Test

It's true that without God there is no morality. But people do get confused about that. That much I can still understand.
But what I meant to wonder about is those people who do not live according to the Hebrew Bible and then suddenly use the Bible as proof of ownership, while forgetting that according to their way of life the Bible tells that their forefathers were murderers and robbers. The point is that there are lots of such people in the country, and that is already crazy superficiality.
And what really is there to discuss if the Canaanites come? I mean according to someone who really does live by the Hebrew Bible.

With God's help, 4 Iyar 5781

If the Canaanites come to demand their "historical right"—we can direct them to South Tel Aviv, which is firmly controlled by the Sudanese and Eritreans. It would be fitting for the descendants of Cush, the firstborn son of Ham, to show an "open-handed spirit" toward their brothers, the descendants of Canaan, Cush's younger brother.

Best regards, Hardababrrr Gafni,
the Sudanese representative in the International Bible Contest

I think the questioner is trying to sketch a more specific line of thought than what is implied by Michi's answer. He probably means to say that the Jews' right to a state of their own is not like the right of other peoples to their own territory. In this way he is trying to undermine the "secular" argument for an independent state in the Land of Israel by means of a dilemma: either believe in the divine promise, in which case there is justification for claiming the land, or don't—and then there is no such justification at all. In the questioner's view, as I understand him, there is no escape from this dilemma.

I think that is a mistake. The hypothetical secular person in the background of the question is not claiming an absolute right to the land (derived from God), but only a relative right. In that respect he is exactly like any Japanese, English, or American patriot. So he does not really have a problem of justification.

One could perhaps argue against this that such a secular position distorts original Judaism, in which the right to the land is an organic component, say. But that is not a real problem for the secular person, at least not for a clear-eyed secular person. If he does not pretend to full authenticity in terms of his Jewish identity, then his relation to the Land of Israel too, distorted or not, is not based on a claim to an "absolute" right. Presumably even a Japanese "secularist" might "distort" his culture in the context of his territorial claim.

In any case, even if the knights of justice decide that we have no historical right to the Land of Israel, which we conquered from the Canaanites—after all, Jews lived all over Europe long before the Middle Ages, when the Franks, Goths, Huns, Teutons, and Normans arrived there, emerging from Central Asia during the Migration Period that destroyed the Roman Empire and in later waves as well. Compared to these savage peoples who invaded Europe, the Jews had been living there hundreds of years earlier.

Likewise, in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Jews had lived for many hundreds of years before the conquerors came out from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century. In North Africa there was even a Jewish kingdom led by the Jewish queen Dihya al-Kahina, a kingdom destroyed by the Arab conquerors. In Yemen too there was a Jewish Himyarite kingdom, destroyed even before the Muslim conquest by the king of Ethiopia.

Accordingly, one may suggest to those interested in returning Palestine to the descendants of the Canaanites and Philistines that they be consistent, and by the same justice return Germany and France, Britain and Scandinavia, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco to us. The invaders of Europe can go back to their homelands on the steppes of Central Asia, and the invaders of the Mediterranean lands can return to the deserts of Arabia. Then humanity will have a redeemer 🙂

Best regards, Attila the Arpadian

Dear Doron! You defined my question exactly, and better than I did. Thank you.
But regarding your explanation of the average secular person, I disagree with you.
After all, all the ceremonies, and the prime minister, and the politicians, and all the patriotic spirit of the IDF—for example the swearing-in ceremony—they never stop saying: we are the people of the Bible, we have returned home.
The national anthem is "Hatikvah," where everyone sings: the two-thousand-year-old hope! Meaning, we are not conquerors; we are taking what is ours by right. We came home.
If the average secular person thought as you suggested, there would be no room for all this excitement, because then we are just people who 73 years ago settled on land, part of which was inhabited, and claimed ownership over the entire area.
Clearly there is an embarrassing contradiction here. And what does Rabbi Michael think?

