Q&A: Something Worth Money Is Like Money
Something Worth Money Is Like Money
Question
Suppose someone caused me 5,000 shekels worth of damage. I learned that according to Jewish law he can unload into my yard a container holding hairpins, watermelons, computer mice, a collection of landscape paintings, nail clippers, half-full bath lotion, a voucher for a couple’s breakfast in Nahariya, etc., and altogether the market value is 5,000 shekels.
Even though I myself would pay next to nothing for this stuff, because turning it into something I actually want, or into cash, would require hassle that just isn’t worth it.
Is that really the Jewish law, and if so, where is the justice in that?
Answer
Strictly speaking, it says in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 7–8) that damages can be paid with anything called the “best,” and the order is: first movable property, and only if he has none, then quality land (“the best of his field”). But Maimonides writes (Laws of Monetary Damage 8:10):
When a religious court undertakes to collect for the injured party from the damager’s assets, it collects first from movable property. If he had no movable property at all, or if the movable property was not enough to cover the entire damage, it collects the rest from land, from the best of the damager’s property. And whenever movable property is found, even bran, it does not turn to the land.
And similarly in the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 419:1.
You can see that they present this Jewish law as an instruction to the religious court, not to the injured party. The court is what decides what is collected from. The point of this Jewish law is actually to make things easier for the injured party, so he won’t get stuck with land and have to bother selling it in order to realize his money. That is why movable property is preferred (even bran), because it is the most marketable.
So it is obvious that this Jewish law is not to be used against the injured party by giving him the assortment you described. The court will collect from the damager whatever is best there from the injured party’s perspective.
Discussion on Answer
Absolutely.
Even the principle of “Occam’s razor,” which requires minimizing entities, would require paying with one entity equal to the amount of the damage, not with many entities 🙂
And one more small consideration: the damager is obligated not only to pay the financial damage, but also to appease the injured party and ask his forgiveness, since causing damage is a sin between one person and another that is not forgiven “until he appeases his fellow.” So it is worthwhile to make the payment in a respectful way.
Best regards, Mashai Remington
With God’s help, 14 Kislev 5782 (93 years since the wedding of the Rebbe and Rebbetzin of Lubavitch of blessed memory)
And since we mentioned the damager’s religious obligation to appease the injured party, it is worth mentioning that the Lubavitcher Rebbe explained in one of his talks that the guiding principle behind the disputes between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud in the laws of damages is this: the Babylonian Talmud sees damage payments as compensation for the injured party, whereas the Jerusalem Talmud sees damage payments as atonement for the damager’s sin.
On the basis of this talk, the distinguished Hasid Rabbi Meir Elitov wrote an entire book called Da'atan Alakh on tractate Bava Kamma (Beitar Illit, 2010), in which he explains in detail all the disputes between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud in the tractate according to this principle: are damage payments compensation for the damager or atonement for the injured party?
Best regards, Yeruham Fishel Noah Kurtman
Very interesting. Though at first glance it’s hard to believe. Maybe you have the book, and maybe there’s there (perhaps in the table of contents) a list of disputes “between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud” (meaning disputes between the anonymous editorial voice of the Talmud?) that are explained this way, and could you please gather from there three or four examples in telegraphic form?
To T.G. — greetings,
Apparently your name really is T.G., which is also an abbreviation for “telegraph,” and that is why you’re asking for a “telegraphic review” 🙂 But the author himself, Rabbi M. Elitov, also took care of a shortened version, which actually preceded the book.
The book Da'atan Alakh on Bava Kamma is a continuation of the booklet series Da'atan Alakh, which are concluding discourses on Talmudic tractates. An overview of them, together with a downloadable digital version, can be found on the Chabad site “Shturem.net.” And from there, with God’s help, you’ll find what you’re looking for.
Best regards, Y.F.N.K. son of B.G. [= biblio-graph]
And regarding “the anonymous editorial voice” or “Gemara”: I’ll note that yesterday was, according to the Epistle of Rav Sherira Gaon, the yahrzeit of Rav Avina bar Rav Huna, “in whose days the Talmud was sealed,” and the clear testimony of Rav Sherira Gaon is preferable to the conjectures of Professor Shamma Friedman, for in “certainty and uncertainty — certainty is preferable” 🙂
I found only this booklet http://www.shturem.net/images/news/35735_news_27042009_1954.pdf
There there is one dispute, namely the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish whether one’s fire is liable because it is like his arrows or because it is his property. And the author explains there that Rabbi Yohanan, who says because it is like his arrows, follows the person, who is obligated not to kindle it, while Reish Lakish, who says because it is his property, follows the property, whose owner is liable for its damages [this “explanation” itself is not something to discuss here]. And he says Rabbi Yohanan represents the Jerusalem Talmud (let’s say), while Reish Lakish represents the Babylonian Talmud (unclear). And he concludes: “The Jerusalem Talmud speaks in terms of obligation on the person, and the Babylonian Talmud in terms of obligation on the object.”
