The claim is that the logical structure of the Kuzari argument is anti-informativist, in Bachlerian jargon.

Ah, now I understand. Why didn’t you say so earlier?!

And your answer?

Irony, irony. I didn’t understand a thing. If you want to discuss it, please spell it out. I don’t deal here in riddles.

Doron, what is “anti-informativist”? Actualist? So what? Why does that refute the argument?

Are you claiming that the Torah contradicts informativism and therefore saws off the branch it sits on? If so, how?

There’s a problem posting replies. When I attach the text, the button disappears. Don’t know how it worked just now.

The comment system in the responsa section is anti-informative. A short comment doesn’t cover the “Reply” button, but when the comment is long, the “Reply” button gets covered.

The fix is to press the Tab key several times, as it is written: “Seven times let them decree upon it that it should become tab…,” and pleasant it shall be to those who hear, and may the blessing of good come upon them.

Regards,
Shatz Levinger

First, my apologies to the readers who don’t know Ze’ev Bachler’s concepts. The Rabbi knows them very well, and broadly speaking he supports most of them (or all of them?).

My starting point is that the Torah really was given to us by God, as it testifies about itself.
In light of that, it is tempting to accuse the Torah of circularity (and from there also of informational emptiness): before us is a document that testifies to the existence of a God who created it (the document) and gave it to human beings. A document created by a God who creates a document, and so on…

But the Torah was a bit smarter than those critics, so it prepared in advance for that accusation. The Torah (that is, the Kuzari argument implicit in it) seems to say: one can escape this circularity by using an extra-textual tool (outside the Torah), namely historical experience, the Jewish tradition that we know directly and not through the Torah itself.
And indeed — amazingly enough — the Torah is really right! On the basis of the existence of the tradition, it is not at all likely that the story of the revelation at Sinai was invented. The circular argument has been successfully broken.

Very nice, but my claim is that in the Torah’s attempt to escape one kind of circularity, it retreats into another — the circularity of historicity. The Torah explicitly tells us, “Ask now of the former days,” etc. In other words: the actual history of human beings and their experiences is precisely the main tool (and perhaps the only one) for examining the truth of the story. On the contrary, as long as history has not reached its end, it is always possible that the miracle will happen again and there will be a mass public revelation to some group. According to what I’m saying the Torah says, if I understand it correctly, such an event (which apparently never happened and who knows whether it ever will) would refute its validity.

That is to say: according to the Torah, precisely the most absolute and authentic knowledge given to human beings from heaven (the Torah itself) denies the human ability to validate the existence of a transcendent object like God so long as history has not been “completed.” And since the historical process has a relative character, then the knowledge too — including knowledge about God and the giving of the Torah — is also relative, that is, of historical status only. Therefore there is no authorization, according to what is implicit in the Torah’s own words, even to think about God (who is supposed to be “above” history).

One can of course argue that the Torah is not dealing with a theory of logic and epistemology, and therefore it does not forbid us to think about or know God through “extra-Torah” channels. If that were true, my argument could be refuted more easily.
In my opinion that is not true. Actualist theories have a tendency to “spread” and nullify the validity of other competing theories, including competing actualist theories (after all, competing actualist theories are separate from the specific theory in question, meaning they are not “actual” from its point of view). All the more so when we are dealing with an actualist theory (the Torah) to which absoluteness is attributed. Its internal demand to nullify any knowledge whatsoever (including its own self-nullification) is far stronger.

In summary: according to this argument of mine, the Torah really was given to us from heaven, but precisely because of that we have a problem.

The Rabbi addressed this at length in an exchange here:

https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%A8-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99/
He does not see this verse as a “proof” of the Torah’s reliability. That is, the non-recurrence of revelation does not prove the truth of the Sinai revelation. Here:

“What the Torah says — ‘Has any people heard God…’ — in my opinion does not necessarily come to prove that there is a God. That is the perspective of a modern person looking for arguments to prove faith. It comes to show believing people God’s closeness to us. He reveals Himself to us and guides us in the world (and we still remain alive), because we are important to Him…

“This is with respect to the Torah. As for what is written in various books of Jewish thought (such as Maimonides, whom you quoted) that rely on the revelation and its uniqueness — that indeed does not persuade me, and I do not feel obligated to explain them or agree with them…

“I suggested a different interpretation of the Torah. After all, the verse ends with ‘and lived,’ meaning that what was unheard-of was not the encounter with God, but the fact that we survived it. Nobody met Him directly and survived…

“As an aside, the verse also does not say that there will not be a revelation, only that there had not been one until then. So later testimony would not say much…”

Doron, it’s unclear why you had to bring Bachler and his concepts into this (it didn’t help at all, except for the claim — which is unfounded — that because the Torah is an actualist theory it has a tendency to “spread,” etc.). In any case, the Torah absolutely does not present the Kuzari argument or try to prove anything. That’s an anachronism. Look at the context of the verses and you’ll see that God is trying to show His greatness in that the people of Israel survived an encounter with God.

