Q&A: Giving Against His Will
Giving Against His Will
Question
See Netiv HaMitzvot, parashat Korach. You cite Gittin 75a, and I really don’t understand Rava’s view there, where he says that Hillel introduced the idea of giving against the buyer’s will (in the case of a house in a walled city). But that isn’t really Hillel’s innovation at all—it comes from the Torah itself, which gives the seller the option of redeeming his house within half a year even if the buyer doesn’t want to. Hillel’s innovation was the part about doing it "not in his presence."
In short: what does Rava hold? According to him, what is the Torah’s innovation in saying that the seller can redeem his house, if not that it works against the buyer’s will?
Answer
What are you referring to? Please formulate the question properly. If you’re referring to something I wrote or said, specify what it is.
Discussion on Answer
There is a difference between a person who refuses to take the money and a person who refuses to transfer ownership. A person who refuses to transfer ownership—the Torah compels him to do so (and this is the rule of “we compel him until he says, ‘I want to,’” because in the end he wants what the Torah commands). But if he refuses to take the money, there would have been an initial assumption that it would not help, because at the end of the day payment has to be made. That person who refuses to take the money will be a wrongdoer, but the house still will not be acquired by the redeemer. Later in the Talmud there they discuss whether this is in his presence or not in his presence, and the relationship between in his presence and against his will.
Wonderful. How did you understand that? It’s written neither in Rashi nor in Tosafot, even though this is a simple misunderstanding that comes up from even a superficial reading of the Talmudic passage.
Correction: not in Rashi.
It says in Gittin 74:
Rava said: From Hillel’s enactment we may infer: If one says, “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and she gave it to him with his consent—she is divorced; against his will—she is not divorced. Since Hillel had to enact that giving against his will counts as giving, it follows that ordinarily, giving against his will is not considered giving. Rav Pappa challenged this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi: But perhaps Hillel only needed to enact it for a case where it was not in his presence; whereas in his presence, whether with his consent or against his will, it is considered giving.
I’m asking a question (it’s not really a question, it’s a lack of understanding—I just didn’t understand) at the most simple plain-sense level, without getting into conceptual analysis and so on:
Rava holds that Hillel introduced giving against his will in his presence. But if so, then what is the Torah’s innovation?? The Torah said that the seller can redeem his house. If this is not talking about giving against the buyer’s will in his presence, then what is it talking about—a regular sale?! Obviously, if the buyer agrees to give back the house then there’s no problem; that’s just a regular transaction. So clearly the Torah’s innovation is that it’s possible to redeem the house against the buyer’s will! So why does Rava say that this is Hillel’s innovation? I genuinely don’t understand.