If out of the whole tractate he chose דווקא this example, that strongly suggests that in his eyes this is one of the better examples. There’s a bit of a difference between your description of the book and what appears in the booklet.
As for the anonymous editorial voice of the Talmud, what I meant was to wonder what is meant by a general dispute between the Jerusalem Talmud and the Babylonian Talmud in terms of content (not the give-and-take or wording), since the amoraim are basically the same amoraim.
To T.G. — greetings,
The booklet is not the book. The booklet (about 20 pages long) is the tenth in the series that deals with collecting the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s concluding discourses on Talmudic tractates. In the booklet on Bava Kamma, since there is only one concluding discourse of the Rebbe, Rabbi Elitov added an approach of his own regarding “his fire is liable because it is like his arrows.”
The book (which is about two hundred pages) is devoted, as stated on its title page and in its introduction, to the topic I mentioned: explaining the disputes between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud in the laws of damages according to the inquiry whether damage payments are compensation for the injured party or atonement for the damager, and you can presumably obtain it from the author, whose address and phone number are listed on the title page of the booklet.
In my humble opinion it is clear that both elements exist. Damage payments are both compensation for the injured party and punishment and atonement for the damager. After all, Torah law is not only social but also religious. If there is indeed a difference between the sages of Babylonia and the sages of the Land of Israel, it could be in the emphasis: whether the main point is compensation or atonement.
In cases of bodily injury this is very clear, because the plain meaning of the verses is that the damager should really be punished in his own body — “an eye for an eye” — and the money option is in the nature of a ransom, which the Torah allows (similar to the ransom paid by the owner of an ox that killed, in order to exempt him from the obligation of “and also its owner shall be put to death”).
And so too Rabbi David Nisani wrote in his book Kifshuto, that converting bodily punishment into money is meant to add to the dimension of punishing the damager also the compensation of the victim. And apparently Rabbi Elitov understands that even in monetary damages both aspects exist: compensation for the injured party and repairing the damager’s sin.
Best regards, Sasson Wolff Halevi Okamsky
The method of preachers and Talmud scholars of stringing halakhic disputes onto one underlying principle is very similar to the principle of “Occam’s razor,” which strives to give an explanation that ties all the facts to one central principle. And clearly, in reality things are more complex,
as the Rebbe says in his concluding discourse, that Reish Lakish, as a penitent, follows the approach of the sages of Babylonia, who arrive at the light מתוך pilpul of questions and answers (see something similar in the introduction of the Netziv to his commentary on the She’iltot).
The two elements in damage payments — compensation and punishment — can seemingly be seen also in the subject we’ve come to, namely paying damages with something worth money.
From the plain meaning of the verses, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” it sounds like the Torah wants the damager to be punished in the most painful way, with the best of his inheritance, the land that is the mainstay of a person’s livelihood.
However, Jewish law places emphasis on compensating the victim, and for that purpose there are situations where cash or movable property are preferable to fill the needs of the injured party, so that he will not gain little economic benefit from receiving a piece of land far from his own fields, where the effort of cultivating it and transporting its produce would make life harder for him.
Best regards, Nehorai Shraga Agami-Pasisovitz
Thanks (but I won’t contact the author and I won’t study the book. What I saw in the booklet, in terms of approach and analysis, seems to me far from what I’d want to delve into. Better a poor man who walks in his integrity, etc.).
See also in Yehuda Yifrah’s article, “The Torah of the Land of Israel — the Return to the Jerusalem Talmud” (on the Makor Rishon site), where he writes about Rabbi Avraham Blass’s “Orot HaYerushalmi Institute,” which finds in the Jerusalem Talmud more of a social and national tendency, and about the researcher Dr. Yaffa Zilcha, who finds in the Jerusalem Talmud more of a tendency toward “serving out of love,” as opposed to the Babylonian Talmud’s tendency to emphasize command and obligation.
Best regards, Hanoch Henekh Feinshmaker-Palti
A bibliographic survey of interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud throughout the generations — in my notes (under the nickname Shatz Levinger) to Dr. Hillel Gershuni’s article, “What Did Rabbi Yehoshua Wear in the Bathhouse of Tiberias,” on the “Musaf Shabbat” section of the Makor Rishon site.
With God’s help, Friday eve, “and he encamped before the city” פ"
In the article “On the Occasion of the Day of Passing: The Book ‘Da'atan Alakh’ Bava Kamma” (the Chabad Online site, 27 Sivan 5770), part of the author’s introduction, Rabbi Meir Elitov, is brought:
“Tractate Bava Kamma in its entirety stands on one foundation, hinted at in the concluding discourse that the Rebbe said on this tractate, and this is the foundational matter: in each of the primary categories of damages discussed in the tractate, there is a ‘person’ side and an ‘object’ side. And when the Torah obligated the person who causes damage, it spoke of correcting two matters: one is the prohibition he violated toward Heaven by damaging his fellow’s property; and the second is correcting the deficiency he caused in his fellow’s object.”