What contradiction??!
The Bible really did exist thousands of years ago, even if the mythological figures (Abraham, Jacob, Moses) are inventions and the whole system of commandments is a regional human development. Our ancient forefathers once lived here under vine and fig tree, fought with Ammonites and Edomites, established kingdoms, and built temples. The fact that they suffered from various religious fantasies is no more important than the fact that they did not even know how to use a telephone. The claim is based on the land of our forefathers, not the land of our God. The Palestinians too come to us today with exactly the same consideration, that this is allegedly the land of their forefathers; that is, the core of the argument is accepted by many around the world.

The concept of a right is psychological nonsense. There is no such thing in reality.
In reality, might makes right. With rights or without rights, social babble does not interest reality.
If you survived on the ground despite the attacks against you, the territory is yours.

In a minute you'll believe you breathe because you have a right to breathe. You are welcome to stop breathing for a few hours while you figure out whether you have a right to breathe and burn oxygen. And on what basis.

Elhanan,
I answered your question, but in your follow-up response you didn't really engage with the answer.
I agree with you that most secular people hold a confused position on this issue, but as I argued, this is a position that can be corrected.
Explain to me what is problematic about the position of a "clear-eyed" secular person like me (for the sake of discussion I choose to compliment myself and distinguish myself from my secular friends…) regarding our right to the land. I choose, with clear awareness, to "distort" my Judaism and take from it also the matter of our right to the land. Except that unlike the Orthodox position as it is usually presented (and some dispute that even from within religion), I do not pretend to claim absolute validity for this right. I choose to follow my forefathers, though in a limited and qualified way. In this matter my situation is more or less like that of the "clear-eyed" Japanese patriot.
What is the problem with that?

Decisor,
This psychologism you're trying to apply to almost everything doesn't work and can never work. In my opinion, you yourself don't really believe it either (though maybe you are trying to convince yourself).
Psychology is important, but it is only one component within a broader reality. You choose (for psychological reasons?) to see the part as the whole.

With God's help, 4 Iyar 5781

The Decisor aptly taught that for the Jewish people the land is not a "right" but a "duty." As explained in the Song at the Sea, the Land of Israel is "the mountain of Your inheritance, the place You made for Your dwelling, O Lord, the sanctuary, O Lord, that Your hands established." The Jewish people are brought into the land in order to fulfill their mission to be "a kingdom of priests" that will guide humanity to walk in the ways of God. Therefore our entry into the land is not an "acquired right" but a trust deposited in our hands so that we may fulfill our mission, just as a soldier "signs for" the valuable equipment the army places in his care.

The Land of Israel is a "conditional land," entrusted to us for the realization of our divine purpose. True, toward us in this generation God acts with long-suffering because of the great suffering we endured in two thousand years of exile, culminating in the terrible Holocaust, and He granted us the merit to walk in the land of life so that here we may be healed by the wise air of the land from all the spiritual defects and corruptions that clung to us through the terrible sufferings of exile. The land embraces us like a loving mother, so that there may be fulfilled in us: "As one whom his mother comforts, so I will comfort you; and in Jerusalem you shall be comforted."

Best regards, Ami'oz Yaron Shnitzel"r

The Decisor did not "teach" anywhere in his comment that this is a duty; rather he said that everything is force (might makes right). And even if he had done so, on his own view moral considerations of duty or right carry no weight at all. In any case, no one really buys this psychologism, even if some tell themselves and us that they do.

As for emphasizing duty over right: it is true that the Torah speaks in general more about duties than rights (that is true of all cultures in the ancient world—Leo Strauss wrote nicely about this at length), but the attempt to dissolve the concept of right entirely is also excessive. The Jewish people do have historical rights to the Land of Israel, and the dispute about them between the "religious" and the "secular" is only about the degree of their validity—absolute or not. Of course, within each camp too one can split hairs about this.

