Question

Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to know whether I understood the moral argument correctly. What I’m writing here is not formulated exactly this way in your notebook, but I’d be happy if you could help me make sure I understood the proof properly:
 
If there is no objective source for values (good and bad actions) + for my moral inclination (the desire to do good without self-interest + my ability to identify good actions as opposed to bad ones), then there really is no morality and everything is just interests, and there are no good or bad actions. In other words, there are 2 claims here:
1) We believe that we have a capacity for moral judgment and decision that does not stem from other interests, meaning it is “for its own sake” (as opposed, for example, to biological reasons).
2) We also believe that there are certain actions that are good and certain actions that are bad.
(I didn’t really see these 2 claims stated explicitly in your writing, but it seems to me that there are indeed 2 claims here.)
If we accept these claims, then I am compelled to believe that there is an external source that implanted in me a capacity for judgment and decision that lies outside my basic interests, and in addition “revealed” to me / created in reality good and evil, and thereby the possibility of choice and judgment can find expression. (Because if I only had judgment free of interests, but there still were no good and bad actions, then my judgment would have no meaning.)
 
If my arguments are too tangled, I’d be happy if you could help me reduce this to a simpler argument that captures what I understood.
 
I hope I was clear.
Thank you very much.