The author links the difference in emphases between Babylonia and the Land of Israel to the words of Tosafot in Sanhedrin, that in matters of prohibition and permission the sages of the Land of Israel are superior, whereas in monetary law the sages of Babylonia are superior. And he explains this as meaning that in matters of prohibition and permission, which are “between man and God,” that is the area of expertise of the sages of the Land of Israel, whereas in matters “between man and his fellow,” the Babylonians are more expert.
Based on Tosafot in Sanhedrin, the Havot Ya’ir explained that for this reason the Jewish law follows Rav in ritual prohibitions, because he learned his Torah in the Land of Israel from Rabbi and Rabbi Hiyya, but in monetary law the Jewish law follows Shmuel, whose Torah was acquired in Babylonia.
On the basis of this principle, the author explains the rule “one who admits a fine is exempt,” for the fine is about atonement for the sinner, since the injured party already received the financial compensation in the principal payment. And since the fine comes as atonement for his sin toward Heaven, here we say: “one who confesses and forsakes will be shown mercy.”
However, the author clarifies that the difference between Babylonia and the Land of Israel is not sharp: “It goes without saying that both in Babylonia and in the Land of Israel they dealt with both areas, namely both the ‘person’ and the ‘object,’ but there is a great difference between them in the emphasis they place… for the Jerusalem Talmud, repairing the person is primary; and for the Babylonian Talmud, repairing the world is primary.”
The author explains, according to this principle, seventeen topics from the first and second chapters, from the chapter ‘An Ox That Gored,’ and from the chapter ‘Merubeh,’ but notes that many more topics are explained according to this principle and “give to the wise and he will become wiser still.”
Best regards, Gabriel Hafzadi Tzveidnimovsky
And I have already explained above two matters in this direction: (a) that payment for bodily injury ought to have been punished by injury to the body of the damager, but the punishment is converted into ransom so that there will also be compensation for the injured party (as explained by Rabbi David Nisani). (b) That “the best of his field he shall pay” is, according to the plain meaning, a painful punishment for the damager, that the best of his land be taken from him; but the Jewish law that determined that movable property too is considered “the best” is based on the consideration of filling the injured party’s loss, since it is better for him to receive movable property that is easier to convert into money.
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… whereas in matters “between man and his fellow,” the Babylonians are more expert.
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… (a) that bodily injury ought to have been punished by injury to the body…
There, lines 2–3
… as explained by Rabbi David Nisani). …
With God’s help, Friday eve, “and the children of Israel were twelve,” 5782
On the site “Smarter” there is a seminar paper written at Beit Rivkah College in Kfar Chabad: “Differences Between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud in Selected Topics,” where naturally the college focuses on explaining the differences through Hasidic thought. I’ll quote here some excerpts from the paper’s abstract:
“… the differences and disputes were created because of different approaches and styles. The style of study of the Jerusalem Talmud is in the mode of ‘general’: the writing is brief, and many hints are embedded within it. By contrast, the later Babylonian Talmud is written in the style of ‘particular’: the writing is long, detailed, and much more explained. These styles are expressed in different methods in Jewish law, in aggadic literature, in the mode of study, and even in language.
These different styles of learning are also the reason why the Babylonian Talmud is called ‘darkness,’ as it says: ‘He has set me in dark places — this is the Babylonian Talmud,’ whereas the Torah is generally called ‘light.’ The lengthy pilpul in the learning style of the Babylonian Talmud resembles a person groping his way in the dark toward the light: he bumps into many objects before he reaches the door leading to the illuminated world outside. So too the Babylonian Talmud: before the final halakhic conclusion is written, there is a long halakhic give-and-take with many questions and answers….
… In addition, the differences between the Talmuds are expressed in the spiritual service of two different kinds of people: righteous people, who walk on the illuminated path — this is the Jerusalem Talmud; and penitents, who sometimes grope in the dark — this is the Babylonian Talmud. In order to attain wholeness in a person’s service, one must arrive at a combination of these two kinds of service. Since these are two opposite kinds of service, using both of them in human service is itself a novelty.
This novelty too is considered one of the novelties of the future redemption, when even seemingly opposite forms of service will be integrated into one unit. In order to taste these novelties of redemption already in exile, one should study the Babylonian Talmud together with the Jerusalem Talmud. To reach a mode of study like this, Torah students need to be in a state of unity… This is the appropriate ‘vessel’ for integrated study of the Babylonian Talmud
and the Jerusalem Talmud, and in fact this is the true preparation for the true and complete redemption.”
Best regards, Nasa"f
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… and many hints are embedded within it. By contrast, …
The best thing is cash, no?