Q&A: The Categorical Imperative
The Categorical Imperative
Question
I received the following question:
Regarding Kant’s categorical imperative,
which has already been chewed over endlessly, the difficulty as I understand it here is: what obligates me to obey some strange imperative when my actions don’t have any effect?
So if the answer is that God legislated the imperative, then excellent.
But in principle it can be understood more simply, as everyone understands that he is obligated to society, without which he would not be alive.
So society has the power to impose such an imperative on him, because the only way things can change is in this way.
I assume I’m not telling the Rabbi anything new; I’m only asking whether my words are correct.
Answer
Even if we assume that society imposes this on you, the question is: what obligates you to fulfill what society wants you to fulfill? At the foundation of every norm there must be a value, that is, a basis that is not factual. The fact that society imposes something on you is a fact, and therefore it does not mean that you have an obligation. So at most you have shifted the discussion from the question of why obey the categorical imperative to the discussion of why obey society.
Discussion on Answer
Let me butt in a bit, if I may.
If morality has an intelligent legislator (a.k.a. the Holy One, blessed be He), then it is understandable and natural that He would legislate a categorical imperative, as the questioner wrote. And you hold the view that all obligation to morality is conditional on the Holy One, blessed be He, requiring it. And you also hold by a categorical imperative.
But I’ll try to ask an intermediate question, about something I’ve been wondering about for a while and haven’t yet understood your view on (ever since my thoughts on the categorical imperative started to wobble because of your remarks, and they’re still wobbling). If we somehow assume the far-fetched premise that there is moral obligation even without a legislator (that is the position I, lowly as I am, take), would you see a difference between an ordinary moral imperative, for example not to cause suffering, and a categorical imperative—which surely cannot be legislated without some higher power that looks from above at the whole picture? Or do you lump all moral imperatives together and make no distinction?
I understand that maybe there is no point, and perhaps even no possibility, in discussing details within a system that seems to you absurd and void—that is, a system of binding morality unrelated to the Holy One, blessed be He—but sometimes it is possible. And if not, that too is an answer.
Tzipor,
I didn’t understand (even after the clarification on WhatsApp). Bottom line, are you talking about commitment to some value without a categorical imperative?
Tirgitz,
I do not see any possibility of a moral value without a divine imperative. Even the imperative not to cause suffering has no basis without a legislator. Of course, you can decide on your own not to cause suffering, but moral obligation cannot be grounded without God. That is at least my opinion.
Do you mean to reply that there is no point / no possibility for you to analyze details within a system that seems to you self-evidently void and psychologically inconceivable—not that it is void because of arguments and proofs—such as the view that moral value is possible without a divine imperative? (If so, that’s unfortunate for me.)
[As for morality and God, aside from the question itself whether independent morality is possible, I also see no logic at all in making morality depend on God. The problem of evil in the world proves so strongly (in my humble opinion, etc.) that God is not interested in trifles like the suffering of living creatures, that to anchor morality in Him—when for everyone, human suffering occupies an honored place within morality—seems to me a very strange thing indeed.]
Making morality depend on God is a priori, and therefore it does not depend on your observations of the world. My claim is that a moral imperative has no validity without God. If you think God is not interested in morality, or that there is no God, then you are not arguing with me. You simply need to conclude that moral imperatives have no validity.
Beyond that, in the Torah He commands us and tells us things that show that it does interest Him.
That is understandable, but making morality depend on God does not come (as far as I can see) from a direct intuition that the Holy One, blessed be He, demands morality, but rather as a theological conclusion meant to ground moral obligation, which alone is felt directly. Therefore there is room to examine whether the hypothesis that God is the one who demands morality is reasonable. And on this I argue that, on the contrary, one who needs God (who of course does exist) for morality should conclude that moral imperatives have no validity, because those two things do not fit together, as is proven by the problem of evil. (Of course, according to your view the problem of evil is no issue at all, so my remarks don’t even get off the ground.)
I don’t know how to deal with what the Hebrew Bible says on this subject when it is so clearly contradicted by what is manifest. Either it contains errors, or one has to employ a great deal of creative interpretation. Besides, if God is not interested in morality in the accepted sense, then scattering a few lies to creatures of flesh is no big thing for Him. (And therefore, a priori, nothing at all can be inferred from the Hebrew Bible regarding the Lord’s own attitude toward morality.)
If you accept the dependence, then your argument only supports the claim: that there is a God and there is no valid morality. I do not agree, of course, but that is a different discussion.
(It’s just that I prefer an alternative formulation: since the dependence is, in my view, patently unreasonable, anyone who needs that dependence is basically saying that morality has no validity. And I suggest to him: think that there is a God, and morality is valid, and there is no dependence.)
The suggestion is rejected out of hand. Tomorrow evening there is supposed to be a debate on precisely this topic.
Wow! There aren’t two people more suited than the two of you to conduct this fascinating discussion. I see the waiting list is closed. Do you happen to know whether it will be uploaded online? (Paid is fine too, of course.)
It will be uploaded (via our “Rinanenu” channel in the evening).
By the way, from the abstract there it looks like Anoch is only going to argue that there is no need for dependence, and won’t go further and argue that the dependence is unreasonable—so he won’t argue that anyone who thinks the dependence is necessary is in fact pulling the ground out from under morality.
By the way, when the prophets (and the Torah) urge honesty and kindness and helping others and so on, do you interpret that as (also) moral values, or (only) religious values? For example, the criticism of stealing, murder, and adultery, etc., or the urging of “Sow for yourselves righteousness, reap according to kindness,” and the like.
(If we learn from the Hebrew Bible that the Lord has a moral interest in the suffering of humans and animals, that means the above criticisms and exhortations are not only halakhic / of Jewish law. But what is the reason to think so if everything is anyway contained within religious values? Unless one softens the categorical separation between Jewish law and morality.)
Ah, actually, you go directly to descriptions and acts of the Lord, like “The Lord is good and upright,” and demands made of Him. I missed that.
Don’t forget the blather imperative.
That’s the imperative obligating everyone engaged in philosophy to spout nonsense at least once an hour.
Commitment to society is understood by everyone, since it is impossible for a person to live without society, and he would die without society.
However, what this highlights is precisely the fact that there is no room to ask: after all, my actions are of no benefit whatsoever, so why should I do them?
And the answer to that is that yes indeed, your actions are not beneficial.
But society can obligate you to do something that has no benefit in itself, because that is its only way to derive benefit: by obligating an act that is not useful in itself, but everyone is obligated in it.