Q&A: The Optional Contribution of the Divine Command to the Validity of Normative Directives
The Optional Contribution of the Divine Command to the Validity of Normative Directives
Question
Where do ethical claims come from, and why can normative directives be derived from them? What validity do these claims have?
Are they an expression of a feeling of moral disgust (“Murder is forbidden” = “I feel bad when I see murder”), or do they express some kind of ontological truth—and if so, what is it? Where does it come from, and why should I act in accordance with it when I could act otherwise?
Of course, it won’t be possible to answer all of these questions in a single response.
My main question, which follows from the questions above, is this: what is the difference between ethical claims based on a divine command and those that are not, with respect to the validity of normative directives? In other words, why is God an entity that must be obeyed, beyond defining Him as such?
This question is a continuation of another question I asked yesterday, but I wasn’t able to leave a comment on the original question page.
Answer
Without a divine command, I would regard these norms as an illusion and would not obey them. The content of the norms does not come from the command, since God Himself is also subject to them (see Column 457).
Why one should obey God is a completely different question. See my article on philosophical gratitude.