Hello Doron,

Since all of human history is full of conquests and expulsions, if the Pandora's box of "historical rights" is opened, the Gauls will demand that the Frankish invaders be sent back to their homeland in the steppes of Kazakhstan, and the Germans will demand that the Russians return to them Königsberg, the city of Kant.

What is accepted today is that an ethnic group that sees itself as a people and lives in a territory has the "right of self-determination" in the area where it resides, without checking the ways its forefathers arrived there. In accordance with this conception, the UN decided in 1947 to establish here "two states for two peoples." Today they would add a Sudanese state in South Tel Aviv too 🙂

The biblical conception is different. The chosen people and the chosen land are the property of the Creator of the world. Just as the White House is the official residence of the president of the United States as long as he fulfills his role, so the Land of Israel is the official residence of the people of purpose.

Best regards, Yafaor

The discourse of "historical rights" was common in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, and led to many wars over regions of land. Germany and France fought over Alsace-Lorraine; Poland and Germany fought over Danzig and East Prussia; Hungary fought with Romania over Transylvania. Lithuania and Poland fought over Vilnius; Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Ukraine fought over Carpathian Ruthenia, and so on and so on.

The trauma of the two world wars, which brought tens of millions of casualties, together with the development of nuclear weapons that created a "balance of terror" between the blocs, led to the decision to freeze the situation created after World War II and to remove the "historical rights discourse" from the lexicon, and "the land had rest" for some eighty years 🙂

Best regards, Yaron Fish"l Ordner

Doron,
You turned the secondary point in what I said into the main point.
The main point is that in reality there is no such thing as a "right."
The secondary point came to explain the source of the "right."

And if in reality there is no such thing as a right, then why are we here? Because we won wars.
If we had lost, we would not be here. Simple as that.

To the Last Decisor—hello,

When a person goes into battle with the feeling that he is fighting for a cause that seems just to him, he develops inner strength that enables him to endure and charge bravely.

Thus the Rosh explains the justice of the ruling of "might makes right" when the religious court has no evidence—there is an indication that the true owner will fight with greater self-sacrifice for his just claim.

There is also a hint to this in the cantillation punctuation of the verse: "On that day the Lord of Hosts shall be for a spirit of justice" (major pause) "to him who sits in judgment" (pause) "and for strength" (pause) "to those who turn back the battle at the gate." From this punctuation it appears that "for a spirit of justice" refers to the whole continuation of the verse: that the spirit of justice is needed not only "for him who sits in judgment" but also for the strength of those who turn back battle at the gate.

With Sabbath greetings, Ben-Zion Yohanan Halevi Radetzky

"When the religious court has no evidence"—
What is the religious court? A fictitious governmental creature based on non-fictitious force (government does have force).

And when the religious court lacks the reasons according to its arbitrary rules (the law is set by human beings) to activate its force, nothing remains except to allow the minor subjects to play by the rules of nature, and then might makes right.

And it is worth mentioning what everyone forgets: the true strongman from the outset is the religious court itself; it's just that in this case, where there is no evidence, it waives the use of force.

Therefore, might makes right is always true. Both when there is evidence and when there isn't.

Ben-Zion Yohanan Halevi Radetzky, you nicely incorporated an idea into the verse, "and for a spirit of justice—to him who sits in judgment, and for strength to those who turn back battle at the gate." But as for the intention of the cantillation marks, it seems different to me. The punctuation really is difficult, but what did the masters of the cantillation marks find so pressing against the straightforward punctuation—"and for a spirit of justice to him who sits in judgment, and for strength to those who turn back battle at the gate"—that they went looking for new interpretations? That is, it is not enough that the new interpretation contain an idea; there also has to be a reason not to make do with what already exists in the verse without effort, before they bother loading on interpretations.
So it seems to me that their intention is that the word "spirit" pulls itself and another with it: "and for a spirit of justice to him who sits in judgment, and for a spirit of strength to those who turn back battle at the gate." As it says, "a spirit of wisdom and understanding, a spirit of counsel and strength."
Therefore, if they chose the expected pause—"and for a spirit of justice to him who sits in judgment, and for strength to those who turn back battle at the gate"—then the idea would be lost that "spirit" also extends to "strength." And if they chose the pause after "spirit"—"and for a spirit—justice to him who sits in judgment, and strength to those who turn back battle at the gate"—that might be more successful, but the way of the cantillation marks is to wait with the pause until there is a unit bearing meaning, as in "Save me, please, from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esau," and not "Save me, please—from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esau." Or, "and let them be for signs and for appointed seasons, and for days and years," and not "and let them be—for signs and for appointed seasons and for days and years." Because they wait for the completion of a meaningful component (and there are many more examples of this). Let the chooser choose.

