Q&A: An Apikoros and One Coerced in Belief in Maimonides
An Apikoros and One Coerced in Belief in Maimonides
Question
A side note:
In your last lecture on dogmatics, you discussed Maimonides' distinction between heresy that stems from "following light-mindedness" and a person who was born among the Karaites. The latter is considered coerced, whereas the former is an apikoros.
Reasoning, of course, would suggest the opposite (or at least that someone who denies matters of belief is surely no less coerced than the other one).
Indeed, in Maimonides' words I thought to suggest—similar to what was said by one of the participants in the lecture—that Maimonides is dealing with that apikoros who followed his corrupted thinking; that is, a person who really did follow only the arbitrariness of his own heart, and the explanations are merely a cover. To this suggestion you said that it is hard to force this into Maimonides' language, since he should have distinguished and said: "In what case is this said? When he followed his shallow thinking; but if he reached his conclusion through his own analysis, then he is coerced."
But in my opinion this difficulty is not really difficult within Maimonides' position, since he was a dogmatist and definitely thought the truth was with him. Anyone who thinks otherwise surely did not think hard enough, and it is certainly a product of inclination. One may of course disagree with this view (certainly today), but in principle it seems to me that this suggestion is plausible in Maimonides.
Be that as it may, this really is just a side note. Maimonides' opinion is not essential to the conceptual argument about "being coerced in matters of belief."
Answer
I didn’t understand your suggestion. You are basically saying what I’m saying. Correct.
Discussion on Answer
What do we know today regarding denial out of a considered position that was not known to Maimonides and the ancient philosophers?
The only change is that there are positions which in their time were outside the consensus, and therefore someone adopting them was seen as having followed his inclination (similar to a person in our society who would declare a philosophical position that sees nothing wrong with murder for personal interest), whereas today they are within the consensus, and therefore one who holds them—even according to Maimonides—would be judged like a Karaite who is coerced, and not like someone following the arbitrariness of his heart.
In other words, even today we agree with Maimonides; the only thing that has changed is the Overton window.
Moshe,
There is no problem. I only want to argue that the distinction between "coercion in matters of belief" and one who follows the desires of his heart can fit Maimonides' ruling in Jewish law. And the fact that he did not write, "In what case is this said" (Michi's objection), is only because in his time such a thing was not possible (at least in Maimonides' view).
This is just a semantic difference. When someone says that even if you arrive at that conclusion as you understand it, you are not coerced, what he means is that if you had thought correctly, you would have arrived at the correct conclusion.
According to your suggestion, a person who denies out of a considered position is coerced. According to my suggestion too. But in the lecture you said that this view of yours does not fit Maimonides' words, whereas according to my suggestion, in principle it does fit. It is just that Maimonides did not believe there was such a thing as denying out of an adopted position (like the ancient philosophers who believed that every immoral act stems from lack of knowledge). It is not a huge gain, but in principle this distinction is possible.