Question

Hello Rabbi!
First of all, thank you for your books and articles, which are illuminating and clarify many important foundations that unfortunately are not really heard and not really studied in other frameworks.
In chapter twenty-four of the book Walking Among the Standing, the Rabbi explains that in essence the Torah’s monetary laws are nothing more than a clarification of the rights that, in principle, the Torah wishes to grant every person, and that is why they are “Torah,” whereas legal studies are not Torah. I wanted to ask about this:

1. If the Torah, through monetary law, creates the Torah’s bill of rights, then why give such broad legitimacy to making stipulations against it? That is, if God determined that such-and-such “belongs” to a person, isn’t that an indication that this is how things ought to be? After all, God wants society to be properly ordered, and if one can bypass and waive these rights, then society will not achieve what the Torah intended—a just society. I understand that one could answer that in order to prevent injustice, all this has to be agreed upon by both sides, but I would still be glad for some further clarification on the matter.
2. If we answer the previous question by saying that indeed God wants a just society, but in the end He is willing for human beings to manage things as they wish so long as no acts of injustice are committed, then would it not be correct to see legal studies as at least some reflection of God’s will? That is, in terms of the reasons for the commandments: if monetary law is meant to organize society, and this is the main divine will—that people’s rights not be harmed—then wouldn’t it be correct to say that legal studies, which also come to organize society, involve an implementation of God’s will? To say, “Yes indeed, that is true, but that still does not make legal studies Torah”—I do not really understand the meaning of that difference.
3. Does the Rabbi’s proposal not make the study of Choshen Mishpat largely unnecessary? After all, in practice we almost never actually conduct ourselves exactly as it says there. I understand that one could answer that there is value in knowing the basic rights that the Holy One, blessed be He, granted a person (and if he wishes he may waive them, but he should know they exist), but it is hard to feel great importance and value in studying an entire field that I can basically do whatever I want with. (Likewise, many halakhic rulings stem from the great flexibility in this area, so it is not clear what the “Torah” is that one is learning in a large part of these discussions. Let me clarify what I mean: if I study a responsum whose final conclusion regarding a certain case is that one may do whatever the parties stipulated, and so on—then have I really studied Torah, or have I simply learned in practice what conduct people are permitted to adopt?)
4. In your opinion, can your approach explain why the study done in yeshivot uses monetary law as a basis for learning conceptual principles only, and indeed keeps away from making the material practical and current? (As opposed, for example, to the study of the laws of the Sabbath and the like, where at least in some frameworks they do supplement the learning with practical study in addition to the conceptual aspects.)
5. There are certain laws in Choshen Mishpat that I do not understand how they are explained according to the proposed principle—for example, the laws of acquisitions. I understand that the Torah needs to give me a right to payment from a paid guardian from whom a deposit was stolen. But why would the Torah need to grant me a “right” to create an acquisition by lifting?

Thank you very much,
Michael