I assume the Rabbi will have a good and illuminating answer, as is his way.

I’ll repeat my argument in a somewhat different way, which may also answer the questions put to me.

1. Regarding my use of the term actualism in this context: the advantage of Bachlerian analysis is that it is suitable for examining a great many (if not all) patterns of thought and knowledge. Why not use it? I don’t understand.

2. In my opinion Bachler himself did not notice this, but the property of “spreading” is essential to every actualist theory. The reason is simple: the actualist theory, whatever it may be, denies the existence of abstract entities separate from it. A given theory sees abstract entities (potential with respect to the state of knowledge) as a “nuisance.” But from the point of view of the given theory, the whole set of theories separate from it (scientific, moral, religious, etc.) are also abstract entities. Therefore they must be annulled. See, for example, the attempt (unsuccessful, in my opinion) of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to strip meaning from every abstract theory (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, etc.).

3. I don’t understand how one can claim that “the Torah does not present the Kuzari argument,” even if it doesn’t call it that. After all, the verse “Ask now of the former days” explicitly recommends (or perhaps commands) that the skeptic conduct his own historical inquiry and thus receive confirmation for his skepticism. The skeptic is asked to investigate whether there are parallel testimonies in history to the Torah’s testimony. Why do you call attributing the Kuzari argument to the Torah an anachronism?

4. It may be that from the Torah’s point of view the absence of a repeated revelation is not proof. I think it is, but that is not the main issue. The main issue is that the Torah appeals for logical support to history (tradition) itself. This is an attempt to appeal to an extra-textual source in order to ground the text itself. The problem: the Torah itself (this is hinted at even in its name — “Torah” — a halakhic code that is supposed to take actual root in human hearts and deeds, that is, to “spread” within history). My claim is that this position implies that from the Torah’s point of view there is no separation between it and the historical process. Consequently there is no room for a transcendent factor to the Torah.

5. Aharon quotes the Rabbi:
“What the Torah says — ‘Has any people seen God’ — in my opinion does not necessarily come to prove that there is a God. That is the perspective of a modern person looking for arguments to prove faith. It comes to show believing people God’s closeness to us. He reveals Himself to us and guides us in the world (and we still remain alive), because we are important to Him…”
If so, the Rabbi agrees with me — the question of God’s separate existence apart from the Torah is not important to the Torah. That is roughly what I argued. The Torah probably does not intend this, but willy-nilly it not only renders the assumption of the existence of separate entities like God unnecessary; it also implies that as history advances (and human knowledge as part of it), faith will weaken, or at least ought to weaken.

Wow, this is an extremely convoluted and entangling formulation. Bottom line, I see no difficulty whatsoever. The Torah tells us that the tradition accompanying it together with the Torah itself constitute, taken as a whole, testimony to the revelation at Sinai, one like which had not occurred. What is wrong with that?
Aharon wrote well (in my name) that it does not say there also will not be one like it. But even if it did speak about the future, I still do not see the problem. The claim is that you will not see such a mass revelation in the future, and any reader who reads the Torah at any future date can examine whether up to his time there had indeed been such a revelation or not. Maybe in the future there will be one? Maybe. Maybe in the future the law of gravity will also be refuted, and still, as long as something stands up to tests until now, we adopt it.
In short, there is no internal contradiction or circularity here that I can discern.

Perhaps your intention is to raise a skeptical question: who says we should believe our senses? The senses themselves? After all, we have no independent feedback. But then you are speaking about skepticism pure and simple, and I do not see what point there is in dealing with skepticism when discussing a specific question about Mount Sinai.

Another side note. As far as I understood what you wrote, all of Bachler’s terminology does not fit and is unrelated to the discussion. Beyond that, even if it is related, it only complicates things and there is no point in dragging it in here. Writing simply and clearly is always more effective.
(Sorry that I allow myself — as someone often criticized for this — to recommend simplicity to you. But I do think I formulate things simply. I use technical and specific terminology only when it is necessary and useful for understanding, to the best of my judgment. Maybe I’m mistaken; others can say. But that is at least what I try to do.)

In short, if you see some difficulty here, then please write briefly and clearly and without confusing terminology exactly what the difficulty is. I don’t see a shred of difficulty here.

