Question

I saw three questions about free will that ostensibly show that a person's behavior and supposedly moral decisions are ultimately a necessary result of the genes and DNA structure with which he was born, and that he has no ability at all to change them. Free will is nothing but an illusion, as is accepted today by the overwhelming majority of scientists and philosophers.
I would be glad for an answer to them.
A. How does free will fit with evolution, which is accepted today throughout the scientific world? Evolution can explain the development of intelligent man as a function of the physical growth of the brain. It has been found that the brains of mammals are relatively larger than those of other vertebrates, and the brains of apes are relatively larger than those of the rest of the mammals. The development of man himself as well, according to the fossil record, from Australopithecus through Homo erectus to Homo sapiens, is explained, and even defined, by a continual growth in brain size. The difference between man and animal, ultimately, is not qualitative but quantitative. Free will, by contrast, is not a matter of development. Will, by definition, is either free or unfree, with no intermediate stages. If man developed from an ancient ape, where did free will suddenly come from? It is also hard to see what evolutionary advantage free will provides, such that it would be worthwhile to develop in that direction.
And the more central point is, as stated, that free will, according to its traditional philosophical and theological definition, is not something that can develop at all. There are no transitional stages between the two binary states of necessity versus freedom.
B. Many philosophers rejected belief in free will on the basis of purely conceptual analysis, long before the rise of evolution. The theory of free will contradicts one of the fundamental laws underlying both our everyday behavior and our intellectual activity alike—the belief that everything has a cause, known as the law of causality. Of the masses who believe in free will, few understand the meaning of this freedom's exception to the law of causality, and the paradox and absurdity involved in it. The argument, known in the general literature from Buridan's ass, was formulated in our literature by Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (Or Hashem, 2, 5, 2): If one were to imagine two people in one identical state, with one identical temperament, one identical disposition, and one identical relation to some matter, with no difference whatsoever—it cannot be that one would choose its existence and the other its absence; rather, it would necessarily follow that one would choose and desire what the other chose and desired. For if they differed in choice and desire, then since the difference is something newly arisen, it would require something to bring it about; and what is the cause of that new occurrence—would that I knew, given that they are in agreement in temperament, birth, and disposition from every side?
In other words: according to believers in free will, Hitler could have been the pope, and yet he was Hitler. So why was he Hitler and not the pope? Just because! Why? Just because! Superficial people may answer: "Not just because, but because he chose to be Hitler and not to be the pope; and Hitler himself is the cause of his becoming Hitler and not the pope." But this is an empty answer. An answer to the question "why" has meaning only if one understands from it that necessarily it had to be this way and not otherwise. If the answer does not provide that necessity, we have gained nothing, because the fundamental question "why" still stands, and has only been pushed one step backward. If I ask, Why is it wet here? and they answer me, Because water was spilled here, they have basically answered me nothing, if what really interests me is the cause of the wetness. After all, I can continue to ask: And why was water spilled here? Had water not been spilled here, it would not be wet here! Similarly, if I want to know why Hitler was Hitler and not the pope, I will receive no answer if they tell me: Hitler was Hitler and not the pope because, by the free choice with which God endowed him, he chose to be Hitler and not the pope. But since in the same way he really could have chosen to be the pope and not Hitler, the original question remains exactly where it was, just as it was first presented: after all, why was it that Hitler (chose to be) Hitler and not the pope?
C. How is it possible that no serious philosopher (except you) believes in free will today.