Q&A: Obligation in the Sabbatical Year When Purchasing a Tree
Obligation in the Sabbatical Year When Purchasing a Tree
Question
Hello Rabbi,
There is an organization that sells grapevines for the Sabbatical year, so that the buyer can fulfill the commandment of shemitta. Does such a purchase of a tree, which does not include ownership of the land in the land registry (to the best of my knowledge), in fact create an obligation of shemitta?
Their website: https://shmeeta.com/
The wording of the agreement (from the website): https://shmeeta.com/wp-content/uploads/elementor/thumbs/Teuda_05a-2-p68i408clrn8djic4ybh36gegfyl953ffrw95fwkzk.png
Answer
See the agreement. You are also buying rights in the land with respect to that tree (something like in the Talmud regarding one who sells trees and also sells the surrounding land).
Beyond that, the question is which of the shemitta commandments you want to fulfill. To declare the fruit ownerless? That certainly applies even if you own only the tree. After all, the land belongs to a Jew and is therefore obligated in shemitta. Working the land is not relevant for you.
Discussion on Answer
You are declaring your land/tree ownerless. What is the problem?
What I mean to ask is whether there is value in this.
For example, it is accepted among us that there is value in wearing a four-cornered garment, because that way I become obligated in the commandment of tzitzit, and then I attach tzitzit to the garment and actively fulfill a commandment.
Is there value in causing myself to become obligated in a commandment that requires me only to be passive?
In other words, is there value in joining the project and buying agricultural land in the land registry / buying a tree? (Regardless of what is actually done with my money.)
Thank you!
And again I ask: why not? Is there value in declaring your land ownerless? Yes (even though it is passive omission. Though one could discuss whether the act of declaring something ownerless is not actually positive action. Assuming one needs an actual act of hefker, like the Yere'im). So now there is land that is yours. Declaring it ownerless is a commandment. If so, buying the land caused you to do another commandment. Why shouldn’t there be value in that? The discussion is about the commandment, not about entering into an obligation to perform the commandment.
Is there also value in buying a donkey so that it will rest on the Sabbath and I will fulfill “so that your ox and your donkey may rest”?
Why not? If this were a prohibition—then no. But it is a positive commandment.
We do not find that people buy donkeys in order to chase after the commandment of letting your animal rest.
Possible explanations:
1. People do not chase after commandments and they are not good enough. Really, all of us should start buying donkeys so they can rest on the Sabbath.
2. One should not force oneself into a situation of fulfilling a commandment, especially if it is passive (I wrote passive to distinguish it from the commandment of tzitzit, where we do indeed find that we force ourselves into an active obligation). If so, one should not force oneself into buying land in the seventh year.
3. On the Sabbath we ourselves rest; the donkey is only a quantitative addition to the resting, and therefore there is no need to chase after that. In light of this, it would seem sufficient to buy some piece of land and not spend hundreds or thousands of shekels on buying land.
4. I’ve come up with a startup no one thought of, and I’ll start selling shares in donkeys that rest on the Sabbath…
I would be glad if the Rabbi could point to the reasonable explanation for why, nevertheless, we do not find people chasing after fulfillment of the commandment of letting your animal rest, and especially why in shemitta specifically it is worthwhile to chase after the commandment of letting land rest by buying land in the land registry.
Thank you very much!
With regard to sending away the mother bird it says specifically, “If a bird’s nest happens to be before you.” The Rabbis taught: “If a bird’s nest happens to be before you”—what does Scripture come to teach? Since it says, “You shall surely send away the mother, and the young you may take for yourself,” one might think he should go searching through mountains and hills in order to find a nest. Therefore Scripture says, “if it happens”—if it comes before you.
