Q&A: Between Deriving One Matter from Another and an Av Principle
Between Deriving One Matter from Another and an Av Principle
Question
To the honor of Rabbi Michael Abraham,
Greetings and blessings!
I have a question, and also a suggested answer.
I would appreciate it if you would write me what your answer is and what you think about my direction.
The Talmud in Menachot 8 discusses the question whether we derive “one matter from another” in the following contexts: Menchat Chavitin from blood — whether it becomes sanctified in halves;
Menchat Chavitin from the sanctification of a meal-offering when one intends to add more;
the sanctification of a meal-offering without oil or frankincense from the showbread, libations, and the sinner’s offering;
a meal-offering whose handful was taken in the Sanctuary from the removal of the bowls of frankincense;
missing showbread from a deficient meal-offering;
peace-offerings slaughtered in the Sanctuary (here there is also a kal va-chomer argument).
My question is: what is the difference between deriving “one matter from another” and an av principle?
And why does this question arise only here?
The direction I was thinking of is that an av principle applies only within the same subject, whereas “one matter from another” applies across different subjects.
And the question arises only in meal-offerings (not within the five voluntary meal-offerings, which are certainly one subject) — whether the whole world of sacrifices is one unified category (that is, whether one learns from blood), and whether the various meal-offerings — Chavitin, showbread, libations, and the sinner’s offering — are one subject, or whether there is no connection between them. And this is against the backdrop of the great detail with which the Torah discusses animal offerings in Zevachim, as opposed to the relatively small number of verses in these areas.
Thanks in advance
Answer
Let me begin by saying that I am not sure there really is a difference. The terminology appears different, but differences in terminology are not always an indication of anything substantive (in Yad Malakhi there is a rule to the opposite effect: sometimes the same term is used for two different meanings). However, the Talmud there says that Rabbi Eliezer did not derive one matter from another, and it is not reasonable to say that he did not use an av principle. So apparently there really is a difference.
So what is the difference? Maybe you are right (one would need to check cases of av-principle derivation everywhere. For example, every “commanded immediately and for future generations” is an av principle, and that is certainly not in the same passage. In addition, I will just mention that there is also “what do we find,” which is an av principle, and that certainly is not in the same passage either. And perhaps what you suggested is the explanation of “what do we find,” as distinct from an av principle. This requires examination).
But it seems more likely to me that the Talmud there is trying to derive one law from another law, but the original law itself is not written explicitly in the Torah; rather, it is inferred by reasoning (since it cannot be offered in halves, it does not become sanctified in halves). Therefore this is not an av principle, because an av principle is a hermeneutic rule for deriving from Scripture — that is, taking a law written in one context and applying it in another context. Here, by contrast, this is a halakhic analogy, but not a formal exegetical rule.