Q&A: Authority in Matters of Fact and Practice
Authority in Matters of Fact and Practice
Question
It is well known that the Rabbi argues that the sages have no authority in matters of thought or fact. On the logical level, it simply makes no sense to think what I do not think, and that is obvious.
Likewise, it is well known that Maimonides also wrote this in his commentary on the Mishnah. On the other hand, Henshke has already shown in his article that Maimonides himself ruled this way in practice. One of the explanations is that Maimonides ruled regarding the practical implications of the act. It follows that even if a person does not hold that view on the ideological level, regarding practice he must still conduct himself in accordance with the sages’ outlook.
That is interesting, and certainly not agreed upon by everyone. What does the Rabbi say? Essentially, one can infer from here that there is value to the act even if at the basis of the act, in terms of worldview, the person does not hold that way. Your view?
Answer
I know Henshke’s article, and I do not agree. It is possible that Maimonides changed his mind, but in my opinion it is clear that authority has no meaning in factual matters. By the way, in my view this is not necessarily Maimonides’ position, so I do not say this necessarily in his name. But this is the truth.
Discussion on Answer
Which article by Henshke?
It was brought in the WhatsApp group
And you won’t tell me?
Just the title of the article or the journal and issue number would be enough….
Abraham, if the facts are not correct then the implications that arise from them are also irrelevant. If a louse is not generated from decay, then it is forbidden to kill it on the Sabbath.
Yishai, the article is in Daat from a few years ago.
Thanks, and for the benefit of the public –
So why, in your opinion, did Maimonides rule that way in the Mishneh Torah?
Someone told me that it is true that there is no authority in matters of fact. But in these cases Maimonides held that this was the clear rational conclusion. So he wrote that way because, in his opinion, anyone who thinks otherwise is simply a fool.
As I wrote, either Maimonides himself changed his mind, or Henshke is right but I do not agree with Maimonides on this point.
It is possible that Chaim’s answer above me is correct. Although in those three examples there does not seem to be a more compelling rational consideration than in other contexts. That might perhaps explain the ruling regarding the 13 principles as well, which also seemingly contradicts his principle that there is no Jewish law in matters of thought.
And what about the practical implications that follow from the facts?