The universe isn’t all that complex….
Maybe life is complex, but evolution did that,
and evolution, aside from the random component that enters into it, is not a complex law but a very logical one. A law that even the Creator is subject to (according to the Rabbi, who says that the Creator is subject to logic).

Evolution didn’t do anything. The laws of nature within which it operates did that. Therefore, the complexity that emerges reflects the complexity and uniqueness of the laws.
You are confusing evolution with natural selection (the strong survive). Evolution also includes the formation of mutations and genetics. But as stated, all of this operates within the laws of nature, and without them there would be no evolution. I elaborated on this in my book.

So the first cause is not the universe itself, but there is no reason to say that it is דווקא not within our experience (as in the cosmological argument), because this is a general line of reasoning.

There is no “reason” to say so? 🙂
What is within our experience has a cause. We do not learn this from experience alone but from a priori reasoning, yet that reasoning speaks about the entities familiar to us. Therefore, it is reasonable that the first cause is something else.

🙂
That is indeed what the logic says, but then I saw that on page 5 it says: “The assumption that a complex thing did not create itself is an assumption of common sense (in the next chapter we will see that this is really a probabilistic calculation), and therefore ostensibly it is valid with respect to all reality and not only to something that fits our experience. This assumption is not drawn from experience but from reason, and as such it is relevant to all entities. If so, here one can still insist and say that God too is not exempt from this requirement—that if He is complex, something else must create Him.”
And I did not see that this initial assumption was rejected, only that there must be a first link in order to avoid regress. But if so, there is no logic in saying that it must specifically be outside our experience, because regarding complexity there is no difference between them that would make it preferable to posit something not within our experience; this is a choice between two equal options, and it is preferable not to introduce anything beyond experience.
Where is the mistake?

If it was created, then something has to create it. But the first link was not created (unlike things within our experience, which are created for some reason).

Sorry, I don’t completely understand.
Is this sentence rejected entirely (is it simply not true in itself)? –
“This assumption is not drawn from experience but from reason, and as such it is relevant to all entities.”
What is not correct about it?
Because from the continuation of the page it seems that the Rabbi agrees completely with the sentence, and he only gives an explanation for why nevertheless this cannot be applied to the first being, (because there has to be a first thing), and there is no explanation for why it is preferable to say that it is specifically not from within our experience. After all, “it is relevant to all entities” equally.
If it is difficult for the Rabbi to elaborate and he would prefer a phone conversation, I’m available.

I explained this. The assumption is that a complex thing that was created did not create itself. The things within our experience were created, and therefore there must be a prior being that created them. Therefore, the first being, which has no cause, must be an entity not within our experience, because it is an entity that was not created, and in any case the assumption that something must create it does not apply to it.
I am only repeating what I already wrote.

Thank you, Rabbi. I’ll try to summarize and see whether I understood.
Regress is a fallacy, and therefore there must necessarily be a first being that was not created.
It makes sense to say that the first being is not of the type of things within our experience, because all the things within our experience were created, unlike the first being, which was not created.
Since the first being was never created, our logic that says every complex thing requires a component does not apply to it, because that logic speaks only about the entities familiar to us (all of which were created at some point in time) and not about the first being (since it was not created); something that was not created does not need a creator.

The Rabbi should add this to the notebook (p. 5), where the claim is brought that the logic regarding complexity also applies to what is not within our experience (“relevant to all entities”).
It is not rejected, and the Rabbi only notes that there must be a first being that was not created in order to prevent regress, and willy-nilly one has to except the first link from the rule regarding complexity (lex specialis).
No explanation is given there for why the first being is specifically not within our experience (because it was not created), and the reformulated wording of the ‘complexity rule’ is also not given—the wording that makes excepting the first link logical and necessary beyond the regress argument (the logic speaks about entities that were created).

Indeed, you understood well.
I’ll check and add it if necessary. Thank you.