Decisor,

The strange claim that there is no such thing as a "right" is equivalent to similar claims that there is no such thing as a "duty," "childhood," "love," or even a "bank." All of these are abstract entities that cannot be seen with the senses or imagined, and yet all are present and greatly affect all our lives.

As before, I suggest you perform a thought experiment regarding your own life: whenever you think something is owed to you (change in a store, fair treatment at the health fund, or "right of way" on the road), tell yourself that there is really no such thing as a "right" and perhaps there is no point in claiming it.
Afterward come back to us and report how it went.

Doron,
Even in the Large Hadron Collider they searched and searched and did not find a "right" particle or a "duty" particle. Meaning, it is a human fiction. All these abstract entities are human inventions.

Does it strike you as strange to discover that reality does not change according to human whims? Isn't that what you would expect from reality after being freed from the chains of childhood imagination?

Can you not distinguish between a game and reality? According to the rules of the game I can make a claim, provided the other side agrees to the rules of the game. For example, if you tell a cartel boss that you are going to sue him and then catch a bullet in the head, it will no longer sound strange to you that there is no such thing as a right.

Decisor,
Your claim is not only disconnected from reality, it is not even connected to your own life.
I suggested that you carry out a small experiment at home that would demonstrate this to you.
What you claimed above regarding "rights" is not only mistaken as an idea, but on the practical behavioral level you are not faithful to it at all.
Of course, by now we have drifted away from the original question (the conception of the right to the Land of Israel from the point of view of a "secular" Jew).

Assuming for the sake of discussion that we ignore the fact that the Owner of the universe gave Israel His private property, the fact that we conquered Canaan by force became meaningless over time. Once there are no legal heirs—and after all, the original Canaanite peoples disappeared long before the Roman conquest—the land behaves like ownerless property, and the current homesteader acquires it.

By contrast, at the time of the Roman conqueror the land was stolen from us, but all along we remained its legal heirs and ownership never expired.

Doron, I didn't understand your question.
Language is a human invention, and here you and I are using it.

With God's help, 7 Iyar 5781

To Tolginus—hello,

Indeed one can also say, as you suggest, that "spirit" refers both to justice and to strength. In any case, even according to that, strength depends "not by might and not by power, but by spirit."

Best regards, Batzir

[I didn't know whether to say it, and maybe I'm just being hasty, and the commentators didn't address it (they didn't know then the detailed rules of the disjunctive accents as they are known today, but the main pauses they certainly knew), but if I were printing a Rabbinic Bible today I would correct the cantillation marks in this verse and add an asterisk with the existing version and the suggestion that the copying was apparently corrupted in ancient times. It looks too strange, and the interpretive explanations don't have the power to justify such creaky punctuation.]

