A question out of ignorance: in the Talmud, do Amoraim also interpret verses and derive Jewish laws from them, or only Tannaim?

A little. The main derivations are by the Tannaim.

If so, it would seem that already by the Amoraim most of the ability to interpret had been lost. And if so, why didn’t they investigate and discuss this in the Talmud—whenever there is a derivation that creates law, to ask why they didn’t derive it differently and why they didn’t derive in this way from other verses?

Either they lost the ability, or they thought they lacked the authority to do so (to innovate Jewish laws). In any case, I don’t know why they didn’t ask and analyze it.

And a not-at-all-side question regarding changing derivations.
It’s possible to ground the dispute with the sages in the commandment itself—whether people with physical defects are obligated in the pilgrimage—or in a conceptual dispute—whether people with physical defects are “like” whole people (an observation about the concept of human worth or something like that).

What could justify disagreeing with the sages about the commandment itself? To disagree with them directly seems a bit excessive, because why only on derivations and not on every reasoning and idea they said—for example, some random example like “this one stands on its own and testifies,” etc. So the route here would be to say that they had a different moral position, and therefore they interpreted (or reasoned) one way, whereas we, having a different moral position, will interpret (or reason) differently. That way there is no direct halakhic argument with the sages; rather, the halakhic argument branches off from their lack of authority in another area, and basically it’s like a change in reality. But that option is apparently ruled out according to your view that Jewish law is a world unto itself and not connected to morality (or did the sages not know that?). If so, it seems there is nothing that would justify disagreeing with the sages about the commandment itself.

What remains is the possibility of disagreeing with the sages on a conceptual issue, from which a halakhic consequence then branches out. That is, they grasped some Platonic concept in a certain way (not that they grasped the moral demand in a certain way)—here, they grasped the concept of a human being in a certain way, whereas today we grasp it differently, and therefore we will interpret differently, and a different halakhic result will branch out. In that sense too it is like a change in reality. But the point here is that when we come to disagree in this way, we are not allowed to base ourselves on our moral perceptions, but only on our essentialist perceptions. That also requires assuming that Jewish law (and maybe morality too) is really determined by concepts that already exist in the world independently of it, rather than that the laws follow their own internal reasons, such that there is no reason for halakhic conceptualization to overlap with the objective conceptualization in the world. Is the pilpul correct?

[I once heard a lecture from someone named Golan Lahat. He described how democracy in Greece initially included wealthy men, and over the course of history expanded to include poor men as well, and afterward slaves were also emancipated and it expanded to include them, and later it expanded to include women. Then he argued that “the development was not in the concept of democracy but in the concept of the equal human being.” That is, from then until today everyone basically held the democratic principle that everyone in the group of equal human beings deserves the right to take part in government. So what changed over the course of history? The conception of the group of equal human beings changed and kept expanding, and from that there branched an expansion in democracy. Then he straightened up and preached instituting democracy for everyone.
It’s not clear whether it is easy to separate the essentialist observation from the implications that people will later derive from it. And it’s also not at all clear whether moral considerations, for example, are supposed to follow from such indirect observations, as has come up several times on the site and as you wrote to Vladimir the doctor regarding the definition of a person and death.]

Maybe this connects to the future column about practical ramifications, which also involves the nature of halakhic truth 🙂

Two comments:
1. I’m talking about a future Sanhedrin that would change this, meaning when there won’t be a problem of authority. So the question of the ability to disagree with the sages isn’t relevant here.
2. Moral considerations do have a place as motivation to look for a different halakhic path. Morality is not the reason for the Jewish law itself (just as, with the sages, excluding the disabled was not meant to achieve moral goals), but rather motivation to search for a different halakhic route.

1. I was referring to the phrase “not only in the sense of authority but also of substance. Who is expert in derivations” that you wrote above.
2. For the search, but not for the decision? If we searched and found another possible option in Jewish law and it aligns with morality, can we simply choose that option, or do we also need to think ‘halakhically’ that it is correct?

