I think I understood. The difference is that the position that there is a creator for my complex system is an intuition that comes from thought, whereas the position that evolution created my complex system does not come only from thought but from observation and cognition.

But theoretically there could be a person who tells you that he looks at his reliable cognition, and the thought immediately occurs to him that “apparently there was an evolutionary process that gave me cognitive faculties suited to reality so that I would survive” (this is a hypothetical person, because as you said, apparently no one would think this way intuitively). In such a case, it seems the objection against this cannot be that it is circular. Because like belief in God, this is a simple intuition derived from the belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties. Do you agree?

Moshe, as an outside observer it really does seem completely symmetrical to me whether it’s evolution or something else, the main thing being to posit some kind of factor.
But the factor itself is transparent as far as the conclusion of the proof is concerned—what it is.
The idea is that you need a factor outside the human-world system in order to trust cognition between them.
Rabbi Michi didn’t write in this answer what I wrote, but I think that’s what he believes

Compared to all the things he wrote, those are only strengthening arguments. And some of them are connected to his belief in cognitive thinking, whereas belief in God makes a substantial part of his proofs for that unnecessary.

And also, another question that came to me—you said in the lecture series that in this proof you are not proving that God exists, but rather that the person standing before you believes that God exists. But is that really a substantive difference? After all, in ordinary arguments too, and not only in revealing arguments, the premises of the argument are things the person believes. For example, I believe that there is a cause for everything, and I believe that something exists, and therefore I believe that there is a God (the cosmological argument). My question is: why is it important in revealing arguments to say that we proved that the person believes in God, and not simply that we proved that God exists? I don’t see a difference between this kind of revealing argument and a regular argument.

There could also be a person who thinks completely differently from me. I think he is mistaken, but that is what he thinks.

The difference is very substantive, and I explained it there. If a person tells me that in his view it is reasonable that a complex world arose spontaneously, that would refute the “philosophical” formulation but not the “theological” one.

Yes, that is clear to me. My question is aimed at the emphasis that in the epistemological proof you did not prove the existence of God, but only that the person believes in the existence of God. But I don’t really understand this distinction—after all, every argument proves to a person that he believes in the existence of God, and does not prove God’s existence itself. That is, if the person believes the premises, then he must believe the conclusion. That is so in the proof from epistemology, and so too in the cosmological and physico-theological arguments, no? In other words, if I proved to someone that he believes in the existence of something, then I proved the existence of that thing in accordance with the specific premises assumed by the argument.

Indeed. That is my claim: a valid argument always assumes what it seeks to prove. And still, there are two types of arguments. After all, there is no way to prove anything about the world itself. Every proof only shows you that you believe the thing. So too in geometry.