Q&A: Does God Change
Does God Change
Question
Hello Rabbi,
What is wrong with the following argument, which denies the possibility of change in God:
“Perfection is identified with staticity; only rest is divine.
Every movement and every change testify to a lack. The driving force behind any change is always something moving from potentiality to actuality.
When a kitten grows and becomes an adult cat, that happens because it is a cat that has not yet grown.
When a cypress seed changes,
grows, and becomes a cypress tree, that happens because it is not yet a mature and complete tree.
Change testifies to the realization of potential,
and therefore to some deficiency. A changing God is a deficient God, and therefore a changing God is not God.”
Answer
The first flaw is the logical gap between the two examples you brought (a seed and a baby) and the sweeping conclusion that every change testifies to deficiency. Not at all. For example, if you look at the entire timeline together, then the whole function is the state of the Holy One, blessed be He: at first there is no world, and in the end there is. At first there was state X, and now there is state Y. And the perfection is precisely that it should be this way at first and then that way afterward. This flaw is already present in your first premise: that perfection is static.
The second flaw is in the assumption (hidden and implicit, which you did not even bother to put on the table) that God must be perfect. He does not have to be. The perfection of being perfected cannot be found in Him. See column 170 and also 187 and others on this.
Discussion on Answer
What is the question? Is there a question here?
As for the argument, 1 is an incorrect definition. 2 is not an axiom but a conceptual consequence. Conclusion 3 is incorrect.
What is incorrect about definition 1?
What is correct? A contingent being is an entity such that it is possible for it not to exist. What does that have to do with changes?
I am arguing on the basis of the principle of causality. I formulate it like this:
For anything that can be in different states (in my definition I call this contingent, even though we disagree about the definition), there is a cause that makes it actually be in a certain state.
The first cause has no cause, and therefore can be in one and only one state, necessary existence.
If it could be in different states, then by the principle of causality it would have a cause, and that contradicts its being the first cause.
I assume that we also disagree about the principle of causality itself, and that is the reason for the disagreement.
Not true. If there is something that does not need a cause, then a change in its state could also occur without a cause.
Beyond that, the fact that the first cause has no cause does not mean that there cannot be causes that bring about changes in it.
This hair-splitting is not leading anywhere. I’ll stop here.
A question about a different argument:
1. Definition: a contingent being is something that can be in state A or state B (or C, etc.). That is, one can conceive of a possible world in which the being is in state A or in state B.
2. Axiom: if an entity changes over time from state A to B, then there is a possible world in which the entity is in state A and a possible world in which the entity is in state B.
3. Conclusion from 1+2: if an entity changes, it is contingent.
4. Definition: a necessary being is not a contingent being.
5. Conclusion from 3+4: a necessary being does not change over time.
6. Axiom: God is a necessary being.
7. Conclusion: God does not change over time