Q&A: Kidney
Kidney
Question
Hello,
In recent days Arnon Segal’s kidney donation was publicized, in which he asked to donate only to Jews.
If we ignore the declaration and the semantics and focus only on Segal’s actual claim, does the Rabbi think that this is racist? Or immoral? How is this different from if he wanted to donate only to his nuclear family and is just extending the claim here?
In any case, I don’t have the intellectual tools to analyze this case, and of course in the media they immediately attacked him, saying he is a racist and so on.
I would be glad if the Rabbi would share his opinion on the matter, and if it’s not too much trouble I’d be happy if there could be a more in-depth discussion.
Answer
First, it’s very admirable that he donated, and I’m hardly in a position to criticize someone who donates—certainly when I myself have not donated.
Second, I don’t see racism here. A person may, and perhaps should, prefer members of his family or his people. There may be other side considerations, such as: if you don’t donate to gentiles, they won’t donate to us. But in principle I see nothing wrong with it.
If he were instructing not to donate a kidney at all to a gentile, even when there is no Jewish recipient, that would already be worse. But even that is open to discussion, since a person has the right not to give of himself for someone who is not from his family or his people. Most of us do not do that even for our own people.
If he were to instruct not to donate a kidney to a gentile but only to a Jew after his death—that would be more problematic. Although there too, most people do not donate organs at all, meaning they see this as a heavy price for some reason. So if it is a heavy price, a person has the right to be willing to pay that heavy price only for members of his own people.
Bottom line, this whole story is part of the anti-racism carnival that is common in our circles, which I have addressed more than once. There is nothing to it. People speak in gut-level slogans.
Discussion on Answer
Absolutely not. The fact that demagoguery and brainwashing lead people to see something like this as racism is their problem. Instead of forbidding a good person from doing what he believes in, we should fight the infantile brainwashing that harms us so much. Of course, if there is a person willing to donate to any person whatsoever, all the better for him. But someone who doesn’t do that and instead donates to his people or his family is not doing anything wrong. On the contrary, he is worth ten times more than all his clucking critics who haven’t donated to anyone themselves. To forbid donating to my people or my family is absurd and a surrender to stupidity.
By the way: is it permitted to donate organs after death?
In my opinion, it is a great commandment.
The position of Jewish law regarding organ donation?
Answer: The only halakhic dispute regarding organ donation from the dead concerns determining the moment of death—whether according to Jewish law brain-respiratory death is the moment of a person’s death, in which case it is possible to donate organs that are still functioning but are in a dead body, or whether according to Jewish law cardiac-respiratory death is the moment of death, and therefore as long as the heart is beating organs cannot be donated.
Many rabbis have ruled that brain-respiratory death is halakhic death.
This is the decision of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel throughout the generations; so ruled the Chief Rabbis of Israel, including Rabbis Ovadia Yosef, Shlomo Goren, Avraham Shapira, Mordechai Eliyahu, Shlomo Amar, and David Lau; this position was also taken by Rabbis Moshe Feinstein and Shaul Yisraeli, and, may they be granted long life, Rabbis Yaakov Ariel, Nahum Rabinovitch, Haim Druckman, Aryeh Stern, Dov Lior, Tzefania Drori, Shmuel Eliyahu, Yehoshua Zuckerman, and others.
As I explained in the past, it has nothing whatsoever to do with determining the moment of death. See my article here:
And of course that is only regarding organs on which life depends. A kidney is not such an organ. And there are donations that can be taken after death, and they too are not part of this discussion.
Hello,
I was very surprised to see your answer on the subject, and I’d appreciate it if you would answer a few questions for me.
First of all, it is obvious that donating a kidney is an altruistic act that not many people are capable of / willing to do—I think no one disputes that.
Do you think that a person who does a good deed is immune from all criticism? I don’t really see the logic in that.
I also want to divide the question into two parts. Specifically regarding Arnon: from what I saw in interviews with him, he did not prefer a Jew; rather, he wanted to donate only to a Jew. (It is clear to me that this is his right—just as it would be his right to prefer white people who are 1.80 meters tall.) The question is whether it is moral to present such a condition. It seems to contradict the categorical imperative. I assume most people would not want everyone to donate only to their own people (certainly not Jews, who make up one tenth of a percent or less), and I’m not even talking about the implications of such a statement.
The second part is this: if we leave Arnon aside and assume he does not donate only to Jews but prefers them, is that a worthy preference? I see a big difference between family and the people as a whole. I assume that when donating to family members, the donation stems from need and familiarity; that is, were it not for the family member’s need, the donor likely would not donate to an anonymous person. That is not the case when donating to a non-family member, where the person does not know the recipient at all and the donation is completely altruistic. Therefore, I don’t really see why preferring criteria such as one’s people is moral (again, a person is allowed to do it; the question is whether it is proper). I’ve seen many people hanging their argument on the statement “the poor of your city come first,” and I ask about the statement itself: why is it moral? In similar cases we would call such preference nepotism. For example, if there are two equal candidates for a certain position and the only difference is that one of them is from my city (or is a relative), is it morally justified to prefer the relative and deny the other an equal chance to be selected (say, by lottery)?
