Q&A: Regarding the Example of Stalin and the Responsibility of the Russian People for His Actions
Regarding the Example of Stalin and the Responsibility of the Russian People for His Actions
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In the last lecture on judging evil, you mentioned the example of Stalin and the responsibility of the Russian people for his actions. You mentioned the idea of collective responsibility. On the other hand, I seem to remember that in the past you said that not every group of people constitutes a collective. For a group of people to constitute a collective, there has to be something that binds them together in some way (such as a legal and judicial system). If so, with regard to the example of Stalin, there is no collective of the Russian people on which collective responsibility can be imposed. Isn't that so?
Another question that occurred to me in this context: how does this example parallel the story of Aharon Barak's unreasonable act of the reasonable person?
Best regards,
Answer
They are definitely a collective. If a people is not a collective, then what is a collective?
I wasn't making a full comparison between the situations. My claim is that in both cases responsibility is imposed on a person who isn't really guilty. He acted reasonably (like the reasonable person), and yet responsibility is imposed on him.