Question

With God’s help
Hello Rabbi,
Following up on what you suggested, to open a new discussion on argument 2, but before that:
1. At the time, I asked you whether you see any necessity that the source of the good must specifically be a transcendent being and not an immanent one, and you said no; the main thing is that it not be you, and that’s all.
But since I think you agree that an ordinary person, or a king, or an alien would not cause you to see an obligation in their commands, I wanted to hear more about what the criteria are for an entity that would cause you to see its words as a binding command. After all, you do not distinguish between an entity within creation and one outside it.
2. Also, I wanted to hear your opinion, as we discussed, regarding Rabbi Moshe Ratt’s approach. I have not read the approach in his books, but as I understand it, it goes roughly like this:
The main binding element in a value is your identification with that value.
Therefore, values created by human beings are relevant only to those who identify with them, and since human beings have a basically similar psychological structure, there are many basic values with which everyone identifies.
By contrast, God is the source from which all reality flows, and therefore His will determines absolute values that apply to everyone, whether they feel identified with them or not.
And so God’s will obligates you because your own will derives from Him, so in practice, if you were free of urges, you would identify with it. And His will is also the purpose of the universe and of all created beings, and the embodiment of the good. And He is also able to punish or reward you.
That is, there is a major innovation here in understanding the concept of objective morality.
Still, I think there are a few points of evidence that could indirectly support his approach as well, even though he does not really argue this here.
A. For example, if your friend asks you to do something that seems foolish to you, you may comply even though this is not to be seen as a moral obligation. That is, it may be that another person’s desires have the power to move you toward a goal, just as we think that the categorical imperative has the ability to move you, or human drives as well.
B. Following the Euthyphro dilemma, the Rabbi explained (column 278) that God’s nature caused Him to will morality in a compatibilist sense. So we see that a will can obligate even though it is “arbitrary” in its essence.
Thank you, and sorry for the length; it is simply a major innovation.