For the sake of completeness, I’ll copy what the Rabbi wrote in the column “Representation and Non-Verbal Thought”: 1. Conceptual Representation (column 379):
As an illustration, one can examine the mistake made by many interpreters of Kant, who explain his doctrine as if he were pointing to a limitation of us and our capacities. They claim that according to Kant we have no possibility of grasping the thing-in-itself (the noumenon), but only its appearances to our eyes (the phenomenon), and this is because we are limited. But that is a mistake. Perception, by definition, is the insertion of the perceived thing into the categories of the perceiver. Therefore perception always takes place through representation. This is not a limitation; it follows from the very essence of perception as such.

For example, there is no point in asking what the real color of the table before me is. Some claim that I see it as brown only because of the constraints of my cognition (our brain distinguishes among seven colors because of the structure of its receptors, which translate electromagnetic waves of different wavelengths into different colors). So what is its real color? This is a question based on misunderstanding. The table has no real color. Color is the phenomenon that is created in our consciousness when an electromagnetic wave strikes the retina of our eye. Without an eye and without a mechanism of visual processing, there are no colors, and therefore the table in itself has no color. Color exists only in the perceiving consciousness.

Another example is that well-known question about a tree falling in the forest: if there is no person there listening, does it make a sound? People dismiss this question and tend to see it as some skeptical business (as if what we see does not exist when we are not looking at it). But that is a mistake. Clearly, the falling tree does not make a sound unless there is an eardrum there for the acoustic waves it produces to strike. Sound does not exist in the world. In the world there are acoustic waves, and when they strike the eardrum they create within our consciousness what we call “sound” (just like in the example of color). Therefore the answer is that when a tree falls in the forest, it does not make a sound; it only creates an acoustic wave. There is nothing skeptical here, nor is it a controversial philosophical hypothesis. It is a simple fact.

And so it is with all our other perceptions. Our perceptions are always described within a system of concepts and through the structure of our consciousness. Through color we perceive the crystalline structure of the table, which is something that exists in the world itself. But every description of that structure will always be given in the terms of our consciousness, and it has no meaning in the world itself. Color and sound are the garments or representations of the phenomena in the world itself.[1] This is exactly what the author of the Tanya claims at the end of his remarks: one who embraces the king through his garments is as though he embraces the king himself.

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You simply explained here what I had asked, so I copied it here.