Thank you very much, Honorable Rabbi. I’ve been looking for a long time on this topic and not finding anything, so I thought maybe there simply isn’t any, and that’s why I turned to you. I’ll keep trying to search.

Regarding the Chayei Adam’s claim, I didn’t fully understand what you said, so I’ll say what I understand: that it’s talking about a person doing something because he knows it is a commandment, and not doing something because he knows it is a transgression, without the need for any special mental or verbal intention and without delving into reasons (not that those aren’t good and important things according to a person’s level, but they are not indispensable).

Many situations would fall under this definition, such as unintentional violation, intentional violation, preoccupied action, unintended action…

I’d be glad to hear your opinion on whether I understood this correctly, and maybe also for advice on where I can look for the halakhic decisors on these two issues.

Just with your permission I’ll add one more point: the level of awareness you have of that knowledge—that you are doing something because it is a commandment, or not doing something because it is a transgression—doesn’t always have to be high, and in some cases a very low level of awareness would, in my opinion, actually indicate something greater; for example, in situations where you are required to do the commandment or avoid the transgression by instinct—your father came up behind you and the moment you saw him you stood up.

I’d also be glad to hear your opinion about this.

If you’re looking for material about intention in commandments, there’s plenty of it online. Try Google.
"Commandments require intention" means intention to fulfill one’s obligation (that is, to do it for the sake of the commandment). Transgressions do not require intention at all, so the discussion regarding them is not relevant. (It’s true that transgressions committed without knowledge are considered unintentional violations and are less severe transgressions. But the knowledge being discussed there is not connected to the intention found in commandments. There it’s about motivation, not knowledge.) None of this is related to reasons, deeper analysis, level of awareness, and so on. The intentions of the Ari and other special intentions are not a halakhic obligation, but at most an added virtue, if that.
The Chayei Adam argues that if you perform an act in circumstances where it is clear that your intention is for a commandment, that is considered as though you intended it even without any special explicit intention. Maybe that’s what you meant.

Thank you, Honorable Rabbi. In my humble opinion, at least for now, simply speaking, if a person does something and not by mistake, that is called intentionally. Based on the little I know, this is what they discuss in the Talmud, but until now I haven’t found any halakhic decisor throughout the generations who says it that way. I thought maybe the Chayei Adam did, but after reading again, really he doesn’t say exactly that either. I’ll keep looking.

You’re missing basic concepts. This has nothing whatsoever to do with whether commandments require intention.