I’m having trouble understanding why it isn’t worthwhile to use Bachler. You yourself have done so several times in your books. On the contrary, Bachler created a meta-theory (whose subject matter is other theories), and it seems fruitful and valid to me, and apparently to you as well. True, I, the little fellow, am trying to go a bit beyond Bachler (my idea that an actualist theory cannot tolerate the existence of competing theories), but in my opinion everything I’m saying is logically implicit in his view.
That said, if the readers feel this is confusing them, I’ll try to present my claim differently.
I can’t understand: where do you see in the Kuzari argument an attempt to appeal to transcendent factors, meaning factors separate from human history and the bodies of knowledge created within it?
How can someone who takes the Kuzari argument seriously as a highly plausible argument (like me, for example) separate between the description of the revelation, the revelation itself, and the historical impact that these “two” created in subsequent history, down to our own day? In my opinion the Torah encourages us (at least within the framework of the Kuzari argument) to cancel these separations.
(By the way, it seems to me that you yourself pointed to a similar difficulty for supporters of Darwinism when trying to explain how Darwinian theory developed out of biology. Don’t catch me on the wording, because it may be that I did not understand you in that example. But if I did understand, then the same logical structure that undermines Darwinism in its failed naturalistic interpretation also exists in the Kuzari argument.)
An example of a more successful and more “potentialist” explanatory model (sorry, it slipped out) is found, for example, in Pauline Christianity. The core of Christian doctrine as formulated in the New Testament does not sanctify history and tradition, but rather the appeal to the heart, intuition, private revelation, etc. In my eyes, the Christian believer’s God is not “blocked” by his doctrine (“for the letter kills, but the spirit gives life”).
I tried to make it as clear as possible.
By the way, do you feel comfortable being addressed in this setting as “Rabbi”? I certainly don’t feel comfortable with it, but as long as I’m your guest here, I respect what is customary.

I feel very comfortable being addressed as Michi. There are people for whom that bothers them and they prefer “Rabbi,” and I don’t object. Fine.
I used that terminology when it was relevant and I saw no better substitute. With you it seems to me completely irrelevant, not really connected, and certainly not clarifying. The fact is that although I think my reading comprehension is reasonable, I cannot understand what you mean, and therefore to this very moment I still do not see even a shred of a problem here. So I’ll try one more time to focus the discussion.

The Kuzari argument (according to your view; according to mine it does not necessarily exist in the Bible, but let’s not argue about that) goes like this:
Premise 1. The Sinai revelation is described in the Torah.
Premise 2. According to your view, the book also adds that there never was and never will be a similar event. I’ll go along with you on that too. This is said for the future reader to examine, as I explained.
Premise 3. The book is accompanied by an oral tradition that says the book is authentic and what is described in it is true (that there really was such an event and that those things were really said there — including the instructions for checking it).

Conclusion of the argument’s premises: the book is the instrument pointed to by generation A as they transmit the tradition to generation B, as if saying to them: here, see what is written here. It really is true. Please pass it on to your children (and let them continue checking whether in their generation something like this has already happened or whether it is still a unique event — according to your view, of course).

The argument itself: the book and the tradition create a fairly reliable chain regarding the giving of the Torah.

I do not see in such a structure even a shred of a problem. I mean, of course, a structural problem. There are challenges to the argument from all sorts of angles, but that is not our topic here.

Now I would ask you to point out briefly and clearly exactly what in the structure I have described here you dispute (or perhaps you think this is not the structure).
And please, no actualism and no burdensome, murky terminology. Plain and focused, in human language.

Rabbi,

“Michi” with a hard “k” or a soft one?

Hard. Why?

The question is:
Is the softening of the kaf its hardening, or perhaps the hardening of the kaf its softening?

Regards,, Michael Maoz, nicknamed “Michal Meisel” or Micki Mouse

It seems that in the Song at the Sea Moses and the children of Israel satisfied both views: the first “Who is like You” with a soft kaf, and the second “Who is like You” with a hard kaf.

In my opinion, the tools Bachler offers are very relevant in this case too, and the limitation you place on me makes it harder for me to explain what I mean. So be it.

According to what you wrote above in summary:

“The argument itself: the book and the tradition create a fairly reliable chain regarding the giving of the Torah.”

My claim is that the reliability test the text offers us does not allow us to separate it from the way it is embodied in human actions in history.

Another claim: if despite this we do make that distinction (as it seems to me you do), then it is not in the name of the text but in the name of reason. The assumption of such separateness is a methodological failure, because it does not try to extract from the text what is logically implicit in it (and what is logically implicit in it, in my opinion, is that there is no separateness).

