Q&A: God Plays Dice – Chapter 1
God Plays Dice – Chapter 1
Question
Hello and blessings.
A friend introduced me to the Rabbi and to some of his thought.
The Rabbi is indeed an impressive person, and I enjoyed listening and reading.
My question:
In chapter 1 of “God Plays Dice,” the Rabbi argues that there is no rational justification for adopting moral values without belief in God; and that when a person who does not believe chooses moral values, this indicates that he actually does believe in God, though not entirely consciously, or else that he is making a plainly irrational choice.
In my view, the evolution of the individual does not end with the individual. I argue that the society we are part of is an organism that obeys those same laws of nature. More than that: without the survival of society, and society’s support for our personal survival, we have little chance of surviving. And there are reciprocal relations between the evolution of the individual and the society in which he exists.
If my personal survival depends on my being part of a surviving society, then adopting socially accepted moral values is a very rational choice. Even if I do not believe in God and am motivated solely by my personal survival, it is still a rational choice.
I would be glad to receive a response.
Respectfully,
Answer
Your remarks contain a mistaken assumption at the conceptual level. This is a confusion between what is and what ought to be.
The question is not whether this is a rational choice, but whether there is a binding value here. What you are proposing is what is called a “naturalistic explanation” of morality, that is, grounding it in facts. But any grounding of morality in facts (in your case: its contribution to the survival of society is a fact) is a fallacy, commonly called the “naturalistic fallacy.” A naturalistic explanation explains how some tendency arose within us (evolution created in us a tendency to do good), but it does not explain why that is binding. Think about a person who behaves immorally. What could you argue against him? That he is not obeying tendencies that exist within him? That he is not contributing to the survival of society? So what? There are many tendencies within me, and I do not obey all of them. Why should the fact that I have some tendency obligate me to act in accordance with it? This is again the naturalistic fallacy, because the existence of the tendency is a fact, and a fact does not create a norm. And if you argue to him that he is not contributing to the survival of society, he will ask you where it comes from that there is an obligation to contribute to the survival of society (especially if that runs against my own survival, or comes at my expense). Here too, you are smuggling in some value through the back door, and regarding that value you have no justification (not even a naturalistic justification).
I explained the connection to God in the debate with Professor David Enoch, which is described in column 456 – 457 on the site. There you can also find a link to the face-to-face discussion between us.