Q&A: Between Formal and Substantive Authority
Between Formal and Substantive Authority
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
From what I understand, you hold that the Sages of the Talmud (the Talmud, etc.) have only formal authority, and only with respect to Jewish law itself. In contrast, in matters of thought and outlook they have no authority at all (if the concept of authority even applies in that realm), substantive or otherwise, and one may hear what they say and either accept it or not accept it.
But it seems impossible to deny that there are halakhot that are based on a certain outlook.
Take the resurrection of the dead, for example. Suppose a person has thought it through and come to the conclusion that there cannot be a resurrection of the dead, no matter what. And because the Sages have no substantive authority over what he thinks is true or false, he continues to deny the resurrection of the dead, while accepting all the other principles of Judaism in full—what is he supposed to do when he gets to the Amidah and the words, “and You are faithful to revive the dead”? After all, because of formal authority he is obligated: 1. to pray three times a day. 2. to use this specific text. 3. to intend the meaning of the words (for otherwise he has not fulfilled his obligation).
So what can such a person do? He cannot change the Jewish law (because of the formal authority). But the fact is that he is convinced that there cannot be a resurrection of the dead.
What courses of action do you see here? I see two: 1. Either he changes the text / says it without intention, etc., because he accepts the Sages only where they do not contradict his outlook. 2. He accepts the Jewish law upon himself, says the prayer as written, but is humble enough to understand that he does not know everything, even when he feels sufficiently convinced.
I’d be glad to hear your response (of course, resurrection of the dead and the Amidah are just examples; it’s not critical if I wasn’t precise about them).
Answer
A Jewish law that is based on an incorrect factual assumption is void. If you do not believe something, you cannot pray it. Even if you utter the words, you have done nothing, because you did not think what you were saying. Of course, you need to examine two things: 1. Is this Jewish law really based on the factual assumption in question? 2. Are you truly convinced that this assumption is false?
As for the resurrection of the dead: if you are convinced that it will not happen (I do not know how one could become convinced of that), then do not say it. That is exactly what the Talmud describes in Yoma 69b. True, you will not be fulfilling the enacted text of the prayer, but you cannot fulfill it.
Discussion on Answer
1. Yes. I wrote that.
2. That’s the situation.
Great question. I have a follow-up: Does the Rabbi say the requests in the Amidah? After all, the Rabbi does not think there is providence. Thank you!
I’ve answered this countless times. If I were certain there is no involvement whatsoever, I would not say them. That is not the case.
Wow, in my opinion this is a wonderful question!
From the Rabbi’s answer it seems we learn that the Sages had formal authority by default over anything we have no way of checking and knowing—such as the Creator’s involvement in the world and future matters like the resurrection of the dead, the Messiah, Heaven and Hell, the survival of the soul, and the rest of the things for which we found no source prior to the Sages.
And it follows that as long as we cannot prove the negation and are not sure that this is not the case, we are obligated to believe all these things, to pray according to their enactment, etc.
That takes some digesting.
At first thought, in my opinion this only leads to the conclusion that their formal authority is not absolute, and consequently their authority is weak.
This wonderful question has been discussed here more than once. And it is not true that they had authority over factual claims, because there is no authority in such matters. Even conceptually that cannot exist. I am not obligated to believe anything, but if I have no proof I will not change a Jewish law that was established authoritatively.
So in other words, the commandment / Jewish law to believe can also stem from their authority, and since there is no way to prove the negation, I am obligated to believe because that is how it was ruled in Jewish law?
That sounds pretty paradoxical.
I really can’t understand what is unclear here. Obviously there cannot be a commandment to believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, nor any commandment to believe something. If I do not believe, then I do not believe, and no command will help. In prayer I can intend it on the possibility that there is involvement, as long as in my view that remains possible.
Unlike belief in God, which as the Rabbi always says is a factual claim, beliefs such as the Messiah, the resurrection of the dead, and the survival of the soul cannot be proven. Even so, they are included as part of the principles of faith. That is what I meant.
As for what the Rabbi wrote about prayer, isn’t that a bit like Pascal’s wager?
No connection whatsoever to proof. It is impossible to command facts.
It is somewhat similar to Pascal’s wager. So what?
True, there is no command regarding facts, but these are still principles of faith (according to Maimonides and others). At the end of his list of principles, Maimonides writes that one who does not believe all of these is a heretic, and it is a commandment to hate him. In other words, there is a commandment for Reuven to hate Shimon, who does not believe in the coming of the Messiah, even though Shimon has no obligation at all to believe it. Belief—or more precisely, the lack of belief—in something that cannot be commanded is enough to generate other commandments.
And regarding the wager in prayer, that is seemingly different from wagering on fulfilling a commandment. If I fulfill a commandment out of doubt (say, taking the lulav or putting on tefillin) because I am willing to wager on the benefit, that makes sense, because the commandment was fulfilled. But prayer out of doubt is flawed—what value does it have? Isn’t it like a voice crying out in the wilderness?
I’m done with this. Everything has been explained.
Thank you very much for the answer. Two follow-up questions:
1. Would you define that person as coerced?
2. Would you actually instruct a person to act this way in practice? After all, people can change their minds at any moment and become convinced one way and then the other… So one day he’ll pray the Amidah (or keep some other Jewish law) and one day he won’t? How can a person function like that?