Perhaps if he went searching through mountains and hills, then even if he sent her away he did not fulfill the commandment, because he did not meet the conditions (and it is also somewhat similar to “anything the Merciful One said not to do—if one did it, it is ineffective”). And not only because of the rationale of the verse, but because of the wording of the verse. And if so, regarding other commandments there is no reason to think that if one searched through mountains and hills he did not fulfill them. And if after searching through mountains and hills there is a commandment, then presumably there is also value in searching through mountains and hills.
Azriel,
Many have beaten you to that startup. Like those who redeem a firstborn donkey, etc.
But I do not understand your difficulty. Clearly there is no obligation, but by the same token it is clear that if you do it, you have a commandment. Is there value in accumulating commandments? Certainly yes. But there is no obligation to accumulate commandments. And if you are occupied with another commandment, then of course there is no reason to leave it in order to deal with this one. So I do not see any difficulty at all, and I do not understand what the discussion is about.
One can discuss how much reward one will receive for such a commandment (because the reward is probably according to the effort—according to the pain, so the gain), but that is also true of someone who lets a donkey he already owns rest, just like someone who bought a donkey for that purpose.
Sando,
as is known, the kabbalists disagree with that Talmudic passage (and with Ran there), and Chavot Yair already noted this.
I didn’t know the kabbalists disagreed. I did not find the Ran—not on the Rif and not in the novellae.
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=37967&st=&pgnum=680
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14455&st=&pgnum=106
I’ll find the Chavot Yair this evening and look into it.
Practically speaking, according to the Talmud’s view that it is only when it happens before him, if he needs the chicks and eggs but would not have gone searching specifically for bird nests, yet he did go searching through mountains and hills, found a nest, and sent away the mother—did he fulfill a commandment? Or since it is not “happens before him,” is it like putting tzitzit on a garment that does not have four corners?
From the wording itself I would not infer that there is no commandment in such a case. However, by logic it would seem that the whole definition of the commandment according to the Babylonian Talmud is that if one wants the chicks or eggs, he must send away the mother; so if he sends her away and takes them only for the sake of the commandment, there is no commandment at all. The commandment comes to prevent cruel taking (despite the Mishnah: “One who says, ‘Your mercy reaches even a bird’s nest’”) and not that there is a standalone commandment of sending away. And the kabbalists disagree on this.
It is agreed that cruel taking does not constitute a commandment. But non-cruel taking, where he searched through mountains and hills (he wants chicks and nestlings to eat for dessert, but instead of going to his neighbor who owns a coop he said “for the sake of the unification” and went out with knapsack and staff)—I do not understand why you would not infer from the Talmud that even if he found one, there is no commandment.
After all, the Talmud certainly did not entertain the initial thought that there is an obligation to search through hills (for why would one think such a thing, which exists in no other conditional positive commandment like tzitzit), and I do not think the Talmud deals in “nice ideas” and derives them from verses. Therefore the initial thought must be that if he searched, found one, and sent her away, he fulfilled a commandment, and the conclusion is that he did not. How do you understand the progression of the baraita if not that way?
The initial assumption was that this is an unconditional commandment, and they learned from the verses that it is conditional.
[Not sure this is necessary, but I assume that even if one derives laws from the wording of the verse and not from the rationale of the verse (or the definition of the commandment), the rationale can still serve as an explanation and prevent a general analogy—an objection: what is unique about this commandment is such-and-such.]
Why? Other conditional commandments are known to be conditional even without a verse. Parapet, tzitzit, taking back his divorcée, etc.
Chavot Yair (67) writes that one is obligated to send away the mother even if he is not interested in the young, in accordance with the Zohar, so that the mercy of Heaven will be aroused for His children through the suffering of the bird over her young (and it needs explanation why mercy should not be aroused by another thousand thousands of birds and other animals and people whose children die or are lost from them. Job 39: “The wings of the ostrich beat joyously; are they the pinions and plumage of the stork? For she leaves her eggs to the earth and lets them be warmed on the ground, and forgets that a foot may crush them and that a beast of the field may trample them. She deals harshly with her young as if they were not hers; her labor is in vain without fear. For God deprived her of wisdom, and gave her no share in understanding”).