Thanks in advance.
I didn’t write that an altruistic person cannot be criticized, but that it makes no sense to criticize altruism. I gave the example of a person who gave 100 shekels to charity and you complain to him: why didn’t you give a thousand? Arnon sees members of his people as extended family. It may be that you don’t (though I very much doubt it. Would you say that the state should support all the poor of the world and not only the poor of our own country?! As I recall, you deny the morality of “the poor of your city come first”). And what about medical care for the entire universe? And education? By the way, I now remember that there was a column on universalism, and there I explained the consequentialist problem involved in it.
In short, to me these objections are completely unfounded.
The objection from equal chance of being selected is also unfounded. Everyone is entitled to a chance to be selected. My kidney, absolutely not. A state should treat all its citizens equally (but not the citizens of other countries), but I do not have to.
Hello,
1. I still don’t understand why it makes no sense to criticize altruism, and the 100/1000 shekel example is, in my opinion, not a good example. A better example might be someone who gives a poor person 100 shekels but throws it at him in a degrading way. I’m not telling anyone to donate both kidneys; I’m only criticizing the declaration not to donate to a non-Jew.
2. I do not see the people as extended family, and I even pointed out earlier the difference between a family member, where the donation presumably comes from need and familiarity, as opposed to a person from the “people,” where the donation is anonymous (Arnon also does not know the recipient).
3. It seems you didn’t address the first part of my question—in Arnon’s case, he did not prefer a Jew but was willing to donate only to a Jew. Given that you yourself also distinguished between the cases, it surprises me that you didn’t address the question of why this is moral.
4. I really do think the state has some responsibility toward the poor of the world (the word “must” is not appropriate here), and indeed in reality there are governmental and international projects to eradicate poverty, and after the earthquake in Turkey many countries sent aid. So I don’t understand the surprise at the idea that the state has responsibility toward the poor of the world. Also, referring to the state as something amorphous is unclear; a state is ultimately the sum of its citizens, and there is a sort of unwritten contract among the citizens, therefore there is a certain “priority” toward the citizens—but not because they are “family,” rather because they have a shared fund. And still, in my opinion one should always ask when the quality of life of the citizens takes precedence over the lives of the poor of the world. I don’t have a clear answer, and there are constraints such that we cannot donate all our output to the poor, but we do need to ask what the priorities are.
If it’s not too much trouble, I’d be glad if you’d send the link to the column on universalism.
5. Regarding what you said—that the kidney does not belong to everyone—I think this touches on the second point, that in the end, if the recipient is unknown, why is one member of the people preferred over another. And again, I do not dispute that the kidney is his and he has the right to do with it as he wants. The question is whether it is proper. Maybe I’ll sharpen the question: a wealthy person who has a lot of money has no obligation whatsoever to donate money to the needy, but do you think he also has no “responsibility” of some kind toward the poor?
Thanks.
Everything was explained.
1. I explained that there is no basis for criticism of his altruism. This is not giving in a degrading way, but giving to this one and not to that one. There is not the slightest thing wrong with that, certainly not when compared to someone who gives nothing at all.
2. I know that you don’t, but he does. The distinction based on familiarity is irrelevant. Closeness is what matters. If for some reason I did not know my son, would it then be immoral to agree to give only to him?
3. Given that I did address it as well, what exactly am I supposed to add? I said what I had to say.
4. In short, you agree with me. Hanging it on some fund or another is irrelevant. In a state, they also support those who do not contribute to the fund. In fact, mainly those.
5. He is not a wealthy person. He has exactly two kidneys, just like you and me.
I think we’ve exhausted this.
The column on universalism is no. 188. I also discuss this in columns 51 and 266.
The problem with Arnon Segal’s conduct is that the damage he could cause in a chain reaction would be dozens of times greater than the benefit of his donation.
Haredim don’t sign an Adi donor card, but they still benefit without shame from organs that others donated.
Among the Religious Zionist public the situation is better, but it is still very far from the situation among the secular public.
At present, organ donations after death go to patients without distinction of religion, race, or sex, according to the most noble principles.
Segal’s behavior could lead to a counter-protest in which Adi card signers begin adding restrictions (only for Jews/Arabs, religious/secular, settlers/non-settlers, or just some anti-Haredi clause).
Shouldn’t Segal’s behavior be forbidden for that reason?