Q&A: The Principle of Preferring the Specific
The Principle of Preferring the Specific
Question
Rabbi, wishing you a joyous festival,
I’m in the middle of studying the booklet on the physico-theological proof, and I ran into a question.
It explains there that there is a contradiction between two assumptions: (a) an infinite regress is impossible. (b) Every complex thing has a designer, and seemingly that should include God Himself as well (who is also complex, otherwise He could not have planned our complex world).
And you explained that the choice to qualify the second assumption and exclude God stems from the principle of preferring the specific, which says that it is better to qualify the broader rule so that both rules remain meaningful (even if qualified).
But I couldn’t understand why that is נכון here, because even if we were to make an exception to the issue of infinite regress in the case of the design of complex things, we would still be left with two meaningful rules (albeit qualified), since assumption (b) would remain fully intact, and assumption (a) too we would apply everywhere else we encounter infinite regress.
I’d be glad if you could explain where I’m mistaken. Thanks.
Answer
I didn’t understand what you are proposing: what exactly would you make an exception for? In complex things, an infinite chain of creation would be possible. What would you gain from that?
But beyond that, there is a difference between these two principles. It’s not that infinite regress is not possible, but that there is no such thing (it is a fiction of concrete infinity). Therefore, here no exception is possible.
Discussion on Answer
A. That exception, even if it were possible (in point B I said it is not possible), is completely implausible. Why should the creation of a complex thing be able to occur through an infinite regress? What counts as “complex” for this purpose? It is like saying that the creation of anything that begins with the letter ayin (= world) can happen through an infinite regress. It makes no sense at all. This is not mathematics that counts the number of exceptions. You have to look at the logic and plausibility of the exception.
B. See above. Making an exception for God is not only plausible but necessary. The entity that stops the regress must be its own cause. That follows from the contradiction itself. Therefore, this is a case of preferring the specific.
A. I would gain the preservation of both principles, which seem reasonable, with one exception (just as there is one exception according to your proposal).
B. If you are saying that there cannot be an exception to infinite regress, then this is no longer related to the principle of preferring the specific, but rather that you chose not to make an exception there because it is impossible, right?