And there he proves from the initial assumption that if one searches through mountains and hills, this implies that when it happens before him he is always obligated; for otherwise, if even when it happens before him he could leave it alone, then what would be the basis for thinking he must search through mountains? I do not understand this proof at all. What is the problem with explaining that only if he needs the chicks, and would otherwise buy them in the market, one might think he should search for a nest; the text teaches us that it is only if it happens before him.
There are several ways to understand the initial assumption and the conclusion:
A. The initial assumption: he is obligated from morning till evening to wander the mountains looking for birds. The conclusion teaches us that he is not obligated.
B. The initial assumption: it is a pious practice to wander the mountains. The conclusion teaches us that he is not obligated.
C. The initial assumption: if he wandered the mountains and sent away the mother, he fulfilled a commandment. The conclusion teaches us that he did not fulfill one.
Option A is very far-fetched. What, his whole life he should search for birds? And why did they not similarly expound: “When you build a new house”—one might think he should spend his life building houses; therefore it says “when you build.” “When you encounter your enemy’s ox, you shall surely return it”—one might think he should spend his life searching for oxen; therefore it says “when you encounter.” “When you hear in one of your cities” regarding an idolatrous city—one might think he should spend his life touring cities; therefore it says “when you hear.”
Option B does not seem plausible to me, that the baraita expounds verses about fear of Heaven and pious conduct. If there are other places where, as a matter of Jewish law, the Torah itself deals with ruling out an initial assumption of pious practice, I would be glad to see them.
Therefore option C blossoms and buds, its clusters ripen into grapes. And that is specifically with sending away the mother bird; but “new house,” “enemy’s ox,” and “idolatrous city”—if he built, searched for an ox, and went around listening about cities, fortunate is he, he fulfilled a commandment.
In the other commandments too, this is learned from the verses in one way or another. Sometimes it is presented as an explicit derivation, and sometimes it is embedded in the interpretation as such. Thus with tzitzit, we require corners, and this is learned from the verse.
I agree with your option C, except that in my opinion it is only another formulation of my explanation (the initial assumption is that it is not conditional, and the conclusion teaches us that it is conditional).
A. From what I understood, your explanation is option A. And it is not at all plausible that even in the initial assumption there would be a day-and-night positive commandment to find birds. And when would he encounter his enemy’s oxen? And listen out for idolatrous cities? That is an impossible initial assumption and not unique to sending away the mother bird.
B. Where is this learned in the other commandments? Not that I would know if indeed it were, but it does not sound plausible to me. A reference would help a lot.
C. I did not understand what corners in tzitzit have to do with this. We learn a condition in the commandment—what is the novelty?
D. According to option C, if he needs birds and went out searching through mountains and sent away the mother, he did not fulfill a commandment. Do you really agree with that? According to option C, everyone agrees that sending away the mother bird is a bad commandment because one does something bad. Therefore the exposition is specifically here to say that it is so bad that if he searches for it, he has no commandment at all in hand. But with other conditional commandments, if he searched in order to qualify for the condition and then fulfilled it, good for him.
Nobody is claiming that he is obligated from morning till evening. The obligation can be formulated in several ways (like once a day, for example, as they did with tefillin without any real source for that). One could tie it to a situation where he needs chicks or eggs, in which case he must specifically seek out a nest over which the mother is crouching, and so on.
B-C. In every conditional commandment there must be a source for the fact that it is conditional—either from the plain meaning of the text, or a midrashic derivation, or an oral law given to Moses at Sinai, or logic. I did not understand your puzzlement about tzitzit. There too there is a condition, and the question is from where we derive it. The fact that it has to be a four-cornered garment is learned from “the fringe of the corner.”
D. I do not agree with that. In short, I explained what I think the initial assumption was, and it does not really matter which of your formulations resembles it.
