Q&A: Moral Judgment Regarding the Ordinance for Penitents
Moral Judgment Regarding the Ordinance for Penitents
Question
Rabbi, in your opinion, is the logic behind the ordinance for penitents a moral logic? Is there significance to the moral level of the population toward whom rulings are made with respect to a ruling of justice? Is there room to argue that it would have been proper to rule like Beit Shammai, against the ordinance for penitents, and that the ruling at the time stemmed from local social considerations and therefore there is no place to accept it today? The question arises from the comparison between Samuel's saying about the repentance of the people of Nineveh: "Even if one stole a beam and built it into a palace, he tears down the entire palace and returns the beam to its owner" (Babylonian Talmud, Ta'anit 16a), and: "A certain old woman came before Rav Nachman and said to him: The Exilarch and all the rabbis of the Exilarch's house are sitting in a stolen sukkah! She screamed, but Rav Nachman paid her no attention. She said to him: A woman whose father had three hundred and eighteen slaves is crying out before you, and you pay her no attention? Rav Nachman said to them: She is a screamer, and she is entitled only to the value of the wood" Rashi – …because of the ordinance for penitents… (Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 31a)
Answer
There are disputed passages, and the sages disagree on very many issues. The possibility of issuing a ruling is entrusted to each person, so long as the Talmud itself has not had the final word. And halakhic ruling definitely can and should be a function of the situation and the circumstances.
Ruling like Beit Shammai is more problematic, since the Talmud ruled that Beit Shammai in the place of Beit Hillel is not considered a valid Mishnah. However, we do find Amoraim who despite this ruled like Beit Shammai. It seems to me that someone who holds like Beit Shammai may rule accordingly. What was said is that one should not rely on them against Beit Hillel. But someone who rules that way because that is what he himself thinks—the fact that Beit Shammai also think so is not a drawback. In the present case as well, you are not ruling like Beit Shammai; rather, you are ruling according to your own view, except that Beit Shammai also thought that way.
Discussion on Answer
There is no moral question here at all. This is only a practical-consequentialist question: what will cause people to repent.
The first question is whether the practical consideration is part of the moral question, or whether it is an additional layer—policy. Or can one say that there is no point in separating them, since there is no meaning to morality that is not practical?