Conclusion: if there is no criterion of distinction built into the Torah itself between the reality of the one observing it (everyone belonging to generation B onward until today, like you and me) and the Torah itself, then a tautology is created: Torah = human history = the actual human beings living in it = human knowledge. Actual human knowledge, and it alone, generates the Torah’s supposedly transcendent status. If according to the Torah itself its transcendent status is not authentic, then it is not a “Torah from Heaven.”

Within my modest abilities, I tried to be clear, understandable, and simple. If I did not succeed, then I of course take responsibility. Even so, note that the logical structure I am describing really does have a very delicate and slippery dialectical character. Perhaps you told yourself something like: “He can’t really mean that the described reality is so inside-out.” Etc. But that is indeed what I meant.

My poverty is great. I don’t understand a word. I give up.

(The problem with Bachler’s wording is that people start speaking in slogans rather than about the matter itself. If his analysis is good, there should be a way to translate it into plain Hebrew in any specific case. The fact that it’s hard for you to do that is a sign that you can’t use his analysis here.)

“My claim is that the reliability test the text offers us does not allow us to separate it from the way it is embodied in human actions in history.”

What is the problem with separating the Torah from history? There is no problem at all, and as I understand it, you haven’t managed to show the problem either (that is, you tried to “explain away” the Rabbi’s view that they can be separated and “failed,” but you never explained why in the first place one should think there is no separation).
That is exactly what I wrote in parentheses at the beginning: your only reason for saying one must not separate them is the decision that the Torah is an “actualist” Torah and therefore it “spreads.” Those are mere slogans, and as long as you haven’t explained what you want, they are worth nothing. An analysis (Bachler’s, in this case) is supposed to help us *think*, but if the arguments (which the analysis helped us discover) cannot be translated into plain Hebrew, then they are still worth nothing, no matter how smart the analysis looks.

Now let me remove the beam from my own eye and ask a question in plain Hebrew: in what way exactly, in your view, does the Torah “not separate” itself from history (the Torah is a book, and history is events; the difference between them seems obvious to me)?
Maybe you define the terms “Torah” and “history” differently from me?

It really is frustrating.
It may be that I don’t understand the argument implicit in the Torah, don’t understand Bachler, and not even your words.
In my opinion that is not the case. I tried to explain in the clearest, most relevant, concrete, and simple way what I mean when I talk about the inherent tendencies of actualist theory to “spread.” Even if I failed, that does not mean that “it can’t be used here,” as you say. (I would have been interested to know how you justify that assertion, but I don’t want to scatter the discussion and dissolve it when we already don’t understand each other very well.)
The very fact that you don’t see the relevance of Bachlerian thinking here — you of all people, who understand Bachler well and even agree with him on many things — is completely unclear to me. Bachler’s theory is in fact a meta-theory dealing with knowledge as such (theories, ideas, etc.). The Kuzari argument implicit in the Torah is certainly an idea, that is, it has a certain logical structure. Therefore it can be investigated through Bachlerian eyes. On the contrary, Bachler himself uses his meta-theory to examine moral questions too (and perhaps even aesthetics). To my mind this strengthens, even if indirectly, the relevance of his method to our question.
In general: in my opinion, when one side in a discussion brings a paradigm that is well known to both speakers, largely accepted by both of them, and especially when it is a paradigm convenient for use by the side introducing it, it is more correct to allow him to present things from that point of view. If the other side (the listener) does not understand the first side’s intention, the fault may lie with the explainer, it may lie with the listener, and it may lie with both. It is even possible that the other side is right and the paradigm really is not applicable to the discussion. But in any case it is not right to “prevent” the explainer from continuing to use the paradigm he is convinced (even if mistakenly) is applicable to the discussion.

I am not “scolding” you, of course, but pointing out a methodological issue that is central in my view to our discussion.

In any case I’ll attach an article I wrote about Bachler and about this issue. The article is long, and presumably you may not have the time or desire to read it. I don’t expect you to make that much effort for me. Only if you feel like it.
Sabbath peace.
P.S.
Michi, without a tiny bit of flattery (whose psychological reward is built in) it is of course impossible: I regard myself as your student and am deeply impressed by you and your words. More than that you won’t get from me.

I’m not forbidding or preventing you from anything, of course. I asked you to omit these concepts because in my opinion they do not contribute to understanding (and as far as I understood, they are not relevant either. But perhaps that is a result of my lack of understanding). This is not a matter of methodological clarification but of trying to advance toward understanding your words. But it turns out that even in the other formulation I don’t understand. So I gave up. Sorry, but I can’t discuss claims I do not understand.

