As a matter of fact, current scientific theories replaced others that turned out to be wrong. If we take physics, Einstein’s theory replaced Newton’s, which turned out to be wrong. And past theories that were shown to be wrong replaced other theories that were also wrong as well (for example, Newton replaced Copernicus’s theory). Overall there are lots of theories that were thrown in the trash because of a lack of empirical evidence. Kuhn too talks about revolutions and anomalies in theories, and then about the need to replace them, and overall this is a familiar historical-scientific pattern.

As for the second part, I completely agree—if I have no good reason to think someone is lying to me about the time, I’ll believe him. Similarly, if I have no good reason to think God does not exist (and I do have good reasons to think He does), then I’ll hold that position. My claim is only against the comparison to the process of abduction as reinforcement—it turns out that usually abductive processes lead us into errors, and therefore I wouldn’t rely on them outside a scientific-experimental context. With scientific theories, I will hold and believe them, since they have been confirmed and not yet falsified.

That is nonsense. None of those theories turned out to be wrong. All of them are still correct to this day. It’s just that there are domains in which correction is needed, and that correction was made. That’s how science advances.
The fact that there is no reason to assume that someone is lying to you is itself the result of induction.

I’ll shift the discussion away from the faith context toward philosophy of science in the context of false theories.
I didn’t understand the claim that they are all still correct today. In my definitions, a scientific theory is a set of propositions that describes the world and yields predictions that can also be written mathematically. Most of Newton’s formulas, for example, do not describe the world. V is not equal to v1+v2; the formula is a bit more complicated and also includes the speed of light, and that is what Einstein corrected. The same goes for most, if not all, of Newton’s theory. It is true that entities in the theory exist (for example, gravitational force), but I have difficulty understanding exactly what in the theory remains correct even today.

It is clear to me that this is how science advances—by correcting the areas where the previous theory erred. But it really did err and failed to hit the truth, so what does it mean to say that it is still correct today?

Forget the definitions. Newtonian mechanics is completely correct even today. After his time it became clear that at high velocities or on very small scales, corrections are needed. That’s all. The fact is that to this day, in the overwhelming majority of applications, people use Newtonian mechanics and not quantum mechanics and not relativity either. That is excellent evidence that science works.
You can infer from this that maybe in the future we’ll discover that the God who created the world did so with His left hand, but broadly speaking scientific conclusions are usually correct. And certainly fundamental principles such as the principle of causality.

Science definitely works; the question is whether it is true.
At least in the course I took (at the Open University), they talk about severing the connection between truth and success, and indeed it is hard to show that success says something about the correctness or truth of a scientific theory. Especially in connection with Putnam’s no-miracles argument, where the objections to it led him himself to retract the argument.
In any case, this is a somewhat broad discussion (realism in science), and the solution that somehow sounds reasonable is to “choose” selective realism. For example, entity realism—belief in the entities of science, but the laws, for instance, do not describe reality.
Do you know a good argument for scientific realism and can you point me to one?

In any case, you answered my question about God, so thank you very much!

Begging your pardon, all of this is philosophers’ gibberish. Scientists, almost without exception, understand that they are discovering the truth about the world (or at least gradually getting closer to it).
The question of scientific realism has different formulations (these are several different questions). For one of its versions I have an argument that, in my view, is decisive. You can see it in column 426.