Question

Hello Rabbi,
I’m currently reading your excellent book The Science of Freedom, and I’m enjoying it מאוד.
A question came up for me regarding your presentation of the contradiction between morality and the deterministic-materialist view. You write there (p. 316) that morality cannot be understood in light of the materialist view alone, because one must add another element, a norm or value, according to which it is not “right” to hit Reuven.
But in my humble opinion, one can offer another reason for the dilemma of whether to hit Reuven, one that does not lie in the normative-value realm but דווקא in the utilitarian realm: why don’t I want to hit Reuven? Because I don’t want him to hit me. If I hit him, the likelihood of that happening will increase, whether from him, his family, or other people who see the incident.
Or, in other words: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow” — but not for a normative-value reason, rather for a utilitarian one. Practically speaking, it is impossible to sustain a society in which people are hitting each other all the time.

I’d be happy to hear your opinion on this, and whether this view does allow for a kind of morality even according to the materialist view.
Thank you,
Mimi Lavi