1. If we had authority and were proficient in derivations, we could change it.
2. If we found a reasonable possibility like the alternative, then one can definitely choose the more moral one. Just as pressing circumstances or other external considerations allow a decision between alternatives. I explained in the last column (453) the mechanism of doubt in pressing circumstances.

1. Ah, I understand, sorry. You meant that one could even disagree directly with the Jewish law, because we’re talking about a future Sanhedrin, and it indeed could disagree even on reasonings like “a piece becomes carrion-status” or “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted,” and anything else in Jewish law, and it could also disagree with derivations if it knew how to interpret. [Though if that’s the intention, then this is a general answer to every question—that maybe the future Sanhedrin will change it, and maybe the Holy One, blessed be He, will reveal Himself again and update the Torah. Or perhaps you meant to emphasize that even a future Sanhedrin would need the knowledge of how to interpret, and without that it de facto would not be able to derive.]

It isn’t reasonable to disagree with someone without the ability to understand him. Still, I can imagine a situation in which a future Sanhedrin reaches a point where it has no understanding of derivations, but it seems to them that many changes in Jewish law are necessary. It might perhaps decide to implement them without understanding the methods of interpretation, due to urgent need. Maybe only temporarily.

Maybe it actually is possible to disagree. For example, one could diagnose a statistical claim that the sages’ derivations tend very strongly, in general, to align with their moral/conceptual view. Then if someone claims that he disagrees with them on the moral/conceptual level, he can assume that if he knew the methods of derivation, he would derive a different interpretation that also fit his moral/conceptual view fairly well. That seems to me a completely reasonable claim. Is that enough to make a change? Or is that more “magical” than relying on what already came out of the sages’ secret mechanism?

Possible.

Above I slipped in a question: what is the relationship between a conceptual-moral disagreement from which a halakhic disagreement branches out, and a ‘disagreement’ about facts from which a practical halakhic disagreement branches out? Maybe, just as with a factual ‘disagreement,’ so too with a conceptual disagreement that leads to a practical halakhic disagreement—we are actually preserving the original Jewish law itself.

With God’s help, 21 Adar I 5782

Beyond derivations and textual inferences, exempting from pilgrimage to the Temple those who have difficulty walking, seeing, and communicating is called for by the simple reason: it is hard for them. Walking—and especially walking in a crowded and packed place—is hard for someone limited in walking, seeing, and communication.

Whoever is willing to go up despite the difficulty, and make his way through the dense crowd—blessing upon him, and no one is preventing him from ascending to “the courtyards of the House of the Lord”; but to obligate one who has difficulty?

Perhaps in the future medicine will advance to the point that “the lame shall leap like a deer and the eyes of the blind shall be opened,” and then there will be no problem at all. But as long as there are people who suffer, Jewish law will treat them with compassion and not impose on them the burden of the healthy.

With blessing, Hasdai Betzalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwass,

Hasdai, but today there are mobility scooters. Meaning, it comes out that the reason for the derivation is no longer relevant today, so why should it remain in force?
Maybe you’ll say that the Torah commands according to what was normal and suitable at the time it was given (or over two thousand years of Torah), and since then we adopt plain conservative continuity. But that isn’t reasonable, because seemingly the Torah commands the principle and not the implementations.
And maybe you’ll say that indeed the reason for the derivation is no longer relevant, and therefore surely the sages today would interpret differently, but despite that there is no authority to disagree with them in practice. But that too is strange, since seemingly in this the sages have no authority, because what led the sages was not part of the Torah, but was born of what seemed to them truly appropriate in light of their time. And as for the Torah itself, we are not disagreeing with the sages at all.

It seems to me Rabbi Michi writes—or it’s quoted in his name—that even if we do not expound the reason of the verse, we do expound the reason of the derivation. Because regarding reasons, the thoughts of the sages are our thoughts.

With God’s help, 21 Adar I 5782

To Tirgitz—greetings,

Even in Temple times there were people of means who could afford to go up to the Temple while being carried in a litter, and on the face of it they were allowed to do so. But to obligate every person to exert himself and hire a litter and servants to carry him—the Torah did not obligate that.

