Q&A: Question about the Cosmological Argument
Question about the Cosmological Argument
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
In booklet 2 on faith, you discussed whether an actual infinity is possible. If I understood correctly, you mentioned that one can accept a description of an infinite process if it is described by means of a function that defines all of its parts.
So for example, if reality could be described as a function like y=2x, one could accept that it is infinite. I wanted to ask:
1. Is it not realistic to think that reality really could be described as a multidimensional function in a very high-dimensional space, which takes relevant inputs and produces a multidimensional output (for example, the position of every particle in the universe given the relevant inputs)?
This function is of course one that we would never be able to succeed in describing. Still, it is not impossible that it exists, and if it exists it makes the need for a first cause unnecessary.
2. If such a thing actually is theoretically possible (a function that describes the universe), what advantage does the conclusion of a first cause have over it? Why should I believe in a first factor, rather than believe in a function that describes an infinite process?
Thanks in advance!
Answer
What I remember writing is that an explanation with an infinite number of links cannot be acceptable as an explanation (infinite regress). I didn’t understand anything from the rest of what you wrote.
Discussion on Answer
(That is, a function that outputs, for every point in time, the location of every particle in the universe—and everything else needed, if there is anything else, in order to get a complete picture of the entire universe.)
If we’re talking only about positions, then maybe yes. But not complete information, because of the uncertainty principle.
Excellent. Let’s assume, for the sake of discussion, that all of reality could be described by a deterministic function. In such a case, do you think the assumption of causality would still be necessary?
First of all, it can’t be done. So this is a hypothetical discussion. Second, I didn’t understand the question about the assumption of causality. If everything is deterministic, then obviously the principle of causality is always operating.
In a case where everything can be described as a deterministic function, apparently the problem of infinite regress is solved—in booklet #2 you wrote (page 11) that when one offers a description of all the links in the chain by means of a formula, infinite regress can be acceptable.
So I’m asking whether in that case the assumption of causality still holds, or whether it falls away.
If you have a full description of all the links, then it isn’t really an infinite regress but rather one complex explanation. But that description is impossible. Even if there were a scientific theory that gave me such a description, it would not be a description of causes but of states succeeding one another in time. Those states come one after the other, but it does not say there what brings about what. And even if there were such a function, what would you need to put into it in order to point to the first cause? It only says that we have no description of a first cause.
None of this has anything to do, as far as I can see, with the principle of causality.
I’ll try to simplify:
Do you think it could be that there exists a deterministic function that describes the entire universe?