Q&A: The Principle of Preferring the Specific
The Principle of Preferring the Specific
Question
Rabbi, happy festival days,
I’m in the middle of studying the booklet on the physico-theological proof, and I came across a question.
It explains there that there is a contradiction between two assumptions: (a) an infinite regress is impossible. (b) Every complex thing has a designer, and ostensibly that should include God Himself as well (who is also complex, otherwise He could not have designed our complex world).
And you explained that the choice to qualify the second assumption and make an exception for God stems from the principle of preferring the specific, which says that it is preferable to qualify the broader rule so that both rules remain meaningful (even if qualified).
But I couldn’t understand why that is correct here, because even if we make an exception regarding infinite regress in relation to the design of complex things, we would still be left with two meaningful rules (albeit qualified), since assumption (b) would remain fully intact, and assumption (a) we would still apply in all other places where we encounter an infinite regress.
I would be happy if you could explain where I’m mistaken. Thank you.
Answer
Sorry for the delay; for some reason I missed this question.
I don’t remember what was written there. I don’t see a contradiction between those two assumptions. On the contrary, both are true, and therefore it is clear that there is a primordial being that has no designer. Perhaps it is not complex, or perhaps it is not of the type of entities found in our experience.
But still, with respect to these two assumptions, it seems right to me to prefer qualifying the second one, because there the exception is explained (an entity not found in our experience, or one that is not complex). By contrast, why should we qualify the rule that rules out infinite regress? What is unique about our case that would make that legitimate?
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