And so too regarding a mobility scooter—someone who can afford to buy one and learn to drive it could go up, at least on weekdays, on his scooter. But it does not stand to reason that Jewish law would obligate everyone to do that. And perhaps there would be a problem that the scooter would crowd the space for pedestrians, unless there were a “lane and route” for scooters 🙂

But furthermore, the prophet Isaiah informs us: “God Himself will come and save you; then the eyes of the blind shall be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped. Then the lame shall leap like a deer and the tongue of the mute shall sing… And the redeemed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with song, with everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall attain gladness and joy, and sorrow and sighing shall flee” (35:5–10).

And all of us will go up to the Temple healthy and whole. May it be His will.

With blessing, H.B. of the holy community of etc.

Why, when the Temple is rebuilt, all the dispersed of Israel will gather, “these will come from the north and these from the land of Sinim,” and they will chauffeur every stumbling person in their “rickshaws.”

With blessing, Ching Chong Chi, man of La-Wing

On the village of “La-Wing” in southern China, see the Wikipedia entry “The Flying Tigers”

By the way, people say (maybe as a caricature) that Chabad has a Kabbalistic pressing-circumstances exemption from sleeping in the sukkah, because he is distressed that he is not moved by the encompassing light (and if he is not on the level to be distressed by that, then he is certainly distressed by his own level, etc.)

With God’s help, 21 Adar I 5782

To Tirgitz—greetings,

On all matters of sleeping and not sleeping in the sukkah, and especially Chabad customs on this, see Chabadpedia, entry “Sleeping in the Sukkah.”

In my humble opinion, it seems that the Chabad rebbes did not practice sleeping in the sukkah for the reasons given by the Rema—both the concern about catching cold (since they lived in northern Russia) and not wanting to leave one’s wife alone. But in order to prevent especially pious people from trying to be stringent at the expense of their health and/or marital harmony, they also gave the custom a worthy reason according to the inner dimension of the Torah: that it is hard for a person with holy sensitivities to sleep in a place whose holiness is so great.

By the way, at the end of the entry (near note 61) it is brought that the rabbi of Kfar Chabad instructed his community members כן to sleep in the sukkah, and it is also explained earlier that when Rabbi the Maharash explained the custom not to sleep there, he said his words were meant as an explanation of the custom and not as a public instruction.

With blessing, Simcha Fish"l Halevi Plankton

I was thinking that maybe they view themselves as a body and therefore do not renew the commandment of sleeping in the sukkah, just as there are those who do not renew tekhelet.

With God’s help, 21 Adar I 5782

To Tirgitz—good day,

It seems to me that the inability of the Hasidim to fall asleep when they know that sublime lights dwell in the sukkah is built into the character of Hasidic fervor, which obligates the Hasid to be inflamed when thinking about the revelation of holiness that he encounters.

The Jewish law that requires bringing all layers of life into the sukkah also demands of a person a willingness to sleep in the sukkah, to take shelter in the “shade of faith” with calm and trust that even when a person is not in the fervor of expanded consciousness, the lights of the sukkah still protect him and allow him to sleep there peacefully like a baby in its mother’s arms.

And perhaps for that reason the German Jews would decorate their sukkahs with an onion adorned with feathers, hinting to “in the shadow of Your wings they take refuge.” For eating onion symbolizes not seeking grand things, which brings peace of mind, as the saying goes: “Eat onion and sit in shade.”

With blessing, Hasdai Betzalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kwass

These two aspects in the service of God—fervor and calm—are expressed in the two explanations of the commandment “to become intoxicated on Purim until one does not know the difference between ‘cursed is Haman’ and ‘blessed is Mordechai.’” The Taz explained that the commandment is to become enthusiastic and thank God both for Haman’s downfall and for Mordechai’s victory, until “one does not know,” at which point one is already exempt from the commandment to praise and thank with fervor.

Whereas according to Maimonides, the purpose of the joy is to fall asleep out of a feeling of calm and trust that brings peace of mind. And therefore Rabbi Shlomo Aviner instructed people to minimize “Haman’s ears” cookies, and from the negative you may infer the positive—to increase “calm for you” 🙂

With blessing, Simcha Fish"l Halevi Plankton