Q&A: Kant's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Kant's Critique of the Ontological Argument
Question
About two weeks ago I posted a question here regarding Anselm's ontological argument, and we corresponded until things became clear to me (remember?).
During that exchange there I argued that I identify a difference between the usual skeptical claim, which says: how do we know that there is a correspondence between a conclusion I arrive at in my mind and reality itself and the way it operates, and the application of this claim to the law of gravity, about which too one could argue that just because I reach the conclusion that the law of gravity is correct does not mean that this is really how reality itself works.
My claim there was that "this is not a correct comparison. Because I formulate the conclusion about the law through some encounter with reality itself, in addition to the thought processes of my cognition that lead me to it.
Unlike here, where everything takes place within me without any interaction with the reality outside, and therefore the basis for doubt is more reasonable in my opinion."
Is this actually Kant's critique? That in his view only synthetic-transcendental propositions have value, and not this kind of pure logic that generates factual claims without being combined with experience of reality??
Am I understanding him correctly?
Answer
Correct. That is why he retreated to the phenomenal realm, and saw all claims as claims about us (the world as it is perceived by us). But I do not agree. In my view, intuition is a kind of observation of the world.
Discussion on Answer
Thought processes**
I didn't understand what is unclear in what I said. When there are facts and you infer from them a general theory that does not follow only from them (rather, an additional intellectual operation is needed, such as generalization and abduction), Kant sees this as a transcendental claim that is essentially a claim about us (about the phenomena), whereas I see it as a claim about the world (created by my intuitive cognition). I definitely disagree with Kant, and I wrote that.
Understood. Thank you very much.
Actually, I still didn't understand… after all, you too would agree that all we encounter is the world as it appears to our eyes. And not necessarily that the world itself looks that way. So for you too it's about us.
And in general, why is it a claim about us according to Kant? It's about the world… admittedly as it appears to our eyes, but it's still a claim about the world.
No, I do not agree. I do agree that we describe the world in our language, but it is a description of the world itself. A certain wavelength is described by us through color, but color is a language used to describe something in the world.
Got it.
There is no way to rule out the possibility that reality as it is in itself includes everything that can exist, and we can never observe such a state; things in our consciousness break down in such a way that the reality apparent to us (the world) is one that makes our existence possible, and all the other observed phenomena are adjusted accordingly.
I didn't understand why the Rabbi says that. Why is that connected?
And why doesn't what the Rabbi answered me there refute Kant? Since even with arguments that come after interaction with reality, in the end it's still all our thought processes, so how do we know it matches reality?