“One person taking won’t change anything” — what about the categorical imperative? And buying slaughtered chicken in the supermarket?

It has nothing to do with the categorical imperative. My claim is that the gifts have already been given, and taking them changes nothing.

One instance of taking, no — but one act of taking joins another and adds up to a big total, and if nobody took, they wouldn’t give again, or the very meaning of the gift would be lost retroactively. So I thought that was included in the imperative. And according to that, why is there any moral problem with buying chicken in the supermarket?

Also, it is forbidden to buy from a thief the object he stole, and it is a great sin, since he thereby strengthens the hands of transgressors and causes him to commit other thefts, for if he finds no buyer he will not steal. About this it is said: “He who shares with a thief hates his own soul.”

And a question for “In the Dumps” —

If we take Kant’s categorical imperative, why should the people of the “International Fellowship” be any worse off? 🙂

As for the substance of the question, it seems to me that rabbis disagreed over whether their goal is missionary, or whether they genuinely have friendly intentions. And that, apparently, is the point of the dispute.

Best regards, Y. F. Ordner

Their lot should not be diminished, because there is also the third reason in the original answer. And besides, in my own view the categorical imperative is something that vanishes like a dream, etc., and I don’t believe any intelligent and wise person who claims to hold by it. I judge him favorably, that he only publicizes it to the masses so that they’ll be influenced as they should be, and no more. In any case, we still need to learn, so we should incline our ear like a funnel, and even gape wide to drink the ink from the inkwell.

With God’s help, 1 Tevet 5781

References and links to rabbinic opinions on both sides can be found, for whoever is interested, on Wikipedia under the entry “International Fellowship,” in the section “Criticism of the Fellowship,” and “give to a wise man and he will become wiser still.”

Best regards, Yaron Fishel Ordner

On second thought, the reason that one person taking really makes no difference does require further clarification. I’ll sketch it briefly.
1. Simply speaking, the categorical imperative belongs to the world of morality, and therefore buying chicken in the supermarket is not a halakhic problem but a moral one.
2. However, in my view this imperative also has force in Jewish law, so there is room for this claim.
3. Still, one can distinguish: with supermarket chicken, even if everyone buys, no halakhic problem is created, only a moral one (halakhically it might be aiding a transgression), whereas here, if everyone takes, there is a halakhic problem (accepting a gift from a gentile).
4. But one can distinguish between our case and supermarket chicken, because even in the current situation there is no problem with the gentile giving; at most the problem is that the Jew takes. Therefore it is not clear to me to what extent this is included in the categorical imperative, because there is not necessarily more of a problem in a situation where everyone takes than in one where a single person takes. The problem of a Jew taking is each individual’s own problem.
5. Put differently: do I need to refrain from taking in order not to cause others to stumble in the prohibition of taking a gift from a gentile? Especially since here this is a very indirect causing-to-stumble, because what is actually being distributed now has already been donated by the gentiles.
6. But in the categorical argument generally, it isn’t correct to view this as a problem of causing others to stumble, because the categorical imperative deals with a hypothetical test (what the situation would be if, hypothetically, everyone took), and not with practical influence (that if I take, others will also take). So the discussion about causing others to stumble is not the discussion here.
7. Even according to my own view in column 122, that this has practical implications, see there, here that is not the case because most people do not agree with this value (there is only a small minority of soldiers who are bound by the prohibition not to take from a gentile).
And in fact, based on this, one should discuss whether the categorical imperative is relevant in a place where most people do not see a situation in which this is a general law as problematic.
8. But as stated, the consideration that one person taking has no effect was only one consideration among several, so I still think it is permitted.

It should go without saying, in light of my clarifications here, that the Jewish law regarding someone who buys from a thief has no connection to this case in any way.

Why does the reason of “drying up the harvest” not apply nowadays?

I explained. The gentiles of today are not wicked, and there is no reason to withhold good from them. Therefore it is also reasonable that the redemption of Israel does not depend on drying up the gentiles.
See also an overview here with additional points for leniency:
http://asif.co.il/?wpfb_dl=7564

Another reason for leniency: after the Lord ceased intervening in the world (according to the secret revealed to Rabbi M. A. D. A. 🙂 ), there is no longer any concern that giving charity will increase the power of the gentiles.