In connection with the verse in Isaiah 28:6, I happened yesterday to speak about this verse with someone who works on the Bible, and he referred me to the words of Shadal, who emphatically claims that the cantillation punctuation in this verse is a mistake. "The major pause under 'justice' and the pause over 'judgment' are without doubt nothing but a scribal error, and they should be reversed; and even though I found it so in no book, I did not wish to uphold so great a corruption." The picture I received is attached here: https://ibb.co/mvncXpp

[But it must be said that it cannot be just a simple copyist's error of exchanging one main pause with another as implied by Shadal's words; other accents would also have to be changed. At present the accents are: 'and for a spirit' (accent), 'of justice' (major pause), 'to him who sits' (accent), 'in judgment' (pause). If one swaps the two main pauses, then the surrounding accents must also be swapped, because one accent does not come before that pause and the other does not come before the other pause. It seems to me that if one corrects it, it should be: 'and for a spirit' (minor connecting accent, perhaps with difficulty another accent), 'of justice' (pause), 'to him who sits' (accent), 'in judgment' (major pause). Therefore it is unlikely that this is merely a copyist's slip from ancient times; if anything, it is an interpretive error or oddity on the part of the masters of the cantillation marks.]

With God's help, Lag BaOmer 5781

To Tolginus—hello,

The lips of the masters of the cantillation marks speak clearly: "for a spirit of justice" is needed not only "for him who sits in judgment," but also "for strength to those who turn back battle at the gate," as the Austrian field marshal Wenzel Johann Joseph Radetzky, a contemporary of Shadal, taught us—he led the Austrian army to victory in Italy even at age 82—teaching you how much a sense of justice strengthens the man of war.

More than that, "those who turn back battle at the gate" was explained by some commentators to mean "those who bring the warriors home safely." Thus Jonathan translated: "and to grant victory to those who go out to battle, to bring them back safely to their homes." Rabbi Moses the Priest (quoted by Ibn Ezra) speaks explicitly of returning those who fled the battlefield home: "for God will strengthen the fugitives" (and Ibn Ezra says of his words, "and he is correct").

To defeat the enemy in battle one mainly needs courage and tactics, but in order to take responsibility to bring all the fighters home, even those who failed and fled, the commander needs not only courage and military skill, but a powerful sense of obligation and loyalty to his fellow fighters, to ensure that not even one remains abandoned and without strength. To bring them all back safely and care afterward for their long process of rehabilitation, the commander needs a great deal of "a spirit of justice"—to do justice to all who went out to battle.

The victories in this difficult battle will not be taught at West Point and the other military academies, but this is the uniqueness and true test of a commander guided by the prophet's vision, who grasps his Creator's attribute as He promises: "And you shall be gathered one by one, O children of Israel."

In our chapter, the prophet also describes as "justice" the unique, individualized treatment that the farmer gives each species he grows, and of this the prophet says: "His God instructs him in proper judgment, He teaches him." The wisdom with which God instructs the farmer teaches him to give a unique treatment to each species, "for dill is not threshed with a threshing sledge, nor is a cart wheel turned over cumin; but dill is beaten out with a stick and cumin with a rod; bread grain is crushed…"

And just as the farmer has a distinct judgment for each and every species, so the commander has "a spirit of justice" that instructs him to give each and every soldier the proper personal treatment and attention.

Best regards, Ami'oz Yaron Shnitzel"r

It is worth noting that the Sages interpreted "and for strength to those who turn back battle at the gate" regarding the battle against the evil inclination and the "war of Torah," and in those cases most certainly "the spirit of justice" is needed all the more.

Paragraph 3, line 5
… for their long process of rehabilitation afterward…

In the last paragraph, line 1
… those who turn back battle at the gate …

One may also disagree with the words on the lips of the masters of the cantillation marks, and all the commentators have done so more than once or twice, starting with the Aramaic translations, continuing with the early commentators, and ending with Malbim. Even the masters of vocalization sometimes apparently disagree with the masters of the cantillation marks. Shadal claims it is a scribal error and not the original punctuation of the masters of the cantillation marks. In my opinion that doesn't really matter; even if the original masters of the cantillation marks punctuated it this way, there is no valid interpretation to their words and it is an error. The writer of the verse built two parallel clauses—"for a spirit of justice—to him who sits in judgment; for strength—to those who turn back battle at the gate"—and if he had wanted to wrap himself in a preacher's cloak and say that a spirit of justice and a sense of justice help the fighters' courage, he would have found ways to style the verse differently. His hand was not too short to write, and there is no reason he would formulate it in such a creaky way. Just a matter of feel.