It could be that Doron thought the Rabbi wrote my previous comment, because he commented on my wording and in the same breath praised the Rabbi.
—-
On second thought, maybe he really was addressing me and only the P.S. is dedicated to the Rabbi. If I’m right, I’d be glad to see the article in question (actually, even if I’m wrong :).

Signed in tears,
D'

I’d also be happy to read the article, since I’m very eager to read anything having to do with the Kuzari argument. For now I’d recommend that you read Yaakov Licht, “The Foundational Claim,” which explains the Kuzari argument emerging from the whole of biblical history and its various claims about several founding events of the people, even before their territorial settlement. He concludes from this that it is correct (without accepting the supernatural dimension). If you want, I’ll send it to you: giladstn@gmail.com

One can explain the weakness of the Kuzari argument implicit in the Torah also by creating an analogy (admittedly a loose one) to Popper’s philosophy of science. As with Popper, here too the basic motivation is rooted in the need for demarcation. In the Torah’s case it is not a matter of demarcating science but of demarcating authentic religion, meaning an attempt to prove, or at least make plausible, the claim that the Torah is true (from heaven), as opposed to other doctrines that are fabrication.
Similar to Popper, the method proposed for testing the Torah’s authenticity (as against competing doctrines) is to conduct a “crucial experiment”: the Torah sends us to the field of human history in order to make observations and gather positive data that will refute (or at least weaken) its own claim to authenticity. “If you do not find such things,” it tells us, “then apparently I am reliable, that is, an authentic Torah.”

The problem in the background of this quasi-Popperian method is that the Torah assumes that the main way (if not the only way) to know God is from within history, of which the Torah is, at least in its own opinion, the main hero. That is, the Torah disqualifies — or at least greatly diminishes — the value of alternative channels of access to God (for example intuition, or rational-philosophical inquiry, or private revelation to a person, etc.). The main gateway to God is a document that burst into history and changed it dramatically (for how could it be otherwise if the Torah is from God and is unique and singular?!).

Just imagine: does the Torah “allow” us to communicate with God through channels alternative to itself? Even if yes, from its point of view they are marginal.

The problem I see in this “method,” of course, is that the most basic ontological status — which should have been granted to God — is granted to the Torah itself. If one cannot separate it from God, and if the Torah exists for us in an actual sense, namely as a text planted within history (and this is self-evident), then one cannot separate it from that God who was supposed to have brought it about in the first place. We are left with an actual Torah (a body of knowledge), and only out of it can we and may we derive God.

To my mind, that is circularity.

At last, clear words.

A few comments:
1. The Torah does *not* assume that history is the only and primary way to arrive at faith in Him. That’s nonsense that you are assuming and trying to screw into some obscure verse that is not even trying to present the Kuzari argument but rather God’s affection for the people of Israel.
2. Even if we accept your wild and puzzling assumptions, I don’t see the circularity. Indeed, from history we prove the truth of the Torah, and from there the existence of God. What is circular here? (Is it that God gave the Torah which proves His existence? If I send you a letter saying I exist, is that circular because it testifies about me even though I preceded it?! Apparently I did not understand your intention.)

Now I understand the words (although the wording is astonishingly cumbersome, pardon me), but I still don’t understand the argument, and in addition I reject its premises out of hand.

As stated, I do not agree with your interpretation at all, but for the sake of discussion I’ll adopt it.
The Torah tells us to test it in the following way: if you discover in history another divine revelation before an entire people — you are exempt from the obligation to serve God.
Where is it written that this is the only or even the primary way to know the Holy One, blessed be He? That is written nowhere, even according to your interpretation (which I do not agree with). Where is it written that emotional-experiential-intuitive or other knowledge is not valid? That is simply invented out of whole cloth.
What is written is at most (and again, even that only according to your mistaken interpretation) that if the Torah does not pass this empirical test, then we are exempt from obligation to it because it is not proven that there was a giving of the Torah. Does that mean there is no God? It does not even mean that He did not give the Torah. It only exempts us from obligation, because there is no clear evidence for the existence of the giving of the Torah, and we are not required to fulfill something that is not sufficiently well-founded.

And even if these two strange and baseless assumptions were correct, I still do not see any problem. This test confirms that there was a revelation that gave us the Torah. What is wrong with that test? Just as the test of a body falling to the ground confirms that there is a gravitational force producing that fall.
My feeling is that there is here a strange insistence on finding a difficulty where none exists. Note well: it’s not that I have some excuse or other. I do not see here even a shred of a difficulty.

