Q&A: The Physico-Theological Argument
The Physico-Theological Argument
Question
You wrote to me in the past that a volitional God is required by the physico-theological argument.
Will, Purpose, and Perfection – Rabbi Michael Abraham (mikyab.net)
Your explanations always enlighten me, so I’d be happy to understand why. Why can’t one say that the regress stops at a necessary entity that is unfamiliar to us and, for some reason, does not require a cause? I agree that this sounds problematic, but how exactly does saying that “God” is volitional, or conscious, and the like, solve anything?
Thank you very much.
Answer
Not exactly. The physico-theological argument requires a first cause that itself has no cause. The reasoning says that it is unlikely that this is a mechanical cause rather than a volitional one. (You yourself write that it sounds problematic, so what exactly is the question?!) If it is a mechanical cause, then it itself requires an explanation/cause.
In any case, if in your opinion that is plausible, then fine. The physico-theological argument only proves the existence of a first cause. What you assume about it depends on you.
Beyond that, tradition joins the argument and tells us this as well.
Discussion on Answer
We know nothing about a non-mechanical cause, except maybe a sense of the power of choice.
The truth is that any cause that is not mechanical is, for me, an abstract mystery.
It seems to me that claiming God is volitional because He is not a mechanism is an argument from ignorance. I know nothing about non-mechanisms that have any effect on anything. As far as I’m concerned, one could simply say, as I wrote, that God is just some kind of cause unfamiliar to us, and there is no indication whether He has desires.
I do feel there is some elusive dichotomy between “volitional” and “mechanical,” but I’d like to know how to define it clearly, in a way I could pass on to others.
I didn’t write that a volitional entity doesn’t need a cause, but rather that a primordial entity that doesn’t need a cause is probably volitional.
When those arguers actually make that claim, we’ll talk. It’s just nonsense. Why is “mechanical” clear but “volitional” isn’t? You’re just insisting on this and attributing it to others.
He didn’t say that “mechanical” is clear and “volitional” is not. He said that we have no indication at all regarding that first cause except that it is a first cause, and therefore it’s impossible to know whether it is volitional or non-volitional. It could be non-volitional and also non-mechanical. These are not forms of negation.
It’s not clear to me why it would itself need a cause if it were not volitional. I’d be very glad for an explanation.
And I answered that this is a matter of reasoning. A mechanical entity is not essentially different from the world, and so it leaves the question of the cause in place. If it necessarily creates specifically a special world like ours, that means it itself is structured in a way that compels it to create such a world — and then the question is why it is structured that way, such that precisely this kind of world would emerge from it, or what the reason for that is. But if it is a volitional entity, then it does not create specifically this kind of world by necessity; rather, it chose this type of world from among all the possibilities. That can be a first cause.
Why doesn’t something volitional need a cause?
And in general, some might argue that knowing the entity is not mechanical contributes nothing to our knowledge of what it actually is — “volitional” is not simply the negation of “mechanical.”