Q&A: Morality
Morality
Question
Hello and blessings. I saw that you wrote that although there is no binding morality without God, there still may be a reality of moral values—that is, facts such as “murder is bad” or “giving is good.”
The question is whether, in your view, a person can choose to do a certain act only because it is good and moral, without a binding command. That is, I understood that in your view, without God morality is not binding; the question is whether it can still be a sufficient reason for action. In my opinion yes. Thank you very much.
Answer
If it is not binding, I do not know how you would define a sufficient reason for action. In a world without God, you do whatever you feel like. There are no reasons for actions aside from interests and desires.
Discussion on Answer
I answered that. Without God, it has no validity at all. Really, nothing has validity, because there is no such thing as validity.
Sorry, it’s a little hard for me to understand the Rabbi sometimes; I’m not as smart as the Rabbi (seriously). I asked whether a person who does something for the sake of that value, out of understanding its importance and not because of a command—that is a logical thing or not? Another question: what does it mean that God “gives validity”? Is it just that He commanded and said that this thing is permitted or forbidden—that is what gives it validity?
Sorry, I don’t know whether the question was sent, so I’m writing again and also adding more. Sorry, it’s a little hard for me to understand the Rabbi sometimes; I’m not as smart as the Rabbi (seriously). 1. It’s important to me to clarify myself, so I’ll try to be clearer. My doubt is this: a person who does not believe in God but does believe in objective good and evil—for example, that a person’s joy is good or a person’s sadness is bad. I’m not wondering whether he is under an obligation to act in a good or bad way; apparently not. The doubt is whether it is possible (logical) to choose the good only because it produces more good, with no interest at all, against his own interests, or whether there is no logic in such an act. In other words, is there such a thing as choice in such a case, or is the person deterministically forced to go with his interests, and only in a case where there is a command does he have choice? I hope I explained myself properly.
When a person knows that helping another is good, but there is no God who gives that validity, then of course he can help another, and there is no problem with that. But there is also no problem at all with not helping. Therefore, looking for a rationale or justification in such a situation is a mistake. Everyone does whatever they feel like. That’s all.
The question whether a person chooses or is compelled is not connected to the discussion about the good in the absence of God in any way that I can see.
This is not a question of intelligence. It is clear that you have not defined the question for yourself and have not read my answers carefully.
Just to make sure I understood: do you mean that there can be “altruistic” acts even without binding morality? That is, that I do the good not out of inner feelings of compassion or something like that, but in order to make my friend happy even though I have no obligation and there is no binding morality?
Another question: is it possible that God does not act according to moral values? Thank you very much for the patience.
Not out of emotion? Then why are you making your friend happy?
It is possible if He has another worthy purpose that overrides moral values.
If there is objective good and evil, then because it is good to make him happy, even though I have no interest at all in it (such as emotion or a conscience that torments me).
And if there is no good and evil, then let’s take for example a case where my interest is at stake versus someone else’s greater interest. The logic in it is that I choose to realize the thing that has more meaning and value—not moral value but benefit—since he benefits more; that is, I act for the sake of his greater benefit.
I asked why you choose to make him happy. You didn’t answer, so I’ll answer myself: because that itself makes you happy (since there is no obligation). In the absence of obligations and authority, everything a person does is because that is what he feels like doing.
Why didn’t I answer? Simply in order to benefit him, in order to realize a value (not a moral one) greater than my own value. You assume that if there is no obligation, then there is no such thing as altruism. Why can a person act for the sake of a moral value but not for the sake of his friend’s happiness? (Again I emphasize that he has no obligation, and this act is not necessarily more proper.) Thank you very much.
When there is no obligation, there is no value. A moral act is an act as a response to obligation. I tend to think that if there is no obligation then the act is also not altruistic, but that is a side issue.
1. I do not mean a moral value, and not a value belonging to the act itself. I mean that my friend’s happiness has value and importance, at least for him; you can’t argue with that. And I act for the sake of his happiness, just as I can act for the sake of my own happiness or for the sake of moral values.
2. Is there really a good reason or necessity to think this way—that if there is no obligation then the act is necessarily not altruistic? In my opinion, no.
Thank you very much.
By the way, it is important to note that this is not a side issue; that was what I was aiming at from the beginning of the conversation.
Thank you very much.
I’ve exhausted the topic.
Ziv came back and asked:
Sorry that I didn’t respond in that same question I had already asked; it doesn’t let me, but I’d still like to respond. I’ll give an example: a person is facing a dilemma—to murder for money or not to murder. On the one hand he wants money; on the other hand there is a human life here, which has a more important value, and he is aware of that value and understands that objectively it is “better” than the value of his money, and not because of a divine command (and let us assume for the sake of the discussion that he has no interest whatsoever). Is it possible that he would not murder because of the important value of human life, simply because it is better? It sounds very reasonable to me that yes. Thank you very much.