Q&A: Pluralism in Jewish Law
Pluralism in Jewish Law
Question
Hello,
I listened to the episode in Talmudic Thinking where you discuss the Ritva’s comments in Tractate Sukkah.
Two questions: why does the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” not apply before someone knowledgeable, where in his view the thing is permitted, but because the other person commits a transgression in the person, meaning that he is rebelling against halakhic authority—similar to the distinction between a transgression in the person and a transgression in the object; you expanded on this in the series.
Why can’t the Ritva’s words be explained as saying that it is forbidden to place a stumbling block before the blind even though in his own view the thing is permitted, simply because if that person who stumbled later understands that according to his own view he sinned, he will be upset and suffer anguish? Why invoke halakhic autonomy? Maybe it is a law in the interpersonal realm?
Answer
And what if you know that he won’t be upset? Besides, if from the outset you draw his attention to the fact that there is a transgression here—and that is a condition for the Ritva’s leniency—that means he wants this and will not be upset afterward. He does not discover anything new later.