Q&A: Proof that Jewish law is not pluralistic
Proof that Jewish law is not pluralistic
Question
Festive holidays.
The Rabbi brings proof from the Ritva in Sukkah that there is no prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” if, in my view, the thing is permitted, even if in the other person’s view it is forbidden. This shows that Jewish law is not pluralistic, because if it were, it should be forbidden since from his perspective it is forbidden. I didn’t understand why one cannot say that since in my view it is permitted, there is no issue of “do not place a stumbling block” for me, even if from his perspective Jewish law forbids it.
Answer
I didn’t understand the question. In principle you could say that, but the Ritva proves otherwise from the Talmud.
Discussion on Answer
Monistic, not humanistic. This is not from the Ritva but from simple reasoning. If according to the view of the person being caused to stumble it is forbidden (and even in my view as the one causing him to stumble, according to his approach it is forbidden), then causing him to stumble is causing him to commit a transgression, and therefore there is a prohibition involved. What is unclear about that?
Maybe I’m missing something. As I understood it, the Rabbi says that the practical difference between whether Jewish law is pluralistic or monistic is whether it is permitted to cause someone to stumble in something that, in his view, is forbidden and in my view is permitted. If Jewish law is pluralistic, it should be forbidden because in his view it is forbidden. I didn’t understand why one cannot say that even if Jewish law is pluralistic, since for me the thing is permitted, there is no prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” for me. Where do you see in the Ritva that this is not so?