Rabbi, it’s hard for me to understand how you can base something so big and significant on Occam’s razor. A big claim requires big proof.
Right. The whole argument is proof that the world is indeed fair.

All of science is based on Occam’s razor. Is that big enough for you? Or do you not accept that either?
And besides, so there are several gods. So what?

A. Science proves things about reality, whereas you are trying to prove something about what lies beyond. And besides—in the rare cases where science didn’t eventually discover it was mistaken and change its explanation. A scientist doesn’t need to know before whom he stands when facing the law of gravity, whereas you and I need to know before whom we stand (during prayer and in general).
B. Besides the fact that this is outright heresy, everything is fine.
C. Just to clarify—does the Rabbi indeed agree that the argument proves the world is fair?

Why does that matter? Either you accept the razor principle or you don’t. And by the way, the Holy One, blessed be He, exists in reality.
The argument doesn’t even purport to prove that the world is fair. It assumes it.
All right, I suggest we stop. This discussion seems pointless to me.

Rabbi, I’d just appreciate one last clarification: where does the argument assume that the world is fair? Is there some hidden premise I’m missing? In the second premise I was talking about a hypothetical world that is unjust.

The second premise is that a world without justice deserves destruction (a premise that itself isn’t really clear to me). In other words, you are assuming that this whole business is being run morally.
Beyond that, the conclusion simply does not follow from the premises. How do you know there is justice in the world? Because it isn’t destroyed? Then we’re back to the assumption that the matter is being conducted justly.
But that’s it. Please don’t drag me into this again by the tongue. This really is a completely unnecessary discussion.

Let the Rabbi just say one last thing, and after that decide whether to answer or not.
I’m not assuming anything, I’m saying:
Would I destroy the world? Obviously not. How is that obvious? From morality, just as it’s obvious not to murder.
Would I destroy an unfair world? Obviously yes.
Therefore I know the world is fair, not because it isn’t destroyed—but because I wouldn’t destroy it.

I saw that the Rabbi wrote here on the site that he doesn’t know whether there is reward and punishment. I wanted to ask what the Rabbi says about distinguishing between sins between man and his fellow man, where there is punishment [He’ll send me down into the world again with troubles], because that makes sense, since I harmed someone—but for sins between man and God there is no punishment, because He isn’t a person and I can’t harm Him, so there is no reason to assume He would punish us for that. And regarding reward, there is no reason at all to assume it exists, since it could be, as the Rabbi explains, that He created us as servants to serve Him for some spiritual purpose by keeping the commandments, and nothing more.

I’m asking the Rabbi because it bothers me a lot—what sense does it make to give punishment if I didn’t harm God? At most, it seems to me that if I didn’t do my assignments, He’ll send me down into the world again so I can complete the purpose for which I was intended.

I have no idea.

I saw that the source for reward in the World to Come is a Talmudic passage in Kiddushin where the Talmud asks: after all, it is written "so that your days may be lengthened" regarding honoring parents, and the Talmud brings a story about someone who honored them and died, and therefore it reaches the conclusion that this refers to reward in the World to Come. According to the Rabbi, who claims that it’s doubtful whether there is reward in the World to Come, how would you explain the promise of the verses? [Seemingly there is proof here for the Rabbi’s claim as well—that even our Sages did not state facts through divine inspiration, but on the basis of proof from verses and their interpretation.]

A lot could be said about this. It does indeed seem that the Talmud learns this from observing the world and from reasoning. But you don’t even need to get to honoring parents. Such a consideration exists with respect to every injustice in the world (the righteous person who suffers). It is more plausible that this is only a textual support or additional confirmation for an existing tradition or an existing line of reasoning.
The promise of the verses can be explained in several ways, and building a new conclusion on the basis of verses is really not the most reliable thing. It also says "an eye for an eye," and it says "until I come to my lord to Seir," and so on. Here are a few suggestions:
1. "Your days may be lengthened" qualitatively. You will have good days.
2. "Your days may be lengthened" as a collective. A society that honors parents has a longer life expectancy (not necessarily the individual who honors them). See evolutionary altruism.
3. "Your days may be lengthened" generally, unless there is some other reason that contradicts it (like Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s well-known explanation of "one who is careful with havdalah over wine will have male children"). That is, honoring parents brings longevity, but if there is another reason to shorten his life (for example, if his father was not careful about vows), then his life can be shortened.
And so on and so forth.
All this of course puts a big question mark over the very proof the Talmud brings, and indeed it is a very weak proof. A nice homiletic point. Imagine someone today deriving such a new theological conclusion from observing a single case. The Torah says that the king should not take many wives for himself "lest his heart turn away." There is a king who took many wives and his heart did not turn away. Therefore the prohibition is void, or the explanation is incorrect, etc. Just look at how people relate to my conclusions about providence, which are drawn from observing how the world operates and from science in general (and not only from a single case), and you’ll understand how hasty and unserious this conclusion of the Talmud is. Aggadah.
Therefore, in general, when there is no proof from verses and no clear tradition from Sinai, then even if there is a logical consideration in favor of the World to Come, it is at most a logical consideration with a speculative conclusion. Is that conclusion correct or not? I have no idea. Maybe yes, but I would not build principles of faith on it, nor concepts of heresy and emphatic certainty as is usually heard with regard to these notions. I have written more than once that in my view too it makes sense that there is some kind of continuation, but such a consideration can create at most a possible speculation, and certainly not an absolute truth or a binding principle of faith.

