Q&A: Silence as Admission and the Laws of Watchmen
Silence as Admission and the Laws of Watchmen
Question
Hello and blessings!
- As is well known, there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether the concept that “a litigant’s admission is equivalent to a hundred witnesses” is derived from a textual source or from logical reasoning, and this is discussed at length in Sha’arei Torah (Principle 1). According to Rashi’s view, that the source is the verse “which he says, ‘This is it,’” is it correct to say that silence as admission (Bava Metzia 6a) is not included in “a litigant’s admission”? Of course, I do not mean to say that the Torah spoke specifically only about verbal speech, but since it would seem that admission through speech is a higher-grade admission than admission through silence, then the Torah did not introduce the concept with regard to silence.
- As is well known, the Amoraim disagreed whether the legal status of a renter is like that of an unpaid watchman or like that of a paid watchman. According to the views that hold that a renter is like an unpaid watchman, it is clear that payment is a significant part of the definition of a paid watchman. Seemingly, this is puzzling, because the Babylonian Talmud (Bava Metzia 94b) was uncertain which passage speaks about an unpaid watchman and which passage speaks about a paid watchman, and in the end it decided on logical grounds. But the Torah itself never mentions the word payment when it speaks about a paid watchman, and if so it would seem that the matter is not measured by payment but by the level of benefit, as is stated explicitly in the Jerusalem Talmud, Shevuot 8:1 [and if so, a renter is equivalent to a paid watchman]. But if that is not so, how could the Torah omit this part and not write the word payment? Doesn’t the very omission call out, “Interpret me”?
Answer
- I do not see this as necessary. It is possible that there is a source in the Torah, and logical reasoning interprets and defines it (and sometimes also expands it). By the way, I am not familiar with the discussion in Sha’arei Torah, but I am not sure there is actually a dispute here.
- Who told you that the level of benefit is equal? It is possible that a paid watchman benefits more (even though he does do a bit of work for it, but perhaps that is only payment for taking responsibility and not payment for the work), whereas the renter pays for his own benefit. Beyond that, even if the Torah does not mention payment, that does not mean the criterion is not payment. On logical grounds, the Sages understood that this passage is speaking where there is payment.
Discussion on Answer
2. Regarding what you wrote, that perhaps according to everyone “a litigant’s admission” is derived from a source — does the same apply even to the views according to which this is a case of migo, etc.? According to them it seems simple that this is based on logical reasoning.
1. We do this all the time. “Do not place a stumbling block” teaches a prohibition against giving unfair advice. “Do not eat over the blood” prohibits five different things (eating before prayer, eating on the day a death sentence is issued, the stubborn and rebellious son) and many more.
2. Even regarding migo, there are views that it is derived from the verse of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” (by the way, that is another example of expansion through logical reasoning). Beyond that, the verse “This is it” teaches this migo (especially since it is a much stronger migo than an ordinary migo, and therefore it can be compared to “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted”).
1. Where do we find that logical reasoning expands the definitions about which the Torah spoke? When do we do this and when not?