Q&A: Psychophilosophy Studies
Psychophilosophy Studies
Question
Hello Rabbi, first I wanted to ask a pragmatic question: what kind of research in psychology do you think could advance inquiry in philosophy?
Rabbi Michael Abraham in effect proposes, in his philosophical approach, an additional kind of “unconscious.”
Unlike the familiar drive-based unconscious in psychoanalysis, there is the intuitive unconscious that the Rabbi proposes. This unconscious can be uncovered by analyzing our intuitive basic assumptions and connecting intuitive assumptions that lead to a conclusion.
In fact, philosophical discourse reveals this.
This element that the Rabbi explains actually reveals our real unconscious.
Now, it seems to me that on the psychological side, one should examine whether a person who uncovers this really believes what he is assuming unconsciously, even when we show it to him.
For example, a person who declares that he is an atheist but believes in the principle of causality, in the idea of design, morality, and so on—if we show him that this indicates belief in God, will he accept that he believes in God unconsciously?
Would research like that, in the Rabbi’s opinion, be able to advance the philosophical discussion on this issue, or does it actually belong on a different plane?
Answer
I draw a sharp distinction between the fields. In my opinion there is no connection whatsoever between psychology and philosophy, and the study you are proposing here is philosophical, not psychological. If the person does not accept the conclusions that emerge from his own statements, then he needs to explain which assumption is unacceptable to him or point out an error in the argument. Either way, this is a philosophical discussion. It has nothing to do with psychology.
Discussion on Answer
In my opinion it has nothing to do with psychology. They suspect that there is something flawed in the argument without being able to put their finger on exactly what. That is how it is with paradoxes, and that is also how it is with good pilpul-style arguments. It is an intuition that their logic is not sharp enough to support.
In a case where this is a phenomenon from the field of psychology (repression, etc.—it can happen), again, there is no philosophical interest in it.
I don’t think this is necessarily psychology in the psychoanalytic sense, such as defense mechanisms and the like.
Rather, it is a problem from the cognitive domain; as you said, the logical tool is weak or defective. By the way, it’s interesting why and how the disciplinary separation was created between the tools of emotion and the tools of logic… isn’t logic also part of the components of the mind just like emotion?
What does the Rabbi think of Henri Bergson’s method?
Thank you.
And if he says, “I accept the assumptions, I accept the process,” but still doesn’t accept the conclusion?
It’s obvious to us that this is absurd, but the phenomenon is familiar… many people ultimately say, “Yes, but it still didn’t show me… I don’t believe.”
They maintain a view that is not consistent with the line of reasoning they themselves followed.
I saw a similar phenomenon with the issue of providence: you explain that it cannot be that both man chose and God chose, they understand, agree, and even so they still say that they hold that view.
Sometimes, to save themselves, they’ll say, “There are things that can’t be understood,” etc.
In my opinion this already spills over into the realm of psychology: they hold a position even though it does not fit the logical inference that they themselves made.
Maybe faith in this sense really is a view that does not align with logical inferences; people simply believe what they believe.