And in any case, your words regarding "those who turn back battle at the gate" do not seem right to me. According to all the commentators, the meaning is strength for the fighters so that they will win. The intention of Rabbi Moses the Priest, quoted by Ibn Ezra, is that those who were formerly weak and fled and returned to their city gate in shame (as it is written, "feet shall trample the crown of pride," etc.)—now on that day the Holy One, blessed be He, will strengthen them and give them courage. Not that God will strengthen those who are currently fleeing, for if there is flight here, there is no courage here. And the translation means that if they prevail, they will naturally return safely to their gates. Radak explained it as turning the battle back toward the enemy's gate. It is all the same idea in different forms, and that is the straightforward plain sense.
In general, wherever I find the words of Shadal, I listen with full attention. In my eyes his intellect is clear and straight like the good oil running down the beard. By the way, he has another pamphlet in which he proves with conclusive and persuasive evidence that the vocalization and the whole sophisticated system of cantillation are late, perhaps from the period of the Savoraim.

In short:

"The spirit of justice," the aspiration and commitment to justice, is needed both for "those who turn the battle back to the enemy gate," according to many commentators, because a sense of justice strengthens the fighter's hands.

All the more so, commitment to justice is needed for "those who bring the warriors back safely to their homes," according to Jonathan's translation (and perhaps also according to Rabbi Moses the Priest, though as you said his words can be understood to mean that God strengthens the fugitives to return to the battlefield). In any case, according to Jonathan's translation, it certainly speaks of bringing the fighters back "safely to their homes," and for that the commander needs a great commitment to justice.

Later in the chapter, where it says about the farmer who knows how to distinguish and to give individualized treatment to each species as appropriate: "His God instructs him in proper judgment"—another meaning of "justice/judgment" emerges: the practical man's ability to conduct his affairs wisely. "Justice" in the sense of discernment and good judgment is also among the qualities required of a commander.

Either way, the masters of the cantillation marks are correct that "for a spirit of justice" is needed not only "for him who sits in judgment" but also for the men of valor who turn battle back at the gate.

Best regards, should read as follows

Commitment to justice is not needed at all. All the heroes of all history are despicable murderers and robbers who ruled the world. Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar and Darius and Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar and Hannibal and Napoleon—all scum who were very successful, while the central sense of justice pulsing in them and in their armies was the desire for glory and the will to power. Bringing the men of war back safely is a characteristic sign of victory in war, like "a troop shall troop upon Gad, but he shall troop upon their heel"—to return back. And even if the idea has some place in itself, in the verse it simply does not fit. If this were some principle of faith, then one could understand why the masters of the cantillation marks pressed themselves (that happens several times), but for them simply to invent things in order to insert ideas of their own—I see no point in that. In any event, let the chooser choose.

And regarding the attempt to date the cantillation marks late—

After all, the earliest Amoraim—Rav and Rabbi Yohanan (Nedarim 37)—know the punctuation of the cantillation marks as an existing fact. According to Rabbi Yohanan, a teacher of children receives "payment for the punctuation of the cantillation marks," while according to Rav he does not receive "payment for the punctuation of the cantillation marks" but only "payment for supervision," because "the punctuation of the cantillation marks is of Torah origin," as it is written in Nehemiah, "and they understood the reading," and Rav explains: "these are the cantillation marks."

Something about which the earliest Amoraim dispute whether it is of Torah origin or rabbinic origin is certainly an ancient tradition that long predates their period.