Best regards, Shimshon Letz-Man

I didn’t properly understand 4–5. I’ll write them as statements, and the questions are where the mistake is.
If the problem is that the Jew takes, then obviously it is forbidden to take (just as it is forbidden to eat non-kosher food from a stand distributing it for free).
If the problem is that the gift will be taken by Jews, then the categorical imperative applies very nicely.
If the problem is that the gentile gives, then taking is encouragement for future giving, like one who shares with a thief (“for if he finds no buyer, he does not steal”).
7 is a great surprise to me, and I still need to think it over.

By my life, I have read the columns that deal with the categorical imperative (13, 67, 122, 252 and its sequels, 284; if there are others and the above referred to them, I read those too), and although all of them, in terms of the discussion and analysis, are sweeter than honey, and with the series in 252 I stood on my feet and recited a blessing of enjoyment over it, still the categorical imperative itself seems to me to come from the vacuum and to it return, and let its name be covered in bewilderment. Except that there is always some nagging little mosquito buzzing around about it, and I need a smith and son of a smith to silence it.

As I explained, sections 4–5 deal with the question of causing others to stumble (afterward I wrote that this is not the main point in the categorical imperative). Now, if the problem were that the gentile gives, then it would be natural to connect this to causing others to stumble, because the accumulation of our actions brings about the forbidden result. But if the problem is only that the Jew takes, then the fact that the gentile gives is merely the enabling circumstance, and there is not necessarily a problem in the enabling circumstance being created by the combination of all our actions. True, if the gentile does not give, Jews will not be able to take, but that is already an indirect connection. And about that I wrote point 5 regarding causing others to stumble in so indirect a manner (and perhaps this is like the question of “before the blind before the blind”).
Note that the problem of the Jew taking is not a problem in the object itself, like eating non-kosher food (for that there is no need at all for the categorical imperative; it is forbidden in itself). The problem is the creation of merit for the gentile donor. And if in practice that is not created by my actions, there is room to be lenient.

Honestly, I’m not managing to follow the reasoning here. I’ll try again in the evening, thanks.

Perhaps issues of the “categorical imperative” in Jewish law could be clarified with observant Jews who head the system of prosecution, such as Attorney General Mandelblit, his deputy Raz Nizri, and Deputy State Attorney Shlomo Lamberger, and thus “salvation comes through much counsel” will be fulfilled 🙂

With the blessing of the “defense imperative,” Levi Yitzhak of Berditchev from Ostropol

In line 3
… Shlomo Lamberger, and thus…

This passage is repeated because of something new that arose in it.

I’ll summarize the answer as I understand it, focusing on section 7.

There is a categorical imperative that deals with a single event — it is forbidden to hit someone for no reason, because I would not want there to be a general law permitting people to hit for no reason, and even if everyone hits for no reason, I myself am still forbidden to hit for no reason.
And there is a categorical imperative that draws its force from its generality — one should refrain from wasting water, because I would not want everyone to waste it and then we’d end up with a shortage. Here section 7 of the answer above comes in and says that if everyone is wasting water, then I too am allowed to waste it, because my own waste is imperceptible. A bit tricky, and that’s why I wrote above that this was a surprise requiring thought.

Now I saw that Hillel Gershuni brought on Facebook a very nice Talmudic passage that seems to say exactly this:

And this is part of what he wrote there:

The Talmud (Bava Metzia 107b) tells of Rav Huna (or Rabbah his son), who had a forest on the bank of the river. According to the rules, he had to cut down the forest to make room for the porters who carry the boats. The public benefit takes precedence over private benefit, even at the expense of property rights.
But Rav Huna refused: what will it help if only I cut mine down? he said. Let the forests above me and below me be cut first, and then I’ll cut mine.
The Talmud wonders about this: after all, it says, “Correct yourself first, and afterward correct others,” so why did he wait for the others to cut theirs? The Talmud answers that the forest above and below him belonged to Parzak Rofila, “a Persian governor, and it is known that they will not be cut down,” in Rashi’s words, and therefore cutting down Rav Huna’s forest would not help.