Q&A: Jewish Law
Jewish Law
Question
Hello and blessings,
Why does the Rabbi think that if the Jewish people as a whole accepted the Talmud, then from that point on we are obligated by it? From the standpoint of Jewish law, only the Sanhedrin is binding, so all the laws in the Talmud that were ruled by the Sanhedrin would be binding, and nothing more. And seemingly, how is this different from all kinds of customs that the Jewish people adopted and that the Rabbi disagrees with? Especially according to the Rabbi’s view that there is such a thing as autonomous halakhic ruling, so what makes Rashba different from Rabbi Akiva?
Thank you.
Answer
This question comes up here again and again. I’ll address it briefly. Every person is obligated to a system of laws accepted by the society in which he lives. As far as I know, the Jewish people have not decided on anything that I disagree with. A custom is not similar to our case, because a custom is not law but practice, and therefore its force is weaker and the attitude toward it is more flexible. And when it plainly contradicts Jewish law, it is void. Can autonomous halakhic ruling also lead me against Moses our Teacher or against the Holy One, blessed be He? Autonomous halakhic ruling operates within an existing framework. If you do not accept the framework, then of course you do not act according to it, and you do not need its permission to do so.
Discussion on Answer
No, because a person is not obligated to cling to every whim of whatever community he happens to live in. The Jewish people are not some accidental community. Beyond that, this is at most a custom and not law. Besides, this is a foolish custom. And finally, it isn’t really a custom but a concern. See Column 2.
And what would the Rabbi say about Kabbalah? According to what you’re saying, everything accepted by Israel is binding, and today everyone acknowledges Kabbalah except for the Rabbi?
Is there some primary reason that I accept this system of laws? Could I equally well choose not to accept it, like my secular brothers?
A.Y.A.,
That’s not true, that everyone accepts it. Certainly not the laws derived from it. And I too accept it as a relevant source (even if not absolutely binding).
Aharon,
There was already acceptance by the public as a whole, and you cannot now declare that you do not accept it. You can of course not accept it and bear the consequences. If in your view it is not binding, then of course don’t observe it. But it may turn out that you were mistaken or just being sloppy.
If the Rabbi were one of those rabbis for whom part of the considerations in halakhic ruling, as explained in Nadav Schneurav’s article, is what will happen sociologically if we rule this way, then it would make sense to talk about what the public decided and what would happen if we changed the decision. But according to the Rabbi’s approach, that one should rule autonomously, the public is not supposed to matter to the Rabbi, at least in cases where the Rabbi disagrees with the Talmud. And there is no concern that you would disagree with Moses our Teacher, because about that nobody disputes that it is forbidden. But in order not to disagree with the Talmud, you have to invent strange ideas like acceptance by the public, which are not mentioned in the Written Torah and are not a law given to Moses at Sinai, so there is no reason to give them such special status.
It has nothing to do with consequentialist considerations. Acceptance by the public is binding in and of itself.
The Rabbi taught that when there is no rational explanation, you go for a psychological one. In my humble opinion, the Rabbi is afraid to say such a thing because it would be outside the bounds.
The next step is for you to prescribe me a medication based on your learned diagnosis.
Heaven forbid. I am but dust beneath the soles of your feet, Rabbi.
At the moment I’m stepping on grass.
So according to the Rabbi, if I’m in a Hasidic community and everyone there follows the prohibition of eating legumes on Passover, then I’m obligated too because of the society?