Q&A: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya
Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya
Question
I read in Rabbi Binyamin Lau’s book Sages, vol. 3, especially in the chapter on Rabbi Meir, and from one thing to another I came up with a rather nice idea. In searching in Otzar HaChokhmah I did not see (yet) that it had already been said, although my heart tells me almost certainly that someone has already noticed it, because it is something visible to the eye. Since it relates to a Talmudic passage that is often on your lips, I said I would present it for your judgment; and even though it is a small point, I would be glad if you could let me know your opinion.
Eruvin 53 says: Rabbi Yohanan said, Rabbi Oshaya in his generation was like Rabbi Meir in his generation. Just as regarding Rabbi Meir in his generation, his colleagues could not get to the bottom of his reasoning, so too regarding Rabbi Oshaya, his colleagues could not get to the bottom of his reasoning. And in Eruvin 13 (the passage that is often on your lips) it is explained more fully that his colleagues could not get to the bottom of Rabbi Meir’s reasoning because he would declare the impure pure and show arguments for it, and the pure impure and show arguments for it, etc. Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Meir had a student, and Symmachus was his name, who would offer forty-eight reasons for impurity on every matter of impurity, and forty-eight reasons for purity on every matter of purity. Up to here, these are well-known Talmudic passages (and also what follows below are well-known passages in their wording; the computer reveals their locations).
Now there is a wonderful point here (and this, as yet, I have not found anyone saying): these two, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya, are the ones from whom the main body of the Mishnayot and Baraitot came. In Sanhedrin 86 Rabbi Yohanan said (it is all Rabbi Yohanan here): an anonymous Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir. And in Hullin 141, from the words of Rabbi Zeira: any Baraita not taught in the academy of Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Oshaya is mistaken, and one should not raise objections from it in the study hall.
And in the Epistle of Rav Sherira Gaon, part 1, he wrote that “an anonymous Mishnah follows Rabbi Meir” means that he learned it from his teacher: “And Rabbi adopted in Jewish law the path of Rabbi Meir, and that was the path of Rabbi Akiva, since Rabbi saw that Rabbi Meir’s approach was short and easy to learn, and his words were arranged in a fine structure, etc., and his words were precise, etc., and not everyone who is wise knows how to compose them so well, etc.”
Now it can be explained like this—and it is a garment you have sewn in several places, only I am dressing it here. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya were great analysts, who saw in every matter sides and sub-sides, and therefore:
A. They had a certain deficiency in the power of intuitive, straightforward decision-making. Not only could his colleagues not get to the bottom of his reasoning—which is itself puzzling, since he states his reasoning openly—but he himself as well could not always get to the bottom of his own reasoning because of the abundance of analysis and sides [this explanation too I have not found anyone saying; it is admittedly somewhat strained at first glance, but still it seems reasonable to me]. And even when he reached a decision, the decision lacked sufficient clarity, because there is something in the development of analytic power that dulls the synthetic faculty, etc. Therefore Rabbi Meir “illuminates the eyes of the sages in Jewish law,” in that he reveals facets this way and that and analyzes and refines; but one cannot especially rely on his final judgment, since in that respect his power was no greater than that of others (and perhaps, as emerges from the rules of halakhic ruling, even less).
B. That very ability enabled them to be highly precise in the traditions and to arrange them with exactness and forceful clarity, each thing in its proper form, to get to the depths of their teachers’ intent, to sense every nuance and examine it, and to weed out every corruption.
Answer
It definitely seems like a possible explanation. Of course, according to this one should not derive from here the matter of autonomy. The reason Jewish law was not ruled in accordance with him is either because his words do not contain a clear-cut decision, or because he truly was not an expert in decision-making. And from the wording, “they did not establish the Jewish law in accordance with him,” it sounds like the latter explanation.
Discussion on Answer
One more small thing. Hagigah 15: “And how could Rabbi Meir learn Torah from the mouth of Aher? But didn’t Rabbah bar bar Hannah say in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: What is the meaning of the verse, ‘For the priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek Torah from his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts’? If the rabbi resembles an angel of the Lord of Hosts, they should seek Torah from his mouth; and if not, they should not seek Torah from his mouth, etc.”
Here too this can be explained in this way: one who learns from a rabbi who is not like an angel can certainly become much wiser through him and uncover new facets and analyses, but how will he receive from such a teacher the synthetic faculty that comes especially from apprenticeship and practical association with the teacher (as you explain in several places), when that teacher’s power of judgment has been corrupted, and that power depends on reverence of heart and uprightness, etc.? Therefore Rabbi Meir, who specialized in analysis, could indeed learn from Aher and see all the sides, but his synthetic faculty was not strengthened by this; on the contrary, that faculty came under suspicion, perhaps having been damaged as a result of that teacher. So Rabbi Yohanan’s statements are bound together, each helping the other, and one says to his brother, “Be strong.”
That is hard to force into the phrase “he ate the inside and threw away the peel.” The inside is the analytic part and the peel the synthetic? Not plausible.
Right. Fine, no big deal—this part can drop.