First I would like to suggest the source of the error in reading the text in Deuteronomy as the “Kuzari argument,” or at least as a version of it. The mistake stems from the assumption that this is a written text, a sort of story, and not an authentic Torah. In other words — there is here a way of thinking about a written document that is trying to persuade its “reader” of the reliability of the event. In a certain sense this is the hidden assumption of biblical criticism with respect to this “important passage” (Rofé), which celebrates some kind of theological argument, supposedly written at a late time in order to try to persuade.

But the truth is otherwise. This text is a transcription of a real speech that Moses delivered before the people of Israel on the eve of their entry into the land. He is trying to show them their beloved status (“Has a people ever heard…”), their prophetic greatness (“the voice of God from the midst of the fire, and lived!”), and of course the greatness of their God — who did two great things for them: revealed Himself to them at Sinai, and took them out of Egypt, “a nation from the midst of a nation,” something that was utterly impossible for the gods who ruled over territorial spaces and could not simply enter a land not their own and pull out a people from there… etc. (see there in Alexander Rofé, master of the teaching of Deuteronomy). And there are various other explanations. Clearly there is no attempt here to prove the Sinai revelation, which was obvious to the wilderness generation and self-evident.

Thus it follows that if you accept the reliability of the text, then you believe it in any case (or at least believe that it was said by Moses to the people of Israel in the generation of the Exodus — and included within that is the recognition that if he told them such things as “you have seen,” then presumably he did not lie to them to their faces and they indeed saw God’s revelation). And if you do not believe that we have an accurate transcription of Moses’ words, but instead assume hidden assumptions that the text was written later — only then might you get entangled in the complication of the “Kuzari argument” and the hidden theological attempts the “author” is trying to preach at you. (Of course there is a third possibility, and it is the plausible one: Moses spoke thus and afterward also wrote it in a book. However, his writing functioned like a stenographer, and therefore one should not infer all kinds of soaring speculations about “arguments” and “persuasions” that the “text” is trying to produce in the “reader.” In sum: once you accept the premise that this is a real speech before a people at a certain moment in history, all the assumptions about the Kuzari argument fall away by themselves. This is the Sitz im Leben of the text. And Doron the questioner’s assumption that: 1. “the Torah sends us into the field of human history in order to make observations and gather positive data that will refute (or at least weaken) its own claim to authenticity” — is mistaken. It does not “send us” — it spoke to them.
2. The assumption that “the verse ‘Ask now of the former days’ explicitly recommends (or perhaps commands) that the skeptic conduct his own historical research and thus receive confirmation for his skepticism” — is mistaken. It is not speaking to the skeptic but to the people of Israel hearing Moses in that generation, and they are not doubtful of that (they may indeed be unsure how desirable they are before God, and whether God is unique, and so forth).
3. The assumption too that “if you discover in history another divine revelation before an entire people — you are exempt from the obligation to serve God” — (in Rabbi Michi’s formulation of Doron) is mistaken — it is not claiming any such thing at all, as stated, and even the history it does speak of is only the history pertaining to the past from the vantage point of the Exodus generation. It is not sending any future reader to perform some experiment.

The basic assumption accepted by both of us (so I thought, and still think) is that the force of the argument for the Torah’s authenticity (its divinity) lies in what we call the Kuzari argument. After all, what is the discussion about if not that? The Kuzari argument is the main guarantee — at least in this discussion (but in my opinion generally) — for that authenticity.

Regarding the problematic “method” (in my opinion) that I pointed out. It seems to me that you have now deviated from the discussion when you try to show that the Torah contains additional “methods” for coming to know God (of course it does!). In my understanding, this deviation undermines your argument.
The core problem is not the totality of the “methods” in the Torah, but the question of the primary method as presented by the Torah in the place most relevant to the discussion (in the section of the Kuzari argument). The logical form of the Kuzari argument overrides parallel arguments or opinions or ideas (in short, “methods”) that of course also exist in the Torah.

This, to my mind, is the meaning of a coherent philosophical interpretation. Take the heart of the theory before you (its logical skeleton), and extract from it with the utmost rigor what is implicit in it. I suspect, Michi, that you agree with me on this point, but in this context, in my opinion, you are not being faithful to your own approach.
Let me add and sharpen: in my eyes there is no defect at all in a theory or argument of any sort (including the Torah, which is also a theory or argument) using a historical-empirical method — perhaps one could call it “naturalistic” — in order to strengthen its position. There is no problem at all in the Torah sending us on the mission of “Ask now of the former days,” and I am not claiming at all that from this standpoint there is circularity here.
Rather: the circularity stems from the fact that the argument implicit in the Torah, insofar as it is first and foremost a document pretending to bear a metaphysical character. This characteristic demands of the interpreter that he “take seriously” the norm that the Torah places at the basis of its “method” (= the norm that sends us to “Popperian” historical research). Be that as it may, one must not mix two different argumentative methods — both have their place and necessity, provided that we distinguish between “higher” and “lower.”