Best regards, should read as follows

People always knew that one had to learn where the main pauses in the verses are, and especially where the end of the verse is. But there was not a detailed specification for every single word as to which accent it has. There is also no reason for the cantillation marks to have been transmitted by tradition from Moses our teacher, since the overwhelming majority follow fixed rules, so that anyone who has studied a little can reconstruct the punctuation of almost all verses. The Sages do not mention the name of any accent or vowel sign. Nor any Jewish law or aggadic teaching that touches them. Nor did they use the cantillation marks to interpret any verse; for example, there are five verses whose meaning is undecided—if the cantillation marks predate the Sages, then the cantillation marks resolve all of them. In such a case, there is no better proof than not seeing it, and that is the end of the conspiracy theories. In general, in my opinion the exemplary systematicity found in the whole cantillation system is such that it cannot be a remnant from the ancient world but rather the fruit of a newer and more learned world. I do not currently have Shadal's book, and I did not find it on HebrewBooks, so I wrote a bit from memory, but I would be very surprised if you find any reasonable contemporary scholar who thinks that the cantillation marks (and the vocalization) are from the time of Ezra the Scribe or earlier. Quite the contrary—go forth with your great host.

Even from the words of Rabbi Akiva in Berakhot—that one does not wipe in the bathroom with the right hand "because with it he points out the cantillation of Torah"—it follows that there existed a tradition of cantillation punctuation transmitted by hand signs, and not written down (like all the Oral Torah, which was not permitted to be written until a later period because "it is a time to act for the Lord").

Best regards, should read as follows

Regarding the rules: conceptualization often comes in the wake of tradition. The conceptualization does not exempt one from the obligation of transmission, because there are many exceptions. The tradition of reading and punctuation was passed on by repetition from father to son and from teacher to students, without most of them knowing the definitions and rules.

Thus, for example, a child learns language by hearing, without either he or, often, his parents knowing the rules of grammar. There are many languages in which there are different case forms for every word according to its syntactic role. The speaker uses intuitively the rules that distinguish between genitive, dative, and accusative, without ever having heard of those distinctions.

When I read from the Torah at my bar mitzvah I did not know the rules of cantillation punctuation; I just repeated and repeated, over and over. Only in my late twenties, when we lived in Nokdim (two years before Lieberman came 🙂 ) and I wanted to help with the Torah reading every Sabbath, did I learn the rules from Rabbi Mordechai Breuer's book, and it helped me prepare the reading.

Regarding "with it he points out the cantillation of Torah," it is unlikely to explain it (as Rashi does) as meaning there were specific accents like revi'a and tevir and the whole lot. It is enough that he points with his hand to the main stopping places. And that may not even be the meaning in the Talmud. If the Sages mentioned the Account of the Chariot, that does not mean they knew "Ze'ir Anpin" and the primordial serpent.
The rules of grammar are the product of natural developments and are therefore full of exceptions, and there indeed conceptualization is only approximate. But the rules of cantillation are far more systematic, with relatively far fewer exceptions, and I have no doubt whatsoever that some vocalizer-tradent sat there with the rules in hand and applied what fit. For several good years I walked around with most of the rules of cantillation in my head and checked almost instinctively in every verse I encountered that everything was in order. If I risk a rough estimate, then 95% of verses are perfectly smooth. Phenomena of melodic constraints and all sorts of tiny rules certainly exist, and people who dedicated their lives to such minutiae dealt with them. Breuer's book is heavy and excessively laborious. All the important rules can be summarized in a concentrated and concise way in two or three pages, and I have actually done that. By the way, once I thought one could derive from the cantillation various proofs about the ancient pronunciation, and I have several examples that surprise me that I have not seen anyone before me deal with this kind of proof (for example, the word "two" with the shin read with a silent sheva, unlike other methods; two shevas at the end of a word, both silent, unlike the view of Hayyuj that the second is mobile at the start of the next word; a sheva after an unaccented long vowel—different tradents disagreed on this. All that and more can be learned from the rules of cantillation).