In practice, your approach is very similar to the Sadducean approach, as explained by Josephus, who describes the Sadducees this way: "But according to the doctrine of the Sadducees, the soul vanishes together with the body, and their whole aspiration in the world is only the keeping of the laws; for they consider it a virtue to dispute with the teachers of wisdom who follow that doctrine. This teaching reached only a few people, though they were of the highest rank; however, they do nothing according to it, if one may so speak. For when they come to positions of power they conduct themselves, though unwillingly and under compulsion, according to what the Pharisee says, since otherwise the masses would not tolerate them." What does the Rabbi think about them—were they just a party, or a coherent school of thought?

I didn’t express any position here, so I don’t understand how you are comparing my position to anything.
I have no opinion about them. I’m not familiar.

In general, the description I brought regarding the Sadducees very much describes the Rabbi’s thought—for example, keeping the laws, and also disputing the teachers of wisdom; and for our purposes, they denied the survival of the soul and so on. They thought with their intellect, as the Rabbi does about everything, including the Messiah. And nevertheless, the Sages pushed them out and wrote about them that they separated themselves from the Torah. Why doesn’t it matter to the Rabbi to reconcile this with the Rabbi’s worldview? After all, the Sages had a stronger intuition [as explained in your book Moves Among the Standing Ones].

I don’t understand the question. If they say what I say, then in my opinion they are right. Surprised? The question whether they really say what I say or not is something that should be discussed on its own merits in each aspect separately, but it doesn’t really interest me. Especially regarding issues on which I have not expressed an opinion (such as reward and punishment or the World to Come).
You are asking why I am not upset by the fact that the Sages opposed my views (their identity with the Sadducees?) Again, I don’t understand this strange question. I have my own position by virtue of various arguments, and I do not reject it because of ad hominem (appeal to authority or to some person), but only by virtue of arguments. Moreover, in order to say that the Sages opposed my views, you need to be specific about exactly which view you are talking about, and not make a general statement that this is like the Sadducees and the Sages opposed the Sadducees. This is not a serious discussion, and as far as I’m concerned it is completely exhausted.

Now I found a passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, 18b, from which one can seemingly prove the Rabbi’s view regarding reward in the World to Come. And this is its wording: Rabbi Abbahu, when he died, they passed before him thirteen rivers of balsam. He said to them: All these—for whom? They said to him: Yours. He said to them: And all these are Abbahu’s? Yet I said, "I have labored in vain." End quote. Seemingly, from the plain meaning it appears that Rabbi Abbahu did not think there was reward; rather, God said so, and that is how one should act.

A great deal of pilpul could be made of this, but this is not the place.

Does the Rabbi perhaps know of books by scholars or rabbis on the subject—whether there is such a thing as Jewish philosophy [or whether everything was taken from their surroundings]?

No.

Why is it that regarding reward and punishment the Rabbi writes that he doesn’t know, but regarding other things the Rabbi writes that we follow straightforward reasoning? For example, in your first book you wrote that straightforward reasoning says there is cause and effect, and there is no reason not to say that this also applies to God, even though He is a being about whom we have no experience at all. The Rabbi still expressed an opinion on the matter. And likewise regarding the meaning of the commandments, the Rabbi explains that they relate to spiritual matters, even though the Rabbi has no knowledge whatsoever of what happens above. Why is this case different from that one?

I didn’t understand the question. When there is a logical consideration, I certainly take it into account. That does not turn the conclusion into knowledge, only into something plausible.

Why doesn’t the Rabbi make some kind of analogy from reward and punishment in our world [the court system] with regard to God?