More on your “naturalistic” bias (in this case) appears elsewhere where you write:
“Thus, for example, I will not pay attention to a story about a miracle that happened to So-and-so if I know So-and-so as a primitive person who believes every bit of nonsense. But if a scientist who is accustomed to critical thinking tells me this, and all the more so if his story has support from an independent source (historical or otherwise), I will believe it more. That is the difference between alternative medicine and conventional medicine. Therefore we accept quantum theory despite its implausibility, and do not accept miracle stories of this tribe or that.
Although from what I say it emerges that much of this stands or falls on trust in the tradition and those who transmit it” (my emphasis).
In these words you choose to believe the testimony of the senses and the historical story (rightly so!), whereas the main question you ought to have directed to the tradition is about its logical skeleton.

In addition, you claim that at most (and even with this you do not agree):
“…if the Torah does not pass this empirical test, we are exempt from obligation to it because it is not proven that there was a giving of the Torah.”

What do these words of yours mean, “we are exempt from obligation to it”? Do they not in practice mean: “we are exempt from obligation to it because it is not an authentic Torah (from heaven)”? Is it not self-evident that if a person denies the reliability of the Torah’s testimony about itself (testimony that explicitly states that its source is heavenly), then he also rejects its claim that it springs from that source?
Again I get the feeling that you are “letting the text off” and not examining it with the full logical rigor required (a phenomenon that amazes me when it comes from a person like you with such exceptional intellectual integrity).

As for what D' challenged me with:
“if I send you a letter saying I exist, is that circular because it testifies about me even though I preceded it?! Apparently I did not understand your intention.”

My answer: if you were a supernatural entity (an abstract metaphysical one) sending me such a letter, then yes, I would see in that a reliability problem arising from the circularity of the argument at the basis of the letter. Assuming, reasonably, that the sender of the letter is nonetheless a flesh-and-blood creature, and therefore one can know him through the senses and through “historical” knowledge (say, the testimony of someone I trust who tells me you are his friend), then there really is no logical defect in your letter. A letter sent from one human being to another, containing the writer’s self-testimony to his own existence, is not problematic and is not circular.

As for Gil’s claim that the things appearing in the Torah are merely a transcription (a putting into writing) of God’s living speech to human beings.
My answer: I have no idea what that claim is based on. If it appears in the oral tradition of the people, that is out of faith-based, psychological, and even logical reliance on what is actually written (and not spoken live) in the Torah. Since most of us do not have direct access to the historical/metaphysical event that took place at Sinai, we have no choice but to turn to the text that testifies about it. (As stated, there are also extra-textual testimonies, but they are not the main focus of our discussion. It revolves around the logical structure of the text.)

To conclude, I will increase the amount of confusion I have caused the readers and say that I myself tend to believe that the Sinai revelation did in fact occur as a supernatural revelation. The Kuzari argument (+ the oral tradition about it) is quite strong.
The problem, as I understand it, lies in the interpretation given to the very existence of the event.

Okay, then I’d be glad to understand your claim. It’s hard to deal with such a long text; please sharpen the point: why, when a metaphysical entity sends me a letter, is that circular? (Especially since in the last paragraph you admit that you would believe such a letter. If so, where is the problem? Not on the logical plane, because otherwise you wouldn’t believe it at all. Maybe the problem lies in your unnecessary assumptions about the nature of metaphysical entities?)

I’ve started thinking this is a random-word generator, one that hasn’t yet reached the level of passing the Turing test. Really, really. I’m not writing this sarcastically.

In any case, even if there is a flesh-and-blood writer here, unfortunately the language he uses is not intelligible to me. I have the impression that the writer also does not read Hebrew. Therefore I see no point in continuing, and I suggest stopping here.

As for the suspicion regarding lack of integrity, I have nothing to say. Apparently your words are very understandable and logical in your own view, so you conclude that I have no way to deal with them. Perhaps.

In any case, if someone here volunteers to translate the question into spoken Hebrew and present it clearly and in focus, I can try to respond. Otherwise, as far as I’m concerned, we stop here.

Doron, thanks for the response. I’ll just note in the margin that contrary to how you quoted me: “As for Gil’s claim that the things appearing in the Torah are merely a transcription (a putting into writing) of God’s living speech to human beings.” Moses our rabbi is the speaker of the above speech in the book of Deuteronomy, and he speaks from his own point of view about the revelation in which he and the generation participated. There is no “transcription of God’s living speech” here, but rather of Moses’ speech.

