Q&A: The Categorical Imperative and the Nazis
The Categorical Imperative and the Nazis
Question
Good evening!
There is a famous criticism of the categorical imperative that it was supposedly used by the Nazis: Eichmann, may his name be blotted out, said that he had no guilt at all since he acted according to the imperative—do what you would want to become a universal law—and he truly wanted the weak not to survive, just as Hitler, may his name be blotted out, said at the end of the war that Germany deserved to lose because they were weak. (To be sure, Nazi philosophy was a mix of Darwinian arguments about natural selection, along with a blend of Nietzschean philosophy about slave morality and the overman, as well as Nordic mythology and Heidegger’s philosophy of nature, etc., but a great deal was based on the categorical imperative, and not as Arendt thought in her idea of the banality of evil.)
And my question is that, as I understand it, this has no connection to Kant at all, because as I understand it the Kantian structure is built differently, as I will explain below:
1. A person must be moral because that is the realization of being human, just like being rational.
2. Morality is not a relativistic feeling, but a rational, considered decision that does not necessarily correspond to one’s feelings (and therefore one must intentionally orient oneself toward morality).
Only after these arguments did Kant formulate what a moral act is by means of the imperative.
Accordingly, Eichmann was mistaken, because the imperative presupposes a prior assumption that a person must be moral, and only afterward does the imperative formulate what a moral act is. Eichmann, by contrast, understood that all morality is merely the fulfillment of the imperative without the a priori assumption that a person must be moral.
Put differently: Kant did not mean that the imperative is morality itself, but only that it formulates a moral principle. So someone who denies morality itself—which Kant did not define, and Kant himself is also not sufficiently clear about the justification for why one should be moral, but that is not the topic here—the imperative says nothing to him. (Eichmann understood the imperative as being morality itself, with morality having no independent meaning. And admittedly this argument fits Nietzsche better, where man creates autonomous morality, but I don’t think Kant meant that.)
I would be glad to know whether I am correct in this analysis.
Thank you very much!
Answer
I think you mean to say the following: if one adopts a subjective interpretation of the categorical imperative—meaning that each person should do whatever he himself wants to become a universal law—then if a person wants something bad, the categorical imperative leads him to bad behavior. But Kant did not mean that. He meant that one should act in such a way that if this became a universal law, the world would be good. If you want something else, you are mistaken.
Discussion on Answer
The question whether this is teleology or not is discussed at length in Column 122; see there. In principle, Kant is not a consequentialist. This is a common interpretive mistake about the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative does not say that one should act in order to make the world better, but that the way to define the moral act is by means of a thought experiment: what would happen if everyone behaved as I do. If in such a hypothetical situation the world would turn out better, then this is the proper act. But the act itself should be done out of respect for the moral imperative, not in order to achieve results. And it is judged deontologically, not teleologically. See there, where I explained that the imperative is valid even where your act has no consequences. Also see Column 344 and many others.
What happens in a situation where a person mistakenly thinks that state X is good, and he acted in a way such that universal behavior would lead to state X, but he was wrong: state X is bad. In such a case, he himself is a worthy person, despite the error in his actions. The judgment of a person is according to his own view (see about this at length in Column 372).
But that is of course if he is mistaken and thinks that this is the good state. If he acts out of self-interest and not because in his opinion this is the good act, then of course he should be judged negatively.
But couldn’t it be that the Nazis defined the good differently, and therefore in their opinion the realization of Nazi ideology is the realization of the imperative?
If they thought that this is what is proper—then certainly that is correct. They were of course mistaken, but they should be judged according to their own view.
Thank you very much.
1. Even if we adopt a teleological definition, the question would still be which good result ought to be aimed at. Does good equal pleasure and happiness, or say survival, etc.?
2. The Rabbi identifies deontology with Kant’s claim that there must be good intention, but do those necessarily go together? Perhaps one could hold that morality is derived from intention, and yet that intention is still directed toward a good result rather than a good act?
3. Even if the good is determined by what is good for the world, Eichmann could still say that the question is: who is “the world”? Perhaps it means the survivors?
That is, it seems that Kant must therefore presuppose some essential good.
4. Regarding the claim that the Nazis were moral according to their own view, perhaps one could answer that evolutionary morality (I mean the term in the sense of survival, not cooperation between groups)—such a morality is a factual claim and not a value claim, and therefore it is necessarily not included in the concept of morality. (That is, Kant must therefore have presupposed an essential morality that perhaps realizes an idea of “the good.”)
Thank you, and sorry for the length.
“He meant that one should act in such a way that if this became a universal law, the world would be good. If you want something else, you are mistaken.”
Meaning, acts that would bring about a better world only if they do not become a universal law are invalid according to Kant?
So which takes precedence over which? That it become a universal law, or that the world become better?
Rabbi, you wrote: “the judgment of a person is according to his own view … and he thinks that this is the right act.” And this is very difficult in two ways.
If judgment is made according to a person’s own view, then he will always come out righteous! And furthermore, this is a direct contradiction to what you explain thoroughly far and wide in your columns about freedom and liberty: that there is a standard that does not depend on a person’s choices, by means of which I judge him (and in that sense it is rabbinic), as you write there, and I quote: “that the path itself should be proper. The judgment regarding the path is made according to some external standard, which does not depend on the person himself.” End quote.
Questioner,
I do not see much point in examining the Nazis’ moral doctrine. I very much doubt that there was such a doctrine, certainly not any general one. It makes sense to discuss the questions themselves.
1. The good that ought to obtain is that the condition of the greatest number of people be good and that they be happy. As they say: your this-world is my world-to-come. It seems to me that a proper social order ultimately comes down to that bottom line. But the action itself is not done from a utilitarian motivation, but from a motivation to act correctly. I explained the practical difference in Column 122.
2. I did not understand.
3. Anyone can define anything. There is no point in engaging in such hypotheses. If someone defines it that way, he is mistaken, that’s all.
4. See my opening remark.
EA,
See at length in the above-mentioned column (372).
Thank you very much, indeed the Rabbi formulated it well.
But one can still object that the Rabbi is offering Kant a teleological interpretation, that is, that the moral act is defined by its results, so if the world will be less good then it is bad. But perhaps he meant deontology, that is, that the main thing is the act itself—whether it is good or not—and accordingly it would indeed make sense to discuss whether their actions would be considered good?