[I was thinking of continuing the homiletic construction. That Rabbi Yohanan specialized in synthetic thinking, and Reish Lakish was the analyst who sharpened his words, as Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat: Are you like ben Lakish? When ben Lakish was around, he would challenge me, etc., and as a result the discussion would broaden. And you say, “a Baraita supports you”—don’t I know myself that what I am saying is good? Therefore it is Reish Lakish there in Hagigah who explains Rabbi Meir’s view: “Rabbi Meir found a verse and expounded it: ‘Incline your ear and hear the words of the wise, and apply your heart to my knowledge’—it does not say ‘to their knowledge’ but ‘to my knowledge.’” Meaning, Reish Lakish was looking for the analyses, and that one can hear from anyone, even from Aher, and therefore Rabbi Meir’s path appealed to him. But Rabbi Yohanan specialized in synthetic thinking, and therefore he required a rabbi to be like an angel (and since Rabbi Meir was an analyst and learned from Aher, Rabbi Yohanan established that the Jewish law does not follow Rabbi Meir against any of his colleagues). Mazal tov, mazal tov.]
But yes, “he ate the inside and threw away the peel” really does contradict it head-on, and in general at this stage it is already getting too detached.
It’s also interesting to think about Rabbi Yohanan’s crying over Reish Lakish’s departure, that he longed for a student like him who would challenge him. Is that also connected to analyticity? Maybe.
I think the basic move is definitely possible and plausible, even if not all the details fit together (like the “inside and peel”). Even regarding “he ate the inside and threw away the peel,” it may be that the Talmud is hinting that “he ate the inside” really is the analytic dimension, and “he threw away its heretical peel.” They are not addressing here the dependence of synthetic judgment on that peel.
With God’s help, Jerusalem Day 5782
Tirgitz—greetings,
Rabbi Meir’s sharpness is well known, as they said: “Rabbi Meir is sharp and raises difficulties; Rabbi Yehuda is moderate and draws conclusions.” But he did have decisional power, for they appointed him in Usha as the “Hakham,” the one whom they ask about Jewish law (see Horayot 13). Also, from the expression that his colleagues could not get to the bottom of his view, it appears that he did have a firm opinion; only because of the depth of his thought, his opinion on many issues remained a “minority opinion,” and was not established as Jewish law for future generations.
Rabbi Shai Weitzen, in his article “Rabbi Meir and Beruriah” (on the Yeshiva website), suggests that Rabbi Akiva chose Rabbi Meir to formulate the Jewish laws briefly and concisely, a trait suitable for one who issues rulings to his many questioners and needs to answer briefly and clearly.
Best regards, Admon Akavya Lichtman-Lederer HaMeiri
At first glance, a problem. But how would you explain the Talmudic passages saying that the Jewish law was not established like Rabbi Meir when he disputed another tanna—so how in his own generation did they rely on him? (I don’t know whether those who received rulings from the Rogatchover relied on him in practice, or whether they more or less refrained, as people refrain today. The words of Seridei Esh are well known.) Perhaps as the “Hakham” they relied on Rabbi Meir because almost all his answers reflected accepted Jewish law, or because he would reveal to the listener the views of his fellow tannaim. I don’t know.
Tirgitz—greetings,
Whoever asked Rabbi Meir received a clear answer and relied on it in practice. Even the halakhic decisors of later generations cannot instruct their questioners without understanding Rabbi Meir’s approach in its full breadth and depth, and therefore they rule Jewish law according to the view that is clearer to them.
Best regards, Aaleh
Rabbi Aha bar Hanina says that Rabbi Meir’s colleagues did not establish the Jewish law in accordance with him because they could not get to the bottom of his reasoning. You are saying that despite this they appointed him as Hakham (which according to you means a practical halakhic authority; I haven’t checked) and relied on his independent rulings? I can understand the approach, but it doesn’t go down all that smoothly, does it?
Thank you very much (and indeed, of course, the issue of autonomy, as against the “betting” idea—which my heart refuses to accept—was what spurred me to think these thoughts).
[And I now have something to add to it. After I sent the question, I went back to search in Otzar HaChokhmah and went through all the results for the search “Meir Oshaya,” and so far I have found nothing. But I came across Rabbi Reuven Margaliot’s book Studies in the Ways of the Talmud, and in one of the chapters he deals with sages who kept silent and did not answer questions, and on page 90 he brings a passage from Yevamot 57, and it joins quite naturally with the above suggestion regarding the connection between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya.]
Yevamot 57: “Rabbi Yohanan asked Rabbi Oshaya, etc.; he was silent and did not say anything to him, etc. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to Rabbi Oshaya: Is Rabbi Yohanan not a great man? (That is, why didn’t you answer him—surely he is worthy of understanding.) He said to him: He asked me something that has no solution.” End of the Talmudic passage.
And Rabbi Yohanan is the very one who said about Rabbi Oshaya that he was like Rabbi Meir, whose colleagues could not get to the bottom of his reasoning. And here Rabbi Yohanan saw with his own eyes an example of the fact that Rabbi Oshaya sometimes could not get to the bottom of his own reasoning—that is, arrive at a conclusion and decide. And that same scholarly power that enabled Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Oshaya to clarify their traditions with precision and clarity was what worked against Rabbi Meir, in that generally Jewish law was not established in accordance with him (Eruvin 46: Rabbi Yohanan said: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda. Between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yosei. They asked: what about Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon? Let it stand unresolved. And in searching on this I saw the Jerusalem Talmud—which they say is founded on Rabbi Yohanan, parallel to Ravina and Rav Ashi in the Babylonian Talmud—Shevi’it 8:7: in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, the Jewish law follows Rabbi Shimon).
[And regarding the difference between Rabbi Meir and his student Symmachus: it is explicit that Rabbi Meir saw even the sides that undermine—that is, the sides to declare the impure pure and the pure impure—whereas Symmachus saw only all the sides that build up the accepted conclusion, that is, all the sides to declare the pure pure and the impure impure.].