Hi Doron. I would strongly recommend that you continue this with Rabbi Sherki, who is very fond of the Kuzari argument. More than that, you should approach Dr. Meir Buzaglo, who elaborates in a special way in his book Language for the Faithful on the Kuzari argument. At a conference in which he participated together with Rabbi Sherki on the publication of a commentary on the Kuzari, he praised him for the refinement of the Kuzari argument that he developed.

Here’s a sample:

http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=10762

Michi,
To the best of my knowledge I am not a random-word generator (but even if I am such a thing, I probably wouldn’t be able to know it).
I can only admit that I failed to provide a clear and understandable explanation, and in all likelihood the responsibility for that lies mainly with me. Still, I think my overall argument is correct.

If I “accused” you of anything, it was of inconsistency and not of “lack of integrity.”
Let me say explicitly: in my eyes you are a model of intellectual integrity. I have read many of your publications, and in them this trait is clearly evident, in my opinion. (Now I’ve also come out a liar: I solemnly promised not to praise you anymore and I didn’t keep my promise.)
When I came to compliment you, I wrote that it amazes me that a person like you, with exceptional intellectual integrity, is not consistent at this point — at this point only.
I still believe — though it is certainly possible that I am mistaken — that I was right on this point.
I have to add that in my opinion you tied my hands to some extent when you asked me to avoid Bachlerian jargon. I already explained why.

Gil, you confused me a bit: are you claiming that Moses created the Torah, invented it out of his own mind? Are you saying he did this by live speech that was only later transcribed into written language?

D', Michi explains far better than I do the distinction between scientific discourse (naturalistic, empirical, etc.) and philosophical discourse.
I can receive a letter from someone in which he introduces himself and claims he exists. In the field of scientific discourse I can carry out empirical research and check whether there is such a person (for example, do a Google search, ask other people whether they have heard of him, etc.).
The moment the letter I received says that the producer and creator of that letter is God, then one cannot rely on sensory evidence, on historical-empirical investigation, etc. (There is no point in googling God Himself; at most, only people’s references to Him.)
If the main testimony (all the more so: if the only testimony) to the metaphysical status of the writer of the letter is found in the letter, then how can I separate that testimony from the entity that supposedly wrote it? I have no tools other than empirical investigation, and that, as stated, is not relevant here.
Notice that by this I have not denied at all the possibility of the existence of metaphysical entities (like God), but only denied the logical validity of claims that testify to themselves.

Good. I don’t see any circularity here. I didn’t understand this line:
“How can I separate that testimony from the entity that supposedly wrote it? I have no tools other than empirical investigation, and that, as stated, is not relevant here.”
What do you mean by “separate”? The paper with the testimony is not God. What is there to separate?
The claim itself is clear: I have no way to confirm the testimony, so I won’t believe it. So what? What is circular and logically invalid here?

(Could it be that you mean there is no way to confirm God’s existence independently of the testimony, and therefore the letter cannot be accepted either?)

The key sentence in your words is the concluding one:

“Could it be that you mean there is no way to confirm God’s existence independently of the testimony, and therefore the letter cannot be accepted either?”

That was roughly my intention, though instead of the word “confirm,” which gives the testifying text a certain leniency, I would say something like: the only way (or at least the main way) for the recipient of the letter to become acquainted with the God who supposedly wrote it is through the letter alone. That is begging the question in my opinion, that is, circularity.
In short: in my opinion the main problem is not the lack of ability to confirm, but something more severe.

That does not of course mean that such a letter cannot be accepted, only that if I received it, I would think — in the absence of testimony external to it (extra-textual testimony) — that its logical status or validity is problematic.

Why is that begging the question?! I receive a letter from God and conclude that He exists.
What exactly did I assume here?

Are we talking now about just any letter, or about the Torah and the support it brings for itself?
My intention from the start was to show the circularity (or at least the logical problematicness) of the Torah — a problematicness that stems not only from its self-testimony but also from the fact that the “proof” it brings for its reliability is bound up with the historical process that it itself brought about (or claimed it brought about).
It may be that the “divine” letter you received need not be considered as logically problematic as the Torah. That is how it seems to me as I think about it now. Though even then my suspicion of circularity has not entirely passed.
But even if there is no such circularity in your letter, in any case it does not seem that I should accept its reliability (unless I have other evidence supporting that the letter in my hand comes from such a high-level instance).

Okay. What is circular in the Torah? So what if it generated a historical process, etc.?
I suggest you try formulating a logical argument with detailed premises and conclusions. Maybe that way we’ll better understand ourselves and each other.