Q&A: The Territory of a Halakhic Domain
The Territory of a Halakhic Domain
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I’m having trouble formulating the question, so I’ll start with examples:
- There are halakhic decisors who permitted the use of large utensils that cannot be immersed in a mikveh (for example, Arukh HaShulchan, Yoreh De'ah 120:39).
- There are halakhic decisors who permitted, in certain cases, going on a trip to a place where there is no minyan.
- In several places in the laws of doubtful cases regarding blessings (for example, Orach Chayim, laws of the blessing over fruits 211:1), Maran does not require a person to refrain or change what he wants to eat in order to avoid the doubt, but only defines it as a recommendation ("it is good to be careful").
Some of these leniencies are based on sources. But even so, it seems that in the background there is a strong rationale: that Jewish law in a certain area is not really meant to go beyond its own domain and prohibit some other subject. The laws of minyan cannot prohibit going on a trip, and the laws of blessings cannot prevent eating a certain quantity. This is especially clear regarding immersion of utensils, where I have not seen any grounding in the sources, only in logical reasoning.
True, in the background there are several general Talmudic topics that relate to some of the cases (when there is no other way, etc.). But in your opinion, is it correct to say that there is a rationale like the one I wrote regarding the boundary of the territory of a halakhic domain?
Answer
I don’t think this is about the relationship between different areas. If you are engaged in some activity in the normal course of things, you are allowed to do it even if it will create a halakhic problem. You would be considered compelled. Therefore I don’t think this is connected to ideas about territory.
For example, the Ritva discusses a person who made a blessing and then changed his mind and no longer wants to eat the fruit. Is he obligated to eat in order to rescue the blessing? He argues that he is not. That is quite a similar rationale (though one could analyze the distinction), and it deals with the very same matter itself (the eating and the blessing over it), not with two different matters.
Discussion on Answer
If what I wrote explains the exemption from minyan, then it explains all the rest as well. After all, if even in a case where this is not about two different matters there is a similar principle, then in a case where it is about two different matters we would say the same thing, and there is no need for the assumption that this applies specifically to two different matters. That is exactly what I wrote.
If eating and blessing are two different matters, then I don’t know what, in your view, would count as one matter. That empties your suggestion of all content.
Specifically regarding the Ritva, they are certainly different matters. The same matter would be blessings—yes/no/what blessing to make. The question whether or not to eat after you have already made the blessing goes beyond the laws of blessings.
But that doesn’t matter, because what you said in the first paragraph is correct. Thanks. I need to think about it.
Interesting. In my opinion, what you suggest can explain the exemption from minyan, but not the exemption from immersion. Here the person is not engaged in anything; he is simply choosing whether to use the utensil or refrain from doing so. As for the Ritva’s words, they are דווקא proof for my point. The laws of blessings can determine what blessing you should make, but they cannot force you to eat.