Rabbi, but if there were an indication of involvement, free choice would have no meaning. Otherwise there’s no problem believing that He exists, since there is an indication.

I deleted your parallel question. If you’re discussing this thread, it should be done here.
As for your question: the Jewish people sinned at Mount Sinai after the greatest and clearest revelation there ever was. Choice always exists. Beyond that, those demons also have an explanation for why you don’t see them: because they’re demons. These are theories that cannot be tested or refuted, and therefore I don’t put much trust in them.
See here: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%9F_%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%94_%D7%A9%D7%9C_%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%9C

Rabbi, is there a good reason to assume that the principle of Russell’s teapot is true on the objective, informative level, and is not merely a methodological approach?

In my opinion, definitely yes. Just as Occam’s razor, which is a methodological principle, reflects truth. That fits my view that intuition is a cognitive tool and not merely methodology. See my article here:

עוד בעניין תערו של אוקהאם

The argument that God and His providence in the world, mentioned endlessly in every chapter of the Torah and in the words of the prophets, are some crazy claim like “the teapot” — is hinted at in the verse: “You neglected the Rock who fathered you, Teshi, and forgot the God who brought you forth”… Teshi, in gematria: the teapot.

Best regards, the Spaghetti Monster [in gematria: Samson Zvi Halevi (including the kollell)]

Why should God intervene? Because you feel like He should? Since when is God your contractor?

The Last Halakhic Decisor, because He can, and it costs Him nothing, and He’s good and upright, gracious and merciful. Someone should call Mr. A. so he can continue.

Don’t decide for Him whether He can, or what He can or can’t do. He’s not your trainee.

In your opinion He can’t?
You’re not my trainee either, and still I’m honored to determine that you are capable of formulating one complete argument.
But for some reason you choose to wrap yourself in the mantle of a prophet of the Lord of Hosts, shooting fireworks and lightning at his stubborn congregation.

What difference does it make what I think or don’t think? Reality isn’t determined by my opinion. The question is what reality is. And the answer is that we don’t know, and all this is nonsense that has supported many babblers throughout the generations.

Just to remind you: the one who said what God knows or doesn’t know was the serpent.

Rabbi, according to your view, how can you reconcile the principle of the celestial teapot with intuition as a perceptive faculty?
After all, intuition can never identify that something does not exist, so unless you assume that if there were such a teapot we would be supposed to detect it—which sounds entirely reasonable—then that principle cannot apply when using intuition alone.
And why should we say that every object that exists in the universe is supposed to cast intuitive waves in us regarding its existence?

How do you know that two parallel lines never meet? You can see a meeting, but not a non-meeting. Intuition can definitely also deal with nonexistence. As for skeptical questions about quantum intuitive fields, I have no answer.

But the point is that there is a clear distinction between the ideal plane, where it is reasonable to say that we are capable of understanding that two parallel lines do not meet, and the practical plane, where it is hard to say that some entity here would affect our intellectual understanding through a non-sensory medium.
So even if Occam’s razor can, and reasonably should, be accepted according to your view with respect to the laws of nature themselves, it still seems to me puzzling to accept it regarding changes that occur within reality itself.
An example of this is the teapot: according to your view, in order to argue that the claim that there is no teapot is more reasonable than the claim that there is such a teapot, it is only because if there were a teapot I would probably be aware of it in a non-sensory way.
But doesn’t that sound a bit strange to you? Is that really the situation—that we are all some kind of prophets, seers of the present?… And material entities affect the ideal world.

Not strange at all. If it sounded strange to me, I wouldn’t say it. Anyway, I’ve explained my position.

Wait, wait, wait,
Do you agree with my description? And do you think that if there were a teapot, we would be supposed to know about it through the mind’s eye to some extent, and therefore insofar as we are not acquainted with such a teapot, we have good reason to assume that there isn’t one either?
(And that means there are effects of entities here on the world of ideas, at least to some extent?)

I had a big argument with a friend of mine back in the day about this issue according to your view, but apparently it always sounded from you that you do not see mutual influence as a kind of interactionism, but only a kind of epiphenomenalism between us and the world of ideas. Even though there is a difficulty from the zeitgeist and so on. But it never sounded as though there was a reverse connection, and certainly not from ordinary entities here in the world.

Chinese. Do you have some actual question?

Indeed,
The question is actually quite simple; I hope it’s understandable.
As I understand it, you hold that we have a capacity for non-sensory observation that looks into some kind of “spiritual” world.

Until now I understood that, according to your view, the spiritual world is fairly fixed, and our observation of it is more like our “reading” it, but without anything from this world being able to “write” in it. (As opposed to Karl Popper, who spoke about the three worlds.)

But here you are in fact claiming that if there were a teacup in space, that fact would be “written” somewhere, that it exists, and as a result we would have accessible information about its existence. Therefore, as long as we do not see that something is “written,” we prefer to say that it does not exist rather than that it does. And that is the basis for the strong intuition behind Occam’s razor. So this is not merely a methodological approach, but an essential one.

You could say the same thing with regard to the causal property of bodies, so that object A “writes” somewhere that it struck object B, and as a result we have accessible information that reads this.

This is a major innovation, because until now I understood (and I’m not alone in this) that you speak of the world of ideas as something more “Platonic”-like, of eternal ideas, but not something that is highly interactive with our world.

Thank you very much,

I don’t understand where you drew this interactivity from in my words. Not that I necessarily object to it (what’s wrong with claiming there is interaction?!), but I don’t see where it grew from or how we got there.

How I got there isn’t complicated, but for the moment I’d rather strike while the iron is hot and ask:
Does his honored eminence in fact hold that there is interaction as I described, regardless for the moment of what exactly is “written” there in heaven and how—basically, is there interaction between objects and our understanding, as in Occam’s razor?

Because if so, that’s a major novelty in my understanding and could resolve many things I never quite understood how they work in your thought.

I never thought about it before, but a priori I don’t see any obstacle to it. Although it may be a matter of exposing a deeper layer and not of a person “writing” in the world of ideas.

If so, that could explain why people once saw in your writings somewhat contradictory formulations—ones that hint at it a little, but no more.
In any case, if it is only a matter of exposing a deeper layer, then it is a bit difficult to apply this method on the basis of observing changes that occurred on a non-deterministic basis, such as free choice, or using Occam’s razor regarding people.

It just seems to me that the “writing” of all the bodies in the universe is one stage more advanced than a world of ideas that speaks more about a set of principles.