, by a miracle (which is “by way of nature”?) you cause children in Africa to die of hunger. It could be… but the burden of proof lies on the one who wants to punish you for that, because of the presumption of innocence. If you prove that by way of nature it happens, or that there is still mutual responsibility today, then there will be no problem.
There used to be prophecy and a Sanhedrin and a Temple; today there are none. In my opinion all these things are closely connected to mutual responsibility, and without them, collective punishment for the sin of an individual is even malicious, because you can’t really prove to me that our problems came because of my sins if you don’t have prophecy (or the breastplate of judgment).
You can see it plainly: everyone blames the other for the problems. Anti-Zionists will blame the Zionists/heretics for the Holocaust, and Zionists will blame other things. If God brought the Holocaust as punishment for sins, but gave us no indication (apart from everyone’s own prejudices) as to why, then we are dealing with a rather cruel God with whom I want no connection.
By the way, even if the Torah really says, as you claim, that one may punish people over matters between man and God even though no harm was done to another human being, then I want no connection with that Torah and prefer to think it has no connection to the word of God. Because that is something very immoral in my view. Harming another person is justified, in my opinion, only if he himself harmed another person.
“Your escape from this is to claim that punishment for matters between man and God is really between people”
No — I said that if you murder a person, you turn it into a matter between one person and another, and they will punish you for that because you acted unlawfully in taking the law into your own hands and killing a person without trial. The act that he did may still be a sin or may not, and that is irrelevant to the fact that you did something problematic. They won’t punish him, because the fact that you harmed him did not turn his act into a matter between people; it only put you in trouble.

7. “But was there actually mutual responsibility then? How do you know?”
When? What are we talking about? In general, I assume there was mutual responsibility then because that’s what it says, explicitly; but if there wasn’t, then there wasn’t. I don’t know exactly when there was and when there wasn’t — it doesn’t matter to me much. Or are you talking about the death penalties in the Torah? Because then each case has to be looked at individually. As for Achan, for example, it is absolutely clear that there was mutual responsibility and that what he did caused death — that is what the text says.
“And if so, why isn’t there now?”
I don’t know — why is there no prophecy now? It could also be that there is now, but the uncertainty is too great to punish people on that basis. It is accepted that one needs strong proof in court to prove harm, beyond a reasonable doubt. But today not only is there doubt about mutual responsibility itself, there are also many doubts about what the correct Jewish law is. So in any case I see no possibility of punishing a person today over matters between man and God (besides the fact that there is no Sanhedrin in the place God chooses, so what are we even arguing about?).
I don’t think these are my inventions. The people living in Zion would probably agree with me that there is no mutual responsibility today, and that the fact that Yossi desecrates the Sabbath does not cause less rain or plagues. What is popular is not necessarily true, but these intuitions/assumptions do not arise randomly. People live in reality and infer them from what they see.

As for the questions:
1. I personally am not all that interesting… I’ll just say that I try to go with reason.
With the Oral Torah I have even more problems. I don’t think it helps at all. I also don’t believe in its existence. We can get into that if you want — for example, on phylacteries and the calendar I have a lot to say.
2. This passage does not grant authority to the sages. It grants authority to the priest/judge who will be in those days (and in the place that He will choose…). So what is written in the Order of Damages has no more authority in our time than what the Karaites, Sadducees, Boethusians, Qumran community, etc., wrote in their time.
Thank you too. Have a good week 🙂

I don’t understand what more you want. It’s written explicitly:
“between blood and blood, between Torah and commandment, statutes and judgments.”
This verse talks about judges turning to a higher authority following a dispute, like in the yeshivot, or when a matter is too difficult, like in Deuteronomy, and then the “highest” authority will issue the halakhic ruling.
Capisce?

K

I already addressed that. Do a search.