Q&A: The Limited Grasp of the One Trying to Understand
The Limited Grasp of the One Trying to Understand
Question
Suppose you and I are arguing. At some point you present a counterargument in favor of your position, but I can't manage to understand it (too deep / too long / too stupid / too short, etc. — it doesn't really matter why). What should I do if I want to be intellectually honest? Give up my position / remain undecided because maybe I would agree with your argument if I understood it? Or should I dig in and keep my position because, at the end of the day, I wasn't persuaded (due to lack of understanding)?
Answer
There is no general answer. It depends on your impression and on how concerned you are that you may have missed something.
Along these lines, I commented on the attitude toward paradoxes in columns 601–603 and in column 654.
Discussion on Answer
But there, in my opinion, it's because there is value in autonomous halakhic ruling, even if it isn't the truth. I've explained this at length in the past.
What's the practical difference between them?
Precisely in matters of Heaven I should rule according to my own view even if it's mistaken, but in worldly matters I need to give more weight to the concern that maybe I missed something and strive more for the truth?
Who is the priest's daughter and who is the innkeeper?
Just to clarify, I didn't mean "should" in the sense of some obligation. I can't think of another word right now, unfortunately.
It has nothing to do with the priest's daughter and the innkeeper. This isn't a question of stringency versus leniency. In the area of Jewish law, one does not seek the objective truth, but rather the truth as it appears in my own judgment. In other areas, the goal is to reach the truth. So for example, if there is someone who is knowledgeable in physics and it's clear to me that he is wiser than I am, then even if I think differently from him I would "rule" like him, because the truth is presumably with him. But in Jewish law I do not rule like Rabbi Meir even though the truth is with him, because in Jewish law there is value in acting autonomously even when that is not the truth.
Rabbi, with all due respect, if as you say we seek the truth according to my own opinion, then why was Rabban Gamliel harassing Rabbi Yehoshua when he disagreed with him, and demanding that he come to him on his own Yom Kippur, along with all the rest of the harassment? Didn't he know that there is value in autonomous halakhic ruling? And why did Rabbi Yehoshua agree to violate Yom Kippur rather than insist on his own view? Would you have agreed?
If you say that Rabban Gamliel was different because he was the head of the Sanhedrin and all the sages were bound by his authority, then why did the sages depose him from the presidency because of the coercion he used against Rabbi Yehoshua?
There we are dealing with the Sanhedrin, which has formal authority. Second, the calendar is under the mandatory authority of the head of the Sanhedrin and is not entrusted to each individual. You're even being deliberately provocative…
Why did they depose him? Because he used his authority far too wildly, and not only in this case.
Besides, your comment contains an internal contradiction. You bring proof from Rabban Gamliel that apparently truth is what determines things, but immediately afterward you wonder why they deposed him, and bring from that a proof in the opposite direction. They deposed him precisely because he followed the truth and paid no heed to autonomy.
This may be related to what is written in the Talmud, that Jewish law was not ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir because they could not get to the bottom of his reasoning. There, even though they were sure they didn't understand him, they weren't afraid to dig in and stick to their own position.