Q&A: On Providence, Free Choice, and Scientific Determinism (Following the Second Book in the Trilogy)
On Providence, Free Choice, and Scientific Determinism (Following the Second Book in the Trilogy)
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In chapter 11 of your book No Man Rules the Spirit, you argue against the possibility of divine intervention that does not constitute a deviation from nature, in the name of scientific determinism. In your words: “This is a conceptual mistake. At least according to what is known to us today, the laws of nature never allow several options. Given certain circumstances, the laws of nature dictate one and only one outcome, and no other.” a0
And from this, “the conclusion is that intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, by definition is always a miracle.” a0
My questions:
A. How does scientific determinism fit with free choice? Is every human choice a deviation from the laws of nature, constituting a kind of miracle? If I understood the Rabbi correctly, when a person chooses freely, deciding on the basis of judgment, he creates a new causal chain. But the human being is also a physical creature, and as such, his next physical state is dictated by his previous state — so where is the room here for his choice? a0
Any explanation that can be given for this question (and would show that human choice is not a deviation from the laws of nature) would apply all the more so to the Holy One, blessed be He. a0
B. To the best of my knowledge, this very position itself (scientific determinism) is disputed. Popper wrote an entire book about it, The Open Universe, and argues at length against this very claim (that given a state of affairs known in all its details and a system of laws, one future state is necessitated).
(Though if I remember correctly, his argument proceeds from his semi-actualist view, and I assume the Rabbi disagrees with him on that issue.) But even so, doesn’t this open another possibility for divine intervention that does not constitute a deviation from nature? Why did the Rabbi simply state that scientific determinism is, as far as we know, a fact? a0 a0
Thank you a0 a0
Answer
- Every choice is a deviation from the laws of physics, but not a deviation from the laws of nature. Our choice is part of nature. I didn’t understand the all-the-more-so regarding the Holy One, blessed be He. I did not claim that He cannot intervene, only that He chooses not to intervene. a0
- I do not deal with philosophers’ conceptions of science. In science, what determines things is the facts, and the facts currently known in physics are that the laws are deterministic, except in quantum mechanics according to certain interpretations. And I have already elaborated at length to show that quantum mechanics is of no help in explaining free will. a0
Discussion on Answer
Choice is part of nature even if not part of physics. When I speak about the “laws of nature,” it depends on the context. There are contexts in which the intention is the laws of physics, and there are contexts in which the intention is nature as a whole (including man and his will). But leave terminology aside and focus on the claims themselves.
My claim is that choice is part of nature, and therefore the fact that it violates the laws of physics is a natural fact. But divine involvement is not like that. And again, I’m not dealing with semantics. You can of course decide that divine involvement is part of nature. Health and happiness to you. The questions are factual questions:
In short, it is clear that the Holy One, blessed be He, can intervene and violate the laws of nature (the One who prohibited is the One who permitted), and that is not what I’m discussing. I am making two claims: 1. If He intervenes, this is a deviation from the laws of physics (= nature, in the context of that discussion). Claims about involvement within the framework of the laws of physics (= nature) are a categorical confusion. 2. In practice, it appears that He does not do so.
There is no divine involvement within the framework of the laws of physics. If you call that involvement within the framework of nature, then you are not distinguishing between involvement that is an open miracle and a hidden miracle. Both are within the framework of “nature,” since God is part of nature. When people raise the claim of involvement within the framework of the laws of nature, they mean that it does not contradict physics. That is simply confusion.
Thank you for the answer,
1. As stated in the quote from your book: “This is a conceptual mistake. At least according to what is known to us today, the laws of nature never allow several options. Given certain circumstances, the laws of nature dictate one and only one outcome, and no other.”
The claim in the book is that the laws of nature (not only physics) do not allow several options.
But according to your answer to my question: in every human choice, what gets broken is the laws of physics, not the laws of nature.
That is — the laws of nature (and not physics) do indeed allow several options from a given state. (Some 10 billion human beings, who really “choose” from time to time.)
As for the all-the-more-so — I’m trying to understand why intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, is defined as a miracle (a deviation from the laws of nature), while human “intervention” is not. Why not say that just as nature allows man to choose, so too it allows the Holy One, blessed be He.
2. The conclusion the Rabbi is trying to establish from the argument is not scientific, but theological/philosophical, and concerns providence. As I understand it, it is derived from a philosophical assumption about the nature of scientific laws, and not from the laws themselves. Therefore, the fact that there are other conceptions regarding scientific determinism seems relevant here. If indeed the laws of science do not force a deterministic conception of material reality (as Popper says, for example), then we have no need for miracles.
Thank you