So in your opinion this initial assumption is not unique to sending away the mother bird. Then why, with the other commandments I mentioned (“when you build a house,” “when you encounter an ox,” “when you hear in one of your cities”), is no such derivation known to me ruling out the initial assumption that all his life there is a positive commandment upon him? According to your view, there is no answer to that unless you find such a derivation for every such commandment.
I said that it is obvious that the commandment is conditional and not an obligation all his life, and no baraita is needed for that. The baraita comes to teach a special point regarding sending away the mother bird, that it is a bad commandment. With tzitzit it is not obvious that it applies only to four corners, so you need a derivation, and that is not our issue at all. As for tefillin, I will look into it. Let the chooser choose.
First, even here it is not necessarily a formal derivation. It is from the implication of the wording (see Tosafot at the beginning of chapter 2 of Kiddushin regarding “and he shall send” and “and she shall go out”). They just formulate it as an initial assumption and conclusion, in order to teach what the verse “if it happens” comes to teach. But they learn it from those words.
Beyond that, everywhere the commandment is conditional there has to be a source for that. Otherwise how would we know? Whether the source is presented explicitly or not makes no difference at all. Whether it is interpretation or formal derivation also makes no difference. There is always interpretation or derivation or logic or oral law given to Moses at Sinai. By definition that is so—why do you need references? I brought an example from tzitzit, where this is learned from “corner,” namely that it is conditional on a garment with corners. You say that there it is not obvious without the derivation, but I claim that this is not a derivation; it is simply the meaning of the text. And so too here. There was a possibility of understanding it as an unconditional commandment, and therefore the verse wrote “if it happens” to teach that it is conditional. Admittedly, this is obvious to you, but only because the verse is written that way and by force of its being written that way.
I really do not understand this discussion.
https://www.torahbase.org/%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%97-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%96/
I found a lecture by Rabbi Asher Weiss that covers the whole issue. You were right. He says that indeed one should not explain the initial assumption as a positive commandment day and night, and the Chazon Ish explained something like what you suggested: that the obligation is limited, like tefillin, and that the initial assumption was that one is obligated once in his life to search through mountains to fulfill the commandment. Rabbi Asher wonders there about the initial assumption that this is a positive obligation (my option A), and suggests that the initial assumption was pious practice, and the conclusion teaches that even that is not the case (my option B). Though that seems to me a novel kind of exposition, ruling out pious practice. The verses strike me with awe, and I had thought that in verses there is only permitted and forbidden, and perhaps decrees, but not “nice ideas.”
And the main thing is that Rabbi Asher brings other such expositions. In the Jerusalem Talmud regarding the beheaded heifer: “if a slain person is found in the land”—not that one must go searching. Regarding the idolatrous city, I invented that there is no such exposition, and it turns out there is one in Sifrei: “when you hear in one of your cities”—and not if one goes around searching. And there is also a general exposition in Midrash Rabbah that all commandments written with “when you see,” “when you encounter,” “if it happens”—if a commandment comes to your hand, you are required to do it; and if not, then not. Just as you said. Therefore my option C, that this is unique to sending away the mother bird, falls away, and we return to options A-B.
I had not seen your last response when I sent mine. Indeed.
I hope Rabbi Asher didn’t forget to recite, “Blessed is He who directed me to the truth” (I already recited, with God’s name and kingship: Blessed is He who has shared of His wisdom with me). 🙂
🙂
You mean that the Chazon Ish should recite it.
Rabbi Asher explains the Talmud itself as: the initial assumption is that it is a pious practice to search through the mountains; the conclusion teaches that even that is not the case.
Hello Rabbi, on this website: https://shviit.co.il/ they offer purchase of land registered in the land registry in order to fulfill the commandment of declaring the land ownerless during shemitta.
It feels a little strange, since I am buying land in order to fulfill a commandment and then simply do nothing, and by that I fulfill a commandment…
Is it agreed among the halakhic decisors that such a move is indeed